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introduction 
list of periodicals 
IMTRODUCTICtti 
The Indian political soene has seen a sea change 
since the death of Mrs, Gandhi. The basic aim ofthis 
study is to bring together at one place the documents 
and periodical articles published in Indian and foreign 
journals on the Subject. Since the topic is so vast, 
I have tried to include all the relevent s\ibtopics and 
in each a few representative articles have been docu-
mented. Since the study deals with current problem, 
I had to decide a cut off date, which I have chosen 
to be July 2o, 1987, in consultation with noy supervisor. 
Keeping in view the topicality of the study, 
instead of plain annotations, informative abstracts 
have been prepared for the articles. 
METHODOLQgy 
The primary sources were consulted in the follow-
ing libraries: 
(i) Maulana Azaid Library, Aligarh Muslim University, 
Aligarh. 
(ii) Indian Cou]|cil of World Affairs Library, Sapru 
House, New Delhi. 
(iii) American Centre Library, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, 
New Delhi. 
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(iv) British Council Library, Rafi Marg, New Delhi-
(v) Delhi University Library, Maurice Nagar, Delhi. 
(vi) Nehru Museum and Library, Teen Murti, New Delhi. 
(vii) House of Soviet Culture Library, Firooz Shah 
Road, New Delhi. 
The procedure followed in preparing this bibliogra-
phy was as follows: 
1. The secondary soiirces were consulted in Maulana 
Azad Library, Aligarh to find out the location 
of the articles, these secondary sources were: 
Index India (Rajasthan University, Jaipur) 
Indian Press Index (Indian Documentation Service, 
Gurgaon) 
Articles of the Week (J.N.U. Library, New Delhi) 
Weekly List of Articles(Indian Council of World 
Affairs, N«w Delhi). 
Guide to Indian periodical Literature (Delhi 
Library Association) . 
2. The relevant bibliographj^cal details were noted 
down on 5" x 7" cards, following the ISI, stan-
dards. 
3. Then Primary sources were consulted in Maulana 
Azad Library, Aligarh, and *n ihe libraries '"" 
Delhi 'i/vuu%-h^n^^cA. rjjcy?. 
4. On completion of the abstracts, subject headings 
were assigned. Subject headings are cor^letely 
co-extensive to the extent possible, 
5. The svibject headings were arranged in an alpha-
betical sequence of various elements. 
6. In the end two separate alphabetical indexes 
were prepared viz. author index and title index 
providing reference to various entries by their 
respective numbers. 
7. No siabjftct index has been provided as bibliography 
itself/arranged aj.]^ habetically through subject head-
ings. 
The material in this bibliography has been arranged 
in the following manner: 
1. Part first is a brief introduction to bibliography, 
this has informations about the scqpe and methodo-
logy adopted in preparing this bibliography. 
2. part second is brief out lines of the subject. 
3. part third is the bibliography, the arrangement 
here is subjectwise taking the subject in an al-
phabatical manner. 
4.(a)An entry is preceeded by the subject heading in 
capitals. But the relation words are in small 
letters and underlined e.g. 
INDIA, POLITICS, PRIME MINISTER^GANDHI (Rajiv), 
Cooperation with OPPOSITION. 
(b)Serial number of the entry in a separate column. 
{c)The entcy begins with the SURNAME of the author(s) 
in capitals words as the Entry elements, followed 
by Secondary Element in parentheses. When the 
SURNAiffi i^ the author(s) is not known, the Entry 
Element is the author(s) name itself, straight 
(Editorial articles of the news papers are entered 
under their titles with first two words in coital 
words and the descriptive terra : is added in the 
end of the entry preceded by cooipnau. 
(d)Then the title of the article (The grammer "arti-
cles" in the beginning are committed). 
(e)Title of the periodical _ . 
. is under lineW. 
(f) Vol\ime nuiaber of the periodical 
(g) issue nxomber of the periodical. 
(h) Year of the publication of the periodical', parti-
cularly of concerned volxime. 
(i) Month of the publication in the abbreviation form, 
(j) pages of the periodical devoted to the articles. 
(k) Colximns in the form of Roman Smalls are given. 
(1) After all; this whole is followed by the annota-
tion. 
The inclusive notation is used to write the Indo-
Arabic numbers - page nximber from 16 to 18 continuously 
are written e.g. 16 - 8, and discontinuous number is sep-
arated by comma. A specimen entry is given below; 
5. -, -, -/ GANDHI (Indira), ASSASSINATION, AFTER-
MATH, RIOTS HINDU - SIKH INVOLVEMENT, CX>NQRESS(I) ^  
268. UNNIKRISHNAN (K P)^. Roits engineered by some 
Congress (I) leaders.^ Statesman.^ 125,^ 30lO|^ 
1984,"^  NOV,® 11;^ 7r?a^-T7^ 
Author accuses "Local Congress (I) Leaders" 
of connving with anti-social elements to unleash, 
widespread violence in the wake of Mrs. Gandhi's 
assassination and demands that the Prime Minister 
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, order a judicial inquiry into 
the recent events. What had happened in the capi-
tal was not the result of any spontaneous anger 
nor was it a Hindu-Sikh conflict. It was the 
result of "preplanned and permeditated plan of 
action unleased by some local Congress (I) leaders'' 
with the connivance of anti-social elements as the 
police administration was rendered ineffective. 
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6. In the end two alphabetical indices have been pro-
vided. There are the author index and title index, 
these cater to the two other possible entry points 
for search of literature. 
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IMTRODUCTION 
On 31st October 1984, the largest democracy of the 
World was stunned to hear the shocking news of the assas-
sination of its prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi. More alarming 
intriguing, disgusting, deplorable and revealing was the 
fact that she was gunned down by non else but lay the two 
of her trusted security guasds on whose shoulders rested 
the responsibility of her security along-with a huge 
chain of officers as per protocol and security measures' 
rules. Again this heinous crime w«s conmitted no where 
else but at the heavily guarded precincts area of her 
own official residence, that consequently poses a seri-
OTis mark of interogation on the security and safty mea-
sures arround her. Her apprehensions that she had a 
constant danger to her life proved to be true. The 
vested interest had played their game successfully. It 
was certainly not the manifestation of the two insane 
minds involved in the game, but a consequence of the 
conspiracy hatched against Mrs. Gandhi and the people 
of India Condemnation of this dastardly act his beyond 
word's e:qpressions. Even her fiercest adversaries re-
garded this act as the most dastardly and gruesome com-
mitted against hiimanity in the annals of democracy. 
Assassination of an elected head of governn»nt of a 
democratic system leads to disrespects to the electo-
rate as a whole itself. 
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Fortmnatttly for tbe Congress party Mrs, Gandhi's assas-
sination was coBSRltted when the eighth' general elections uerm 
round the corner* The incidents of Assess Tripura and speci-
ally of Punjab, when the array's entxy was ordered in the Gol-
den teisple, the Congress party was preparing to give a new 
slogan to the electorate to vindicate its electoral chances 
and gains that there was (and is) a constant threat to inte-
gri"^ of the country. The Congress party went ahead with a 
very calculated nove to p^ rove that this danger was real and 
Mrs. Gandhi's murder pJt»>vided it the ispetous to do so and 
it did and diS it successfully since its counter parts in 
tim opppsition parties, particularly the non-Leftist parties 
with the exception of Congress (j)*, could not visualise this 
problem.in its ri^t perspectiiM India's security was not 
part of their consciousness, ffenever Mrs. Gandhi referred 
to these dangers, they dismissed Imx J^ llcs as an attei^t to 
sidetrack tho attention frcMn the internal problems. Soma 
leaders of the €9f»osition parties appeared to anxious to 
white-wash US designs against India and gave no objection 
certificates to the Ignited States. Mr. 61Ju Pfttnaik and 
Mr. George Fernandes of the Janata party who visited Pakistan 
earlier in 1984, assured the Indian people that there was no 
danger from Pakistan and that Zia*ul-Haq was a man of peace-
ful intentions. This reccuMsendation was given at a time when 
Pakistan was getting ready to manufacture a nuclear h<^a> and 
demanding more and mere sophisticated military equipment from 
the United States. The Indian electorate remembered this. 
Even in Mrs. Gand&i's death, these parties did not 
try to read the iBC}eriali»t hand and allowed themselves to 
be swayed by wishful thinking jof getting the Lion's share 
in the political power of the country. In their blindness 
and oppositional politics these parties did not attach the 
slightest iaportance to Mrs. Gandhi's murder and consequently 
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lost all contact with the mood of the vast selection of 
the electorate. They looked upon the assassination as 
nothing more than an electoral inconvenience which was 
best ignored. This process of isolation was further 
accelerated by the interiainable and unprincipled wrang-
lings between these parties for electoral seats by the 
failure to present a recognisable alternative. The advan-
tage of isolating the Bhartiya Janata party, essentially 
embeded to communal tange and policies, was lost. After 
all the people now aspired for a governioent that could 
protect unity and prevent the process of destabilisation. 
These opposition parties were thinking that with the 
erosion of the Congress (l) influence during the last 
five years, electoral victories would be automatically 
theirs. They hmi. no need to work for this. The were, 
therefore, extremely charge of setting the masses in 
action. Even on the issue of undemocratic and autho-
ritarian dismissal of N.T. Rama Rao Minister in Andhra 
Pradesh they did not agree to a Bharat Bandh Call. 
Erosion of Congress's Influence on the electorate was 
beyibad doubt. In 1983, Congress party was routed 
in -Andhra Pradesh, it was defeated by the Janat party in 
Karnataka. In the by election to the Lok Sabha in 1983 it 
wrested one seat from the opposition (Sonepat in Haryana), 
lost Bett^i^ in Bihar and Bulandshahar in Uttar Pradesh. 
In December 1983 the Congress won eight out of Eleven. 
Assembly by elections but in 1984 the story was quite the 
contrary. In the by election in May 1984, out of 23 seats 
for which elections were held Congress could secure only 9 
seats. It lost its sitting seats in Damoh (MP) and Jaipur 
(Gujrat) to the BJP and Malihabad (up) to Rashtriya Sanjay 
Vichar Manch. It was defeated in Ratnagiri in Maharashtxa. in 
the 9 by elections in Gujrat the Congress lost 5 to BJP and 
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and could retain only one. In the 10 by-elections to 
the Lok Sabha since 1980 It wrested only one from the oppo-
sition. This was acconpanled by the growing Inner fights In-
side the organization and exposure of Its corruption. The 
Internal struggles and pactional squables were before 
the people. Congress Ministerles In a nuiaber of States 
had to be changed and rechanged In order to satisfy the 
factional aiabltlons and Inhibitions. Subsequently and 
consequently the organisation^ the party as such, was on 
the verge of collapse when Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated. 
One more point In this regard needs raentlon that ex-
posed the Inconsistent arguments of the opposition parties 
before the electorate as *heer political glmlcs. Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi was elevated to the post of Prime Bilnlster, being a 
bonaflde member of the paxrty as well as duly elected member 
of the XiOk Sabha. These opposition parties sensed and smelt 
this as dynastic rxxle or prelude to dynastic rule. This atti-
tude certainly leads to the disrespect to the people of his 
constltoeaey, and the part of electorate that voted Infavour 
of Congress In 1980. Mrs. Gandhi*s departure did not and 
could not mean the extinction of the Congress party from 
the majority In parliament. Congress was the majority 
party on the basis of which Mrs. Gandhi was the prime 
Minister of the country and after her death It was the 
headache or the business of that party to elect Its leader. 
It was a siiqple Internal matttsr of the party. It could 
elect anyone Its leader and the opposition was not to have 
any say In this regard nor was it feasible for the Congress 
party to elect Its leader from amongst the opposition fold. 
Rajiv Gandhi's election as a leader of majority party was 
confirmed by the Congress parliamentary Board and was later 
on ratified by Aicc also. The Inconsistent mongerflngs and 
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statements of opposition leaders led to nothing but a bad 
taste towards them In the eyes of the people. This attitu-
de 6f the exposition provided the Congress an opportunity 
to propagd::b&agalnst the opposition and reflected the dis-
gust and frustration In these parties. Erosion that was 
fast developing against the Congress party created the 
picture of disintegrating party torn by Internal dlssen-
tions and unable to ]ce«p its \mlty. But the picture changed 
drastically with the sympathy wave after the assassination 
and the wide spread concernc'^ for national unity. The fai-
lure of opposition parties to forge deeper links with the 
people.and their total disregard for national unity enab-
led the Congress to ride the w«ve and reap the harvest of 
the opposition's political folly which it reaped and re-
aped vigurously. 
A detailed analysis of the problem of national inte-
grity, unity and stability is required specially in connect-
ion with the 8th General Elections and the voting pattern of 
the electorate, it is innocous a propostion to take it for 
granted that the electorate will accept the thesis provided 
by political parties. People cannot be taken for granted as 
they also have the capacity to visualise a particular problem 
in its right perspective rather than accept whatever is pro-
pagated to them. The Indian electorate has opd^ ned in 
favour of the right perspective. Question of national inte-
grity was very much there during the general election. The 
electorate recused to be s%^ ayed and expressed in concerned 
as far as the integrity, unity and stability of the nation 
is concerned. 
Mrs. Gandhi was the fifth victim of the iBpleriallst 
designs in this sub-continent. The first victim was Aung 
San,the leader of the liberation movement in Burma. The 
second was Paldstan's first Prime Minister Nawabzada Liequt 
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All Khan, third was Soloman Bandranalke,Prime Minister o£ 
Sri Lanka* the fourth was Bangaladesh President Mujibur 
Rahman. Mrs. Gandhi was the fifth. It was beyond doubt 
that the threads of Mrs, Gandhi's assassination extended 
beyond India's borders. The sinister designs of inperia-
listic and divisive forces, the opposition parties conve-. 
niently or ignorantly chose of ignore and recognise while 
going to the electorate for a fresh mandate. The electo-
rate which was not ignorant and wq[s seeing a constant 
threat to the country's unity and felt bothered by this 
and was ready tc^act in order to combat these evil designs 
of the forces that be. This led to a direct confrontation 
between these parties and the electorate as far as this 
grevious most problem of the country was concerned. The 
obvious result was to follow and followed it did. This 
attitude of these parties was not taken by the people as 
an attitude of ignorance but as a matter of convenience 
upon their part for immediate political gains that the 
electorate was naturally in no mood to con^ly with. 
What was the outcome of the elections ? The Congress 
party was able to muster ui^recedented number of seats in 
Lok Sabha. It contested 498 seats in all and was triun|>h-
ant in 403 seats the largest niomber won since independence. 
The following table reveals all party position in the 8th 
Lok Sabha along with the number of seats contested* num-
ber of seats won* winning percentage and the percentage of 
the votes polled. 
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NO. Of 
seats 
contested 
No. o£ Winning percen- Percentage 
seats tage of seats of YOtmB 
von contested rausf red^  
Name of Party 
Congress (I) 498 
Telugu Desam 34 
CPI (M) 59 
AIAOMK 12 
Janata 207 
CPI 61 
Dalit Mazdoor igg 
Kisan Party 
BJP 226 
Congress (S) 32 
DJHK 26 
National . 
Conference 
403 
30 
22 
12 
10 
6 
3 
2 
4 
2 
80.92 
88.23 
37.28 
100.00 
4.83 
9.83 
1.78 
0.88 
12.50 
7.69 
75.00 
49.31 
4.11 
5.96 
1.56 
7.12 
2.64 
6.00 
7.68 
2.29 
The table shows that the Congress sole slogan of the 
problem of the preservation of the unity of the country wor-
ked successfully and the electorate gave ui^recedented ver-
dict in its favour. At the sarae time the people of Aodhra 
Pradesh registered a scathing critisra of the Congress poli-
tical drac^ staged during the month of August 1984 in the 
ouster of the democratically elected government of N.T. Rama 
Rao. It shows that the people cannot be taken for granted 
to remain immune forever about the political happenings 
around them. The most scathing jolt was bestowed x;^ on the 
BJP throughout the country as it was reduced to a dismal 
blank. Out of 226 seats (next only to Congress) it contes-
ted it could manage to win only '2. Thus registering a poor 
percentage of 0.88. Next was the DMKP capturing three seats 
out of 168 it contested with an overall percentage of 1.78. 
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Janata contested 207 seats, captured iO having a percentage 
of 4.83, In coi^arlson to the performance of these non-ljeft 
parties, the Leftist parties performed exceedingly well though 
with a reduced nuinber of seats In the Lok Sabha and It was 
despite the fact that the ruling party at the centre bestowed 
step-motherly treatment to their governments in the states of 
West Bengal and Tripura, CPM contested only 59 seats through-
out the country and won 22 while CPI contested 61 seats and 
won only 6 registering percentages of 37,28 and 9.83 res-
pectively . 
In a nutshell, it can be concluded that the Ck^ ngress 
slogan of the problem of preservance of the unity and integ-
rity of the country worked successfully and it was fully 
augmented by the sympathy wave in its favour due to the 
assassination of its top most leader and Prime Minister 
Mrs. Gandhi. 
This was a very bKlef analysis and account of the 
political situation of the country on the eve of 8th Gene-
ral Elections and the electoral results that followed. 
Now a brief survey and analysis of some post elect-
ion developments and their perspectives will not be out of 
context here soon after the triumphant victory of the Cong-
ress party in the elections, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi formed his 
ministry and the assured the people of India that he would 
provide a clean administration to the country. It was a 
conscientious declaration and assurance to the people un-
doxibtedly. On 5th January 1985, in a national telecast he 
outlined the policies of the government to be undezrtaken. 
The vital points that were mentioned emerged as : 
that his government would give top priority to 
the Punjab problem ... the members of Sikh conrau-
nlty may rest assured that their life and property 
would be protected In evei:y part of India, 
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that his first duty would be to safeguard the life 
property and legitimate rights of the citizens be-
longing to every faith. 
that all patriotic forces raust repudiate those 
who preach seperation and practice violence. There 
cannot and will not be any concession to seperatist 
ideologies and the cult of violence. 
that India's unity is paraiaount everything else 
comes after that. The caispaign for unity must be 
taken to every village and every street corner. 
that an ideological battle must be waged against 
the coraminal fanatics in schools and Universities 
in work places and in the media. 
that the war against our old enemies - poverty, 
unemployment, disease and ignorance - must continue. 
Now coming to the follow up actions proposed to have 
been taken up by the government in the respective spheres. 
The formation of a cabinet committee consisting of Mr. S.B. 
Chavan, Mr. p.v, Narsimha Rao and Mr. K.C. Pant, Minister 
of Home, Defence and Education respectively to study the 
various aspects of the Punjab problem and to look at the 
alternatives for a peaceful settlement within a specified 
time frame was announced. The convnittee initiated but half 
heartedly. The problem had to be looked into in its right 
perspective and for this open-mindedness upon the parts 
of the parties was an essential requirement. The Akalis 
had to be assured for a better treatment during the delibe-
rations and their leaders be released in order to partici-
pate in the dellbrations. All the Akalis can not be and 
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should not be taken to have extraneous relations with the 
protagonists of the Khalistan. The extreraist elements, whos-
ever that be, however, must be dealt with severly, undoub-
tedly. 
Again Mr, Gandhi has repeatedly announced that he 
would not tolerate any type of corruption in the public 
and civil life that is prevalent in the country's frame 
work in an aghast form, a recognised and widely accepted 
phenomenon, undoubtedly. 17th - I8th January '85 incidents 
stand a witness to this. To the utter dismay and disgust 
of people, the national dailies blasted the news of a 
grivious espionage scattered through out the important 
government departments that are responsible for the safety 
of the country and economic development of the people. The 
Hindustan Times (January 18, 1986) said "Top officials 
among seven held for espionage". It further said, "A major 
espionage ring has been smashed with the arrest of seven 
people, including five Government officials, in sensitive 
positions. The top functionaries included some from the 
Defence Minister, one each from the cabinet and prime 
Minister's Secretariat. Among those held are a personal 
assistant to the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, 
Mr. P.c, Alexander and another attached to the Defence 
Secretary ... •• in the best traditions of service 
Mr. Alexander tendered his resignation which was accepted. 
Mr. Gandhi's assurances to the people of India can 
be briefly categorised in three or four sections for the 
convenience of study and analysis for an onlooker. Integ-
rity of the country is to be preserved as a top priority, 
poverty of people be eradicated. Public Sector's working 
to be studied in the context of their produces and adopt-
ion of modern technological devices, particularly, the 
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coo^uter system, in order to cope with the problems o£ 
development. None of these proposals can be contested 
on the ground of logic. 
people of India have voted Mr, Rajiv Gandhi and his 
party to political power with an ui^recedented majority. 
They have believed his assertions and straight forwardness. 
Punjab problem had to be resolved politically for which 
positive attitude from both of the parties were e:;q>ected. 
The Akalls could not be doubted as the vllllan of the piece 
as was being tried to be shown by various vested Interests 
and circles. Extremism Is to be shunned and must be foight 
against vigorously. The opposition should play a responsi-
ble constructive and positive role In the solution of the 
problem that has posed serious threats to Integrity and 
unity of the nation. 
Corri^tion prevalent in the administration both at 
centre and state levels along with the political corrupt-
ion must be eradicated. Roots of Corruption are to be 
Identified at every level and warfootlng measures be 
adopted for the purpose. 
Coiraounalism and the caste factor continue to be the 
In-glorlQus ingredients and detriments of the Indian polity. 
Though, officially India has been deiSlared to be a secular 
polity, but in practice caste and communal infestations have 
not been overcome because of lack of zeal and convictions as 
the custodlanai of the secular values preach the communal and 
caste values in order to realise their selfish interests and 
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grind their own axes to remain at the helm of political 
power. 
Secularism in India means not indifference to« or 
exclusion or rejection of religion, rather it means accep-
tance of religion, freedom to all religions and religious 
institutions to preach their faiths which our secularism 
pretends, but it does not persue. It pretends despite 
the fact that it has been xinable to prevent different 
religious communities to accuse each other as inferior 
and ic^ious of infidel and heretic and to spread mutual 
Jealosies, exclusiveness and enemity which eventually leads 
to cutting each others throats during communal violence. 
For this our secularism, freedom to all religions and the 
religion itself besides our being religioxis is also res-
ponsible • 
There is no denying the fact that communal violence 
takes place when it is provoked by some vested interests, 
since the religious beliefs are not merely beliefs Imt are 
blind beliefs, and faiths in assxiaption, imagination and 
fantasies contain elements of emotionalism, fanaticism 
and sentiraentatlism. This provides further grounds to 
the vested interests to play up sentiments and emotions 
of one caamunity against the other. So, seeds of division 
are not sown by forces outside the society, instead they 
always exist in the society. What the vested interests 
do is, they nurture these seeds to grow them into poiso-
nous plants to reap violence and transform the apparently 
harmonious society into an openly rancorous and divided 
society. So until and unless, the people themselves do 
not get detached from their faiths and trust in fanati-
cies, assun^jtions and presunptions, and give way to reason 
and rational thinking, they would continue to provide fair 
20 
field for any adventiirer or schemer to coroe and play the 
game of divide and rule. 
The minorities have their own anxieties about the 
very question of their subsistance and the majorities be-
cause of their long heritage, consider themselves to be 
the natural inheritor of the political power. Under the 
circumstances, conraunal tensions are bound to be created 
only by the vested Interests or their stooges in order to 
grind their own axes to self agrandizement, for which they 
easily get the opportunity because of the unbalanced ntimber 
of the people belonging to various communities and religions 
that infest in number very much. There are major religious 
coarounities in Ihdia. The Hindus 82 %, the Muslims 12 %, 
the Christians 2.6 %, the Sikhs 2 %, the Budhist 0.7 %, the 
jains 0.5 %, and the Zoroastrians or Parsis. Again they are 
bifurcated in different sub-categories that again provide 
opportunities to the political opportunist to resort to 
communal resource so that, they are in a position to befool 
the fellow bretheren of their own respective communities. 
There is no dearth of su^h examples where the people at 
the lowest ebb of the different communities and religious, 
fall victim to these sinister political designs and even 
give their lives in the process for no fault of theirs 
and no political ambitions for themselves. It happens 
and is made to happen through instigations and gimmics of 
the vested interests. 
The first casualty of the landslide victory of the 
Congress (I) in 1984 General election was the Janata Govern-
ment in Karnataka. The Chief Minister of State Mr. Rama 
Krishna Hegde who had run for two years a Government with 
a fragile majority skillfully warding off sustained attacks 
by the Congress (I) to topple him by engineering defections 
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in his ranks decided to siil;»alt the resignation of his 
government when he caiae to know that the Congress (I) had 
won 24 out of 28 I*ok Sabha seats in Karnataka. The morning 
after the election results were declared Mr, Hegde called 
a cabinet meeting to find out what is colleagues felt. 
The cabinet unanimously passed a resolution recommending 
the dissolution of the state Assembly and holding of fresh 
elections. The letter of resignation from Mr, Hegde was 
delivered to the Karnataka Governor Ashok Nath Banerjee 
when he was prisiding over the convocation ceremo«y of 
the Dharwar University, Actually Janata had not done too 
badly in Lok Sabha. The Congress (I) had won on reduced 
margin in most of the constituency and tnis had boosted 
the Janata morale. As Mr, Poojari Congress (i)leader of 
the state and Union Minister admitted, "Hegde is a shrewd 
and clever man. He is hoping to get popular syn^pathy". 
Mr, Hegde said "if the Assembly elections are held I will 
get two thirds majority. In the neighbouring Andhra Pra-
desh N.T. Rama Rao's Telugu Desam party gave the Congress 
(I) a drxibbing by capturing 28 out of 32 Lok Sabha seats 
it contested thus making it the largest opposition party 
in the 8th Lok Sabha.. Actually bya^emarkable seat adjust-
ment the elections became virtually a straight fight bet-
ween Congress (i) and Telugu Desam or one of its electoral 
allies. The Congress (I) began, with high expectations of 
repeating its stupendous performance of 1977 and 1980 of 
winning 41 out of 42 seats in the parliament, the result 
was quite the contrary. Similarly in Jammu and Kashmir 
the Congress (I) lost to National Conference Parooq Abdullah 
groiap in the valley. This and the result in Andhra Pradesh 
carried the crucial message for the Congress (I) that it 
does not pay to temple the state Governments through dub-
ious means. That is exactly what the Congress (I) goverment 
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at the centre had done by supporting the defectors both 
in Andhra Pradesh and in Jammu & Kashmir. 
1984 end also saw India's latest espionage case. Ever 
since his dramatic arrest i^as the spider at the centre of 
the spy web Coomar Narain had been singing like the prover-
bial canary. As a result the number of arrests had risen 
to 16 and two more Delhi based diplomates from the polish 
and East German Embassies were given their expulsion orders. 
Emboldened by his success in the 1984 hols. Sabha elec-
tions Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi decided to go in for As-
sembly elections in 11 states and one union territory in 
March 1985. The Congress (i) parliamentary Board finalised 
the list of its candidates for 2534 Assembly seats by the 
middle of Feb 1985 in which it axed almost 40 % of the 
settin MLAs- replacing them by younger and relatively un-
known fresh faces, it dropped 63 Ministers from the out-
going state Government. In Maharashtra 13 Ministers were 
dropped and two former chief Minister were denied party 
tickets. In Orissa 5 of JB patnaik*s 15 Ministerial col-
leagues failed to make the grade. In Bihar no fewer than 7 
Ministers including 4 of cabinet rank went over-board. In 
Himachal Pradesh 2 Ministers were axed. In Uttar Pradesh 
7 Ministers and 4 General Secretaries were denied tickets. 
In Gujrat Madhav Sinh Solanki's Cabinet of 17 was decimated 
with no fewer than 11 being dropped. 
In the opposition run^ states^ Karnataka Chief Minister 
Ram Krishna Hegde who hlid recommended the dis-solution of the 
state Assembly formed the prospects of a Janata win fading 
due to its failure to reach an 'imderstanding with its 
alliance partner the BJP over the distribution of seeds. 
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There was however sorae consolation for Hegde In the fact 
that his main rival the Congress (i) also ran into a head 
wind after the High Coraraand decided to drop many party 
heavy-weights including the former Chief Minister Gundu 
Rao and the former Minister H. Srikantiah. Thus only 62 
out of 88 sitting Congress (I) MLAs found berths while as 
many as 53 new faces appeared on the Karnataka political 
scene. 
In Andhra Pradesh there was the embarassing sight 
of Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao running scored and filing 
hia nomination papers from three Constituencies: his 1983 
Asseiftbly base of Gudivada in Krishna district plus the 
Nalgonda town seat in Telangana and Hindu pur in Rayalaseema, 
Clearly N.T.R, was unsure of repeating his 1983 win from 
Gudivada which gave the Congress (I) a majority in Decem-
ber 84 parliamentary poll, and hence felt the need for 
stepney constituencies. 
If that reflected poorly on the Telugu Desam when 
it was expected to sweep the polls, there was somewhat 
happless sight of N, Bhaskara Rao making his do or dye 
atternpt to stay on the State's political map. He had 
failed to put up any candidates belonging to his break 
away democratic Telugu Desam (DTD) for the last Lok Sabha 
poll and this time there was no sign of any attenpt at 
joining hands with his one-time ally the Congress (i) . 
Nevertheless Bhaskara Rao declared that "It is between 
NBR and NTR. The Congress (l) is irrelevant. Will Raljiiv 
Gandhi become the next Chief Minister in Andhra Pradesh ?" 
That sounded suspiciously like whisling in the dark because 
Bhaskara Rao hinself had been forced to desert his vemour 
constituency in costal Andhra Pradesh and opt for the hope-
fully safer Malakpet constituency in Hyderabad. 
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The state election this time were essentially trian-
gular in character. The Congress (i) had put up candidates 
for all 294 seats, adopting independents in the places where 
its chosen few field to file their papers. Bhaskara Rao had 
only one ally the Majlis-e-illihadul Muslimeen which had 
been alotted 15 seats while his DTD contested 279. The 
Telugu Desam fielded 249 candidates leaving the rest to 
its electoral allies, the GPI the CPI (M), the BJP, the 
Janata and an independent. The pre->canpaignlng thunder 
was stolen by the Congress (i) but not in a manner that 
redounds to its credit. The 22 candidates who refuse to 
file their nomination were clearly motivated by the fear 
of defeat. 
The elections on March 2 and 5 resulted in Congress 
(I) victory in nine of the 12 Assemblies which went to the 
polls while Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Sikkira were an-
nxed by Telugu Desam, Janata Party and Sikkiro Sangram 
Parishad respectively. In three states i.e., Maharashtra, 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the Congress (I) faced strong 
opposition and had its majority in the Assemblies reduced 
considerably. This led some observers to interpret the 
results as something of a setback for the party. The 
detailed results of the 11 states and one Union territory 
are as follows; 
Andhra Pradesh 
Flections for 294 seats Legislative Assembly were 
held on March 5, 1985, the Assembly having been dissolved 
in mid term of November 22, 1984. On the advice of the 
Chief Minister Mr. N.T. Rama Rao, 
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The results of the voting on March as follows; 
Telugu Desam 202 
Congress (I) 49 
CPI 11 
GPI (M) . 11 
BJP 8 
Ittfthad-ul-Musliineen 3 
Janata Party 2 
Independents 6 
At the dissolution on Assembly in November 1984 
Telugu Desam had 199 seats and Congress (l) had 59. 
Mr. N.T. Rama Rao was sworn in as Chief Minister 
on March 9* 
Bihar 
The Congress (I) won 192 seats in the 324 seat 
Legislative Assembly in elections on March 2 and 5. 
Results of the vottng on March 2 and 5/as follows: 
Congress (i) 
DMKP 
BJP 
CPI 
3.W 
^Fharkhand Mukti Morcha 
Congress (a) 
GPI (M) 
Independents 
192 
46 
15 
13 
12 
10 
1 
1 
29 
Gujrat 
The Congress (i) increased its share of seats from 
142 to 149 in 182 seat Legislative Assembly elections on 
March 5. 
JNP 4 
BJP * 11 
Independents 8 
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Mr, Madhav Sinh Solanki was sworn in as Chief Minis-
ter for the third time on March. 
Himachal Pradesh 
The Congress (I) retained an absolute majority, 
increasing its share in 68 seat Legislative Assembly from 
37 to 55 in elections on March 5. 
BJP 7 
DMKP 1 
Independents 2 
Karnataka 
The JNP won an absolute majority of seats in elections 
for 224 seat Legislative Assembly on March 5. Mr. Rama Kri-
shana Hegde, who became Chief Minister in January 1983 when 
Janata party first won the largest number of seats. 
JNP 
C o n g r e s s ( I ) 
CPI 
M a h a r a s h t r a Ekkaram 
CPI (M) 
BJP 
DMKP 
I n d e p e n d e n t s 
Madhya P r a d e s h 
S a r a i t i (MES) 
139 
66 
4 
3 
2 
2 
1 
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The Congress (I) won over three quarters of the seats 
in 320 seat Legislative Assembly in elections on March 2, 
The results as follows: 
Congress (l) 250 
BJP 58 
JNP 5 
Congress (s) 1 
Independents 6 
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Maharashtra 
In elections for 288 seats Legislative Assembly^ held 
on March 2 and 5 Congress (i) retained control of the state 
by winning 162 seats. A four party grouping, the progress-
ive Democretic Front led by Sharad Bewar/ the former Chief 
Minister and National President of Congress (s) won 104 
seats of which Congress (S) had 56 seats. 
JNP 20 
BJP 16 
Peasants and Worker's party(PWP) 12 
C^I 2 
CPI (M) 2 
Independents and others 18 
Orissa 
The Congress (i) won 117 seats in the 147 seat Legis-
le^ive Assembly on March 5 the same total as in previous 
Assembly election in 1980. Results of Assembly elections 
as follows: 
JNP 19 
CPI 1 
BJP 1 
Socialist unity Centre of India ^^  
(SUCI) ^^ 
Jagrata Orissa 1 
Independents 5 
Mr. Janaki Ballav patnaik was swer in as Chief 
Minister for his second successive term on March 10* 
Raj as than 
In Assembly election on March 5 Congress (I) won 113 
•eats in the 200 seat Legislative Assembly, the 
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BJP 38 
DMKP 27 
JNP 10 
CPI (M) 1 
Independents 9 
Mr. Barldeo Joshi Chief Minister of Raj asthan from 
1973 to 1977 was unanimously elected leader of Congress (I) 
in the Legistative on March 9 and was sworn in as Chief 
Minister on the following day. 
SilcXim 
The Sikkim Sangram parishad led by former Chief 
Minister Mr. Nar Baharadur Bhandari, won 30 of the 32 
seats in the Legistative Assembly elections on March 5; 
the Congress (I) and Independent won the other two seats 
on March 8 president's rule was revoked and Mr. Bhandari 
was sworn as Chief Minister. 
Uttar Pradesh 
The Congress (I) won 266 seats in the 425 seat 
legislative Assembly elections on March 2 and 5. 
DMKP 
JNP 
BJP 
CPI 
Congress (j) 
CPI (M) 
Independents and others 
85 
19 
16 
6 
4 
2 
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Mr. Narain Dutt Tiwari was sworn in as Chief Minister 
in Lucknow on March 11. 
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Uttar Pradesh recorded the lowest vote turnout in 
the current sta^ te elections, with an estimated 40 per cent 
of the electorate going to polls has as opposed to a 56.25 
per cent turnout in Dec, 1984 parliamentary elections. 
Repelling was ordered at 24 polling stations after various 
irregularities on March 2 and three peoplewere killed in 
violent incidents in the north of the state on March 5. 
The overall leve of violence and intimidation, however 
was less than some had feared 
Pendicharry 
The Congress (I) won 15 seats in 30 seat Legislative 
Assembly in Union territory in elections on March 5 and 
being in alliance with the AIAOMK won 6 seats. Mr. M.O.H. 
Farook of Congress (I) was sworn in as Chief Minister on 
March 16. The results were: 
Congress (I) 15 
AIADMK 6 
DMK 5 
Janata 2 
Independents 2 
The year 1985 also saw the solution being reached 
to one of the biggest problem the country had been facing. 
Even since operation Bluestar, the Punjab problem had been 
defying a solution. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had pro-
raised to give the highest priority to this problem. The 
culmination of hisefforts was the signing of the Punjab 
accord on 24 July 1985 between Prime Minister Gandhi and 
Sant Harchand Singh Longowal. prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
had every reason to be satisfied, in signing the Pnjab 
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accord he had kept his promise to the Indian electorate 
that Punjab was his nuiober one priority and that he would 
move to solve it as soon as possible. That he should have 
b«en able to reach an agreement within five months of 
setting the ball rolling in March was a magnificent feather 
in his cap. After the accord there was no reason why peace 
should not return, why Punjab should not once again become 
the beacon of progress tt was and its people regain the 
extiberance they have for long been proud of. Yet even as 
the country savoured the movement/ it had to remember that 
there were other problems associated with the pact. Some 
lessons had to be learnt from the Punjab experience. The 
first lesson had to do with the too-little-too-late syn-
drome. The Punjab agreement contains very little that 
sets it apart from earlier negotiations. By all accounts 
of the points that had been agreed upon could have been 
achieved during the abortive and some times secret dis-
cussions in 1982 and 1984 • From the stand point of 
July 1985 the accord was an accoBtpllshed fact. The second 
lesson was that as long as politicians seeks to exploit 
such problems for their own gajtns, there can be no solut-
ions. This happened with Akalis and this happened with 
Congress (l), The third lesson was that a government 
that lacks credibility lacks ability. The story of Punjab 
was in one sense the story of the decline of New Delh's 
credibility whether it was because of suspected links 
between some Congress - Men and Bhindranwala and other 
extremists, or the force over Bhindranwale's arrest even 
the political manoeuvers that won the rulitvj party the 
government in Haryana at the cost of peace in Punjab. The 
fourth lesson was that a government that appears to be weak 
and indecisive can raaJte no great head - way in takiing poli-
tical and social problems. From a position of some strength 
inl98l Mrs, Gandhi's political fortune plummetted. The 
31 
Shakier and more paralysed her government seemed in hand-
ling the Pvmjab problem^ the bolder becaiae the extrepsists. 
Rajiv Gandhi, who had the backing of some 400 MPS in the 
Lok Sabha was able to seize the initiative and make what-
ever concessions he needed to precisely because he spoke 
srom a position of strength. Finally it were abundantly 
clear that the problem was in essence a political one. 
People in general do not want violence. Vfhat they want 
is justice. Punjab persisted because for too long it was 
treated as a law and order issue. If the right lessons 
are learnt from the bitterness, it might just happen that 
India, a country known sadly for its social conflict and 
sectarian violence, would come to be regarded as a nation 
which has learned two live in harmony with itself. 
The agreement had miraculously lifted clear the 
thick ball of gloom and fear which had held the country 
in cruel bind for over four years. Not that the relief 
was universal. It led to anger and consternation among 
the pro^extreraist elements tike the United Akali Dal and 
the All India Sikh Students Federation whose members clashed 
violently with Longowal supporters as he returned to the 
Goldent Teiqple. Armed with guns, swords, lathis and 
Kirpans, the two factions' clash outside the Akali Dal 
Office in Amritsar left several injtired. 
The Prime Minister and his aides including some of 
his cabinet colleagues and Ifunjab Governor Arjun Singh, 
who played a crucial role in bringing about the accord 
had much to be proud of and more to be thankful for. Few 
agreements to settle domestic disputes would appear to 
have had the widespread sanction and approval of such 
large numbers as that reached between Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi and Akali Dal president Sant Harchand Singh 
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Longowal. Among both Sikhs and Hindus the response to the 
agreement was overwhelmingly favourable but certain areas 
in Haryana showed a greater degree of dissatisfaction over 
the agreement which could be a pointer to possible trouble 
of all the issues bedevilling an accord on the Punjab pro-
blem, none had proved more intractable than the distribut-
ion of Ravi-Beas river waters between Punjab, Haryana and 
Rajasthan. And even the latest accord stopped short of 
finding the solution to this problem. The agreement set 
the seal on the present usage of water by the three states 
from the Ravi-Beas system as on July 1, 1985. Water for 
drinking purposes would remain unaffected bjtt the conflic-
ting claim over the remaining water was to be worked out 
by a tribunal headed by a supreme court. Judge. The ruling 
would be final and binding on all three states. The Akalis 
have always taken the rigid stand that since Punjab is the 
sole riparian state, it alone has the right to the waters 
of Ravi-Beas and sutluj. They do concede to Haryana a small 
share since it was once part of Punjab, But centre maintains 
that since Rajasthan cannot get water from any where else it 
has got to get it from Punjab Obvioxisly until the Thein dam 
comes up all the talk of utilising the remaining water of 
Ravi will remain national. However construction work on 
the long delayed Sutlej Yamuna link canal (SYL) on which 
Haryana had spent te, 100 crores and written off Rs. 700 
crores in crop loses will be speeded up and wcis expected 
to be completed by August 15, 1986. 
On the question of territorial dispute for the first 
time principle of contiguity and lingustic affinity with a 
village as a unit had been recognised. Punjab was to get 
the Chandigard capital project area that comprises nearly 
70 % of the union territory. The town of Haniraajra and the 
adjacent areas minus the Sukhna Lake go to Haryana. 
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A commission constituted with the help of lingustic everts 
was to determine the remaining Hindi-speaking areas of Pun-
jab which were to be transferred to Haryana when CSaandigarh 
went to Punjab on the Republic day 1986. Other claims and 
counter claims for readjustment of the existing Punjab and 
Haryana boundaries were to be gone into by another commis-
sion. The award of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in January 1970 hai 
given Chandigarh to Punjab with Haryana getting the pros 
parous tehsils of Abohar and Fazilka. Earst while Chief 
Minister Bhajan Lai of Haryana had gone an accord to state 
that he would respect the award of the commission^ but it 
is pretty clear that his troubles are going to take off 
once the report comes through. Large areas to which Haryana 
had been laying claip^  on the ground that they were Hindi 
speaking had become Punjabi speaking. The last census of 
1981 saw many Hindus opt for Punjabi as their mother tongue 
instead of Hindi, But whichever way the decision on terri-
tories went it would ultimately affect people* unsettle 
families and even lead to a minor exodus, in fact that 
problem would be most pronounced in Chandigarh where thou-
sands of Haryana Government enployee have begun thinking 
in terms of shifting to a new capital which has not come 
into being. 
The process of normalisation in Punjab which was 
expected to bring in an era of peace and harmony to the 
state recieved a severe jolt when one of the signatories 
to the Punjab accord Sant Harchand Singh Longowal was 
gunned down on 20 August, 1985 at Sherpur village. With-
in hours of the Sant's Assassination the forces of dark-
ness seemed to be closing in one Punjab again. The gra-
dual build up of euphoria following the Rajiv-Longowal 
accord of July 24, appeared to be evaporating fast. Al-
most as swiftly as the assassin opening fire came the 
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first discordant signs of strife over leadership^ crisis in 
the Shiioraani Akali Dal. For six years the Sant has headed 
the party firmly, steering it through longest agitation in 
its history. Hours before his death he had successfully 
managed to cement serious rift in the Akali Dal by skilfu-
lly drawing back into its fold two of its most powerful 
dissenting members, former Chief Minister Prakash Singh 
Badal and 5GPC president Guru Charan Singh Tohra, who had 
consistently opposed the party accord with the government 
and objected yet more strongly to calling a early election 
in the state. 
In the meantime as part of the Punjab accord elections 
had been announced for 22 September, 1985. They had to be 
postponed due to the murder of Longowal. The government's 
decision to go ahead with the elctions in Punjab inspite of 
Longowal's assassination was the only one it could have 
taken. In the words of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi "Shell 
we allow the exercise of will of the people to be obstruc-
ted, frustrated and subverted by the forces of extremism 
and terrorism ? on a correct response to this hinges the 
fate of the democratic system in India ... How in-dividual 
parties fare in of little consequence. It does not matter 
whom wins and who loses, what matters is the lanp of demo-
cracy is not extingushed; what matters is that India wins". 
The decision was a calculated gamble, one which put 
at risk all that had been achieved in Punjab in the last 
few weeks. But it was an unavoidable one. Any other 
decision would have put the terrorists in the driver's seat. 
Any move to delay the elections would have caused the prob-
lem in Punjab to fester longer, denied a popular government 
which alone could take charge of the state's problems and 
tackled them in the only lasting way democratically, Longo-
wal »s assassination show that even the presence of gunmen 
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was no guarantee of safety* The government had to very 
seriously consider providing each candidate with a suitable 
nxiiaber of bodyguard who were more than a token deterret to 
a would - be killer. The elections were postponed by three 
days to 25th September^ 1985. 
The peaceful conduct of election and t he high voter 
turnout bear a more inportmnt message than the electoral 
verdict. Mundanely put, they spelled a reaffairmation of 
the desire in Punjab for peace and national unity. It was 
a mandate unlike any other in present day Punjab's 19 year 
history, rivalling in Magnitude and sweep the verdict Rajiv 
Gandhi got in the Parliamentary election after his mother's 
death confounding the Pundits and pollsters the Shiromani 
Akali Dal led by Sant Longowal's gentle successor Surjit 
Singh Barnala inperiously swept aside a disspirited 
Congress (I) challenge and surged to power on the crest 
of massive vote which gave it a near two-thirds majority 
in the vidhan Sabha, in the process whittening down the 
Congress (l) to half its former strength. It was a deci-
sive vote against extremism and a vote for peace in the 
troahled state, in another sense it was a vote confounded 
in equall parts of syii^ athy and protest - sympathy for the 
Akali Dal whose Chief Sand Harchand Singh Longowal was 
felled by the extremists' bullets and protest against the 
Congress (I) for operation Blue Star which deeply scarred 
the Sikh psyche. The Akali Dal backed 73 seats out of the 
100 they contested in the 117 member Vidhan Sabha. It elec-
ted Mr. Surjeet Singh Barnala as its leader. The party 
position was as follows: 
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Akall Dal 
Congress (I) 
BJP 
Janata Party 
CPI 
Independents 
E l e c t i o n coxintermanded 
73 
32 
4 
1 
1 
4 
2 
117 
At the national level prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
went in for a major reshuffle of his cabinet. He dropped 
some senior Ministers like virendra petil, Mrs, M. Chandra 
Shekhar, Reus Virendra Singh« Ashok Ghalot, C.S. Singh etc. 
elevating Buta Singh as Minister for Agriculture and Rural 
development and Bansi Lai as Minister for Transport, Rail-
ways and civil Aviation. He also reinstated people like 
ABA Ghani Khan Chou^xiry, N.D. Tiwari« D.R. Bhagat and 
Sltaram Kesari. It was the biggest reshuffle since 
Prime Minister Gandhi took over in November 1984. At the 
sane time he went in for a major restructuring of the 
Ministeries, Earlier the Government of India comprised 
31 Ministeries; now there were four less yet three new 
Ministeries had been carved out. 
During the same period there was a change of leader-
ship in India's most populous state: Uttar Pradesh. Mr. Vir 
Bhadur Singh took over as Chief Minister from Mr. N.D. Tiwari, 
who lasted a bare 416 days as Chief Minister. He, however, 
had the consolation of being sworn in as the Union Minister 
for Industry the next day. in April 1985 every bo<^, it 
seemed, was fighting every body in Gujrat the Upper Caste 
were fighting the lower caste, the working calss had turns 
against the middle class, Hindu were fighting the Muslims, 
the police were battling both the people and press and the 
Government was fighting opposition. What had started of 
eleven weeks earlier as a stjadents agitation against the 
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state Government reservation policy had matamorphosed into 
a bloody cauedron in which the catalytic conflict between 
Upper caste and anti-reservationist and a government bent 
on pushing through with the consessions granted to the majo-
rity lower castes was subseumed by other collective angers 
that exploded simultaneously across the state and shattered 
even the basic social contract between the police and the 
citizenary. Just when it was thought there could not pos-
sibly be any recrudesence of the communal clashes which 
left reveral dead if the walled city in March 1985, there 
was a fresh out break of communal clashes both within the 
pressure cooker atmosphere of walled city and in outlying 
areas where the fabric of communal amity had been not rup-
tured till then. Just when it was thought that the police 
will not repeat the strong arm tactics that they displayed 
in the Asarwa locality in Ahmedabad in the first week of 
April, 'the 9000 - strong police force showed the city's 
3 million residents that Asawra was not even a faithful 
trailer. They repeated their Asawra excesses in the 
Khalia and Gomtipur areas on April 17 and 18 and then went 
on the write one of the most shameful chapters in the his-
tory of India's police forces by going on a seven hour 
long sausage on ^ ril 22 after one of their own men was 
hacked to death by a raob< . When they finished the offices " 
and press of Gujrat's largest selling newspaper Gujrat Saroa-
char (Circulation ; 300,000) had been gutted and the city's 
streets were littered with burnt scooters and auto-rickshaws, 
The state government later claimed that after their "emotio-
nal outburst" the police were persuaded to report back for 
duty but the Muslim resident of Bapu Nagar are convinced 
that many police-men led gangs of Hindu goondas in a 
night long attack on them which left 55 dead. The rioters 
came in 8 to 10 trucks l^d by an Assistant Superintendent 
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of police, an Inspector and two sub inspecters. The trou-
ble soon spread to Baroda, Surat and else where and Madhav 
Slnh Solankl government was coEopelled to calleiithe ariny 
for the second^in five weeks to in^ jose the curfew which 
its own forces had failed to enforced. 
Addressing a rally in Guwahati on August 12 the 
Prirae Minister Rajiv Gandhi promised an accord on Assam 
problem that will leave no winners or iMDsers, And true 
to that promise the authors of the accord signed in the 
early hours of August 15, 1985, performance a remarkable 
balanceing trick. The accord lays down januai^ 1, 1966 
the base year for detection of foreigners. The 1967 elec-
toral roll will be the basic docximent for the identifi-
cation of foreigners. From the minorities, point of view 
it protects the large number of Bengali Hindus who came 
in the wake of 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict. The names 
of the people who came in between January 1, 1966 and 
March 25, 1971 will be deleted from the electoral rolls 
for lO years and those who entered Assam after march 25, 
1971 will continue to be identified and eaqjelled. An 
obviotos sop to the agitators was promise to reconsider 
synpathetically cases of disciplinary reaction and crimi-
nal cases, except those for heinous crimes, filed in the 
course of agitation. For relatively harmless kind of agi-
tator the government had offered to raise the upper age 
limit in public services. Most Assamese student lost two 
to three academic years in the ourse of agitation. The 
minorities in Assam differed with the agreement but even 
to them it could mean a positive change if it achieved 
its main objective of bringing about lasting ethinic and 
lingustic peace. 
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Parliament approved the citizenship Amendment Bill 
on December 3« 1985 and the Assam £lectiOQ were scheduled 
for December 16, 1985. 
A 21 member Asom Gana parishad (AGP) Ministry led by 
Prafulla Kumar M^anta took the oath of office on December 
24, 1985 with the tumultous chears of crowds punctuating 
the proceedings, AGP secured an absolute majority by win-
ning 64 seats in the 126 - member Assam Assembly. It also 
had the support 6 independents, it also won 7 of the 14 
Lok Sabha seats. The detailed party position as follows: 
Total seats 
Seat declared 
Countermanded 
AGP 
Congress (i) 
United Minority 
Congress (S) 
PTCA 
CPI (M) 
Independents and 
Front 
others 
Assembly 
126 
125 
1 
64 
25 
17 
4 
3 
2 
10 
Lok Sabha 
14 
14 
0 
7 
4 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
The Indian National Congress became 100 year old 
on December 28, 1985. The historic centewdry session of 
the country's oldest and most powerful political party 
concluded in ^mbay on December 29 with a firm resolve 
to pursue its goal of socialism, economic self reliance 
and poverty removal and a stirring call by prime Minister, 
Mr, Rajiv Gandhi, to creat a new work ethic, cleans the 
ptablic life and revitalise the ruling party. 
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The Congress also vowed to launch a frontal attack 
on poverty until it is eliminated, icnprove the lot of far-
mers and workers, fully safeguard the rights of minorities 
and iiqplement crash prograirroes for the uplift of the 
scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes and the backward 
classes. The vow was contained in a 13-page resolution 
described as "cenetary resolve" and adopted after a two 
day discussion at the plenary session. The resolution 
called upon the people "to rise with all their strength 
to root out terrorism and violence which represented a 
frontal attack on our ethos". 
Summing up the party•» introspectional outlook on 
its growth, acconplisheraents and failing at the close of 
the three day centenary celebrations at the Brabourne 
Stadium, the Prime Minister announced amidst cheers that 
the organisational elections would be held soon as a first 
step to revaEqp the party so that it could devote itself to 
the task of nation - building. 
He asserted that the Indian National Congress is the 
only organisation in the country that could be relied upon 
to shoulder the onerous task of nation building, thanks to 
the party's unrivalled historic standing. 
Mr. Gandhi spelt out an 11-point charter to make 
India "a mighty power" and ensure it glorious future. In 
his presidential address at the historic centenary plenum, 
he said: 
"Let us build an India: 
Proud of her independence; 
Powerful in defence of her freedom, strong, self 
reliant in agriculture, industry and front rank 
technology; 
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United by bonds transcending barriers of caste, 
creed and region; 
Liberated from the bondage of poverty; and of 
social and economic inequality; 
Disciplined and efficient; 
Fortified by ethical and spiritual values; 
A fealess force for peace on earth; 
The school of the world, blending the inner 
repose of the spirit with material progress; 
A new civilisation, with the strength of our 
heritage, the creativity of the spring time of 
youth and the unconquerable spirit of our people 
Great achievements demand great sucrifieces; 
Sacrefice not only from our generation and the 
generations gone by, but also from generations to 
come; 
Civilisations are not built by just one or two 
generations. Civilisations are built by ceaseless 
toil of succession of generations. With softness 
and sloth - civiliaations succumb. Let us beware 
of decadence". 
It is quite ^propriate that the Congress centenary 
celebrations were held in Bombay, which was in the Vanguard 
of India's freedom movement. It was here that the "Quit 
India" battle cry was raised on August 9, 1942 at Gowalia 
Maidan under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. 
Ever since the first session of Indian National Cong-
ress was held at the Gokuldas Tejpal Sanskrit Pathshala 
Hall in Bombay loo years ago ^ the Congress has been the 
main political force in the country. 
Electoral successes in the past 37 years, with insig-
nificant interruptions except in 1977, have continued to 
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give to the Indian National Congress a largely popular 
reason for sxurvival as the principal national repository 
of power. 
The Congress centenary, a political and historical 
landmark, reminds the nation not only of its long and heroic 
struggle for independence but also of its unfulfilled tasks. 
As it steps into its second century the Indian i-ational 
Congress is passing through a crisis of self confidence. 
Rajiv Gandhi was typically thorough in the clinical preci-
sion with which he cut open the innards of the party and 
displayed the rot inside. But his hourlong speech at Indira 
Nagar was heard by the largest ever Assembly of Congress-
men with a certain cynicism. He said in his hardhitting 
speech, "we (Congressmen) obey no descipline, no rule, 
follow no principle of public morality display no sense 
of social awareness show no concern for ptoblic weal corrup-
tion is not only tolerated but even regarded as the hall 
mark of leadership". He also voiced concern over the 
"brokers of power and influence, who dispense patronage 
to convert a mass movement into a feudal oligarchy". He 
went on tO' add "they are reducing the Congress Organisa-
tion to a shall from which the spirit of sacrifice has 
been enptied". 
Hardly a week went by In the latter half of the 
year 1985 without the newspapers carrying startling head-
lines about government - ordered raids on business houses, 
trade establishment?, and private residences. And the 
list of people raided on allegations of "economic offence" 
read like a veritable who's who of Dalai Street. A jittery 
business community reacted with dismay when the axe fell 
on industrial Stalwarts S.L. Kirloskar and Rahul Bajaj 
Even ordinary, middle class citizens began expressing 
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fear and doubt about their right to privacy and freedom 
from undue government intrusion. This raised questions 
about who the raiders are, where they derive their power, 
what protections and right accure to the raided, how raids 
are conducted. Who are the likely targets and whether it 
is proper to public use raids on people who have not yet 
been found guilty. 
Communalism - Hindu, Christian, Muslim, Jain or 
Sikh - Nehru warned in 1955, is desruptive, separatist 
and a trend imbued with hatred. "If we maintain this 
kind of communalism", he said, "India will siseg eease-
to be what it is. It will go to pieces". Today more than 
30 years after that warning, the commuinal poislon spread 
throughout the land like an odiferous gangrene eating 
away at the very innardes of the country's body politics. 
And there seems to be no leader in sight either capable 
or willing to stem the venomous tide. And as the evil has 
Spread, it has created within its course permulation and 
combinations of hatred and suspicious which have bludge-
oned into..disuse all norms of reason, common sense and 
coip^assion. 
Today, India lives in an atmosphenin which its 
people appear to have been vaccinated against the natural 
human response of loathing against communal convulsions. 
They seem to be inured to the daily atrocities in which 
man kills man in the name of religion or caste or community 
So deep are these divisions that ordinary Hindus - perfectle, 
reasonable, even kindly folk appland sectarian violence be-
cuase "it is time we taoght them a lesson", or because, 
"they deserved it". In Assftm where economic insecurity 
and mass enophobia erupted in cononunal havoc called Nellie, 
there is no troxible over teaching the Assantese language in 
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schools. The same lingtistic tension an outgrowth of 
uncheclced comraunallsm holds a taut grip over Goa and Bel-
gaum • In Punjab, the traditional and time honoured bond 
of brotherhood it will Hindu and Sikh has been cut. In 
the tribal belt of Madhya Pradesh of Bihar, Christian 
missionaries are locked in a potentially explosive battle 
with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. In Gujrat half as many 
people have been killed within a few days ia two gory 
riots caused by a bloody cocktail of communadi and castist 
politics, than in Punjab during an entire year. In Uttar 
Pradesh hitherto peaceful town Allahabad and Barabanki 
have been roped by communal upheavals. Andeach time 
politicians have "rushed" to the trouble spots, clucked 
their sancti-monious tongues, smiled like jackasses for 
newsphotographers and moved on to their business of politic 
king. What is shameful that our national politicians have 
often themselves incited or played opportunistic games with 
communalism. 
But for patch work remedies - the transfer of district 
magistrate or a Superintendent, an inquiry into a PAC firing 
dusk to dawn curfew orders Rajiv Gandhi's Government has 
failed to demonstrate its ability to bottle the Communal 
genie. Or to launch an all out attack on the dangerous 
combination of politics and religion. 
No one can accuse Rajiv Gandhi of being a Communalist. 
But his actions - even with the best intention in mind - on 
the Mvillira Women's Bill and the Ram Janam Bhoomi issue -
have only helped to compound an already bad situation. 
Comnunalism cannot be wised away or solved through mecha-
nistic administrative remedies. What is required to fight 
it is statesmenship, uncoieproraising moral courage and agge-
ressive leadership. Rafiv should have visited Barabanki, 
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He should have visited Allahabad - the home office his 
enacestors - personally. He should have visited Ahioedabai . 
He may not have been able to solve imnnediate problem but 
his presence would have been a symbol of the national 
will to battle comnrunalism. It Would have shown, most 
of all, that he cares. And caring, cannot be deligated 
to others. During his early days in office, people ad-
mired Rajiv for his tought no nonsense approach. But now, 
the very absense of these qualities is losing him the psy-
chological edge through which he can asse-irt moral authority 
Rajiv l^ast himself take the communal bull by the horns. 
|;he inplementation of Punjab accord had run into dif-
ficvilties in meantime. A commission headed by Mr. Justic 
K.K. Mathew had been set up as part of accord to determine 
which Hindi speaking villages will be ceded from Punjab 
in lieu of Chandigarh. The Commission's report was delayed 
by more then three weeks as it sought repeated extensions 
of t£me^ it long last submitted its report on the 24 of 
January 1986. It delivert an unexpected anti-climax after 
a forenight of mounting tension, drama and suspense and 
said that 83 Hindi - speaking villages and the two Hindi-
speaking towns in Abohar and Fazilka Tehsils of Punjab 
could not be transferred to Haryana because they were not 
contiguous with Haryana's border - the Punjabi majority 
village of Kandukhera itood in the way. So Aeptiblic day 
downed to a (italeraent, the government had sleeped tap on 
its schedule for in5>lementing the accord which holds the 
key to ending the Punjab problems, and the future suddenly 
looked uncertain once again. 
Undeterred, both the Chief Ministers, Barnala of 
Punjab and Bhajan Lai of Haryana, decided on the mosuing 
after put up a brove front on the events. Barnala claimed 
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credit for having prevented the transfer of Fazilka and 
Abohar to Haryana stating that this had "vindicated our 
stand" and added that "no body can stop us from getting 
Chandigarh today or tomorrow". Bhajanlal in turn thundered 
that he had prevented Chandigarh from going without his 
getting the territory he wanted. The fact of course was 
that this was nobody's victory and every body's defeat 
Rajiv Gandhi's only defence could be that he tried his 
best. He deputed Arjun Singh, Arun Nehru, Arun Singh and 
P. Shivshankar to monitor developments. Arjun Singh meet 
Barnala six times in ten days and conferred twice with 
Bhajan Lai. He maintained his basic optimism despite 
the statemate. But the country's attention was focused 
on the moment on the set back that had just occured and 
bungling that had caused it : the rising passions in both 
states through the process of lingustic enumeration, the 
conttnunal divide this caused in the villages being enumerated, 
the building up of tension before the commission gave its 
no go verdict. There was Congress (i) is failure to keep 
Haryana chief Minister Bhajan Lai in check even though 
he raised the banner of revolt as early as December and 
the Punjab government go slow on the STL canal. 
Punjab Chief Minister Barnala was critical of the 
Government of India and the latter should have recognised 
that there was logic in Barnala's criticism of the venkata-
ramiah commission on's unhelpful report and of the Desai 
Commission's flawed terms of references, as there is in 
his declaring at no stage did the Punjab accord envisage 
the transfer of Punjabi _ Speaking areas to Haryana. The 
centre must also fined a response to the Sikh grievances, 
one of which related to the manner in which the Ranganath 
Mishra commission going about it business. And instead 
of waiting for Barnala to take the next step the centre 
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should have displayed socae initiative inbreaking the 
dead lock and placing greater drust in Barnala then seemed 
to exist. 
Even when the Justice Ranganath Mishra Conroission 
of inquiry was appointed in 1985, in dependent observer 
has predicted that it would txirn out to be a lame duck la-
ves tigation, A tough inquiry would have caused iirpoirtant 
heads to role. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had made no 
secret of hits own reluctance to order an official probe 
into the large scale killings of Sikh's following Mrs. 
Gandhi's assassination in October 1984. He had once 
referred to riots as a "dead issue" and had argued against 
opening up old wounds. 
The coRinission was finally appointed because of public 
pressure and exigencies of the Punjab accord. In early April 
1986, an influencial body of eminent lawyers and Jurists -
the citizens Justice Committee (CJC) which has been invited 
to assist the commission withdrew from its hearing after 
bitterly critiaing its procedures in a 44 page petition 
address to Justice Mishra. Mr. V.M. Tarkunde, retired 
Judge of the Bombay High Court said "We did not feel there 
was any point in our participating any more. This has been 
a one sided investigation. We were never given a chance to 
participate in it as we had been promissed" Commission per-
sonnel refused to comment on the CJC decision. R.L. Gupta, 
secretary to the commission. The CJC's withdrawl from the 
commission's proceeding removes the only body that was 
actively representing victims and survivors of the November 
1984 violence. The CYC had got more than 600 affidavits 
from victims alleging participation by the police and 
politicians in the change. 
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Relations between the Commissiofi and Coraroittee had 
never been cordial. Prom the start, CJC roerabers claimed 
that the independent investigation agency (headed by ju-
nior superintendent of police from Orissa) appointed by 
the commission was not powerful enought to undertake 
investigations involving senior government officials and 
politicians. In addition while the GJC produced hundreds 
of witnesses who have been subjected to rigorous cross 
examination within the commission, "not one officer 
from the government or the Delhi administration has been 
invited to step into the witness box," the CJC petition 
said. 
A CJC member, advocate Soli Sorabjee, said that key 
interviews had been conducted behind closed doors and "we 
were not given an opportunity to cross examine anybody". 
Vital government dociiraents including police reports on 
the riots summoned from the government at the CJC'S behest 
were kept secret from the CJC despite repeated requests 
for disclosure, "the same police officers against whom 
§llegations of intimidation and harassment had been made 
by the witnesses were entrusted the task of investigating 
the allegations". Their report* along with replies from 
the Delhi administration, were made available to the com-
mission but not disclosed to the GJC. Said Gen T.S. Aurora. 
"Prom the beginning, the terms of reference of the Commis-
sion were biased against the victims, the victims were 
forced to come to the investigation with the burden of 
proof on them". 
Following the GJC's withdrawal, the work of the 
commission is almost certain to be speed up. But when 
the commission does give its final report, it may find 
that it has few takers". 
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Cornraissions of inquiry are supposed to uncover the 
truth, and the truth on public issues is supposed to be 
made public in open society. The May 1986 ordinance per-
mitting the government to keep secret the findings of any 
commission of inquiry grously violated this fundamental 
principle, and deserved to be condemed and opposed the 
parliament* It moved away from open government, diluted 
accountability to the people and cut at the root of eery 
necessity of Judicial conanission, which stood reduced to 
little more than the departmental inquiry. The ordinance 
enabled the government to suppress information and judge-
ments, unpalatables to those in power - under the garb of 
that catch all phrase "public interest". And it rendered 
uncertain the value of any commission of inquiry that is 
ever appointed, for a question mark must have hang over 
the fate of finding. Especially in a country that has 
an official Secrets Act instead of a Freedom of Informat-
ion Act, and were information of kind that is easily acces-
sible in most counteries is all too often classified as 
secret, there is a need for laws that expand the frontiers 
of public knowledge, not contract them. 
The ordinance was issued some days after the defence 
lawyer of Mrs. Gandhi's convicted assassin asj^ ed for the 
Thaldcar commission's report on the circumtances of the 
assassination and what lapses made the murder possible. 
But if that was seen as a provocation, it provide no justi-
fication for ordinance. If the government lost nerve in 
the face of Satwant Singh's lawyer demanding the report, 
that does not speak well for the government either Media 
report say the commission has listed a series of errors 
committed by senior government officials and pointed to 
the fact that but for a last minute change of schetiule 
Mrs, Gandhi would have walked safely to her appointment 
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with a TV crue while Biant Singh and Satwant Singh had 
gone to toilet* that Justice M.P. Thakkar wanted to sub-
ject R.K. Dhawan to a lie detector test and that the com-
mission had deferred the issue of wider conspiracy to the 
Anand Ram CoHanission which was still going through its 
labours. If all this was true it pointed to inevitable 
coaplications that resxilt when a trial proceeds simulta-
neously with two commissions of inquiry. The government 
would be hard put to denying that it is trying to STj^ ress 
the fact of the case. 
There could be other ten^itations in future to invoke 
the new Law. What if the Rananath Mishra commission deter-
mined that a few Congress (i) stalwarts who are now Minis-
ters in central government were quilty of some role in the 
Delhi riots that followed Mrs. Gandhi's assassination. 
Would the government have supressed that report too in 
public xnlex&st f. . 
Jf the government had though sufficiently hard about 
blunting an instrviment of truth and Justice, and about the 
dangers of empowering all future governments with powers 
to supress in convenient fact it might well have desisted 
from its drastic and indefensible step. No matter what 
view it took to its immediate predicament concerning the 
Thakkar report. 
The middle of 1986 «aw another Punjab type agitation 
raising its ugly head. Darjeeling, the queen of the hills 
was in revolt. "Land first, bread and butter later", was 
the war cry of the brave Gorkhas. Reminisent of the Bloody 
Punjab agitation, the Gorkhaland movement was not for eco-
nomic emancipation but for the political identity and due 
status of the Gorkha Community. As in Punjab the leadership 
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of coionunity has slipped away from the hands of the 
moderates to the militants. And as with Punjab in this 
case too the authority initially dismiss the demand for 
a seperate Gorkha state as the brainchild of a frenzied 
mind. The successful Gorkhaland bandh in May 1986 orga-
nized by GNLF shook the power that be out of their com-
plecency. Darjeeling may go the Punjab way if firmed 
step are not taken by the central and state government. 
Centre was to be blamed for the violence and ararchy stalk-
ing the three hill subdivieiion of Darjeeling as it was un-
able to make-up its mind^ how to treat Mr. Subhas Ghishing 
Leader of GNLF. The Gorkhaland agitation had weged West 
Bengal Chief Minister Mr. Jyoti Basu squarel between 
the devil and the deep sea. He had to balance his 
party's traditional commitment to some form of regional 
autbnony for the Darjeeling cureas dominated by Nepalese 
Speaking people, with resisting any accomodation with 
the current leadership of the moveo^nt whose demands 
have far exceeded the original goal. But instead of 
helping to extricate him from his unevible discomfiture 
in the national interest. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
and his aides have chosen to play political football 
with the issue which if left to bubble could spread the 
poiaion of ethinic separatism throughout the land. The 
Congress (I)'s short cited game plan in West Bengal has 
suddenly given respectibility to GNLF Subash Ghishing of 
former Indian Army Corporal who was barely six months 
earlier regarded as an irresponsible crainp. The centre 
has helped him to stake the claim of being the spokes the 
spo of the 15 lac Gorkhas in an around Darjeeling. And he 
finds in the position of being able to play off the centre 
against West Bengal in a situation where the two need 
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maximum cooperation. Basu refuses to talk to him because 
he considers GKU? anti-national, Rajiv does not agree bec-
ause he says the Union home and Law Ministeries have exa-
mined the GNLP's literature and seen nothing there which 
is anti-national. This is patently absurt. In the past 
six years the GNLF has written letters to foreign heads 
of state and the United Nations seeking their help to end 
the Indian genocide of Grokhas and has appealed to the 
40 thousand Gorkhas In the Indian Army to revolt, Jyoti Basm 
i«— want deal with anybody demanding a homeland for the 
Gorkhas or threatening violence and there is little doubt 
that Basu must# at some point« talk to the Gorkha movements 
leadership. If the issue w^s not so serious^ Rajiv stand 
would have been laughable. Displaying astonishing igno-
rance, he kept referring to all Nepalis as foreigners and 
till he was corrected by Buta Singh, The centre is indul-
ging in double speak on this issxie. For now, Basu can 
blame the Centre for duplicity, but in the end he will 
have to take up the challenge of the Gorkhaland issue both 
as a politician and a statesman. 
In Mizoram t|ie yearning for peace found a new ejcpres-
sion in June 1986 as Laldenga, the former Indian Army haval-
dar who led one of the bloo^ist insurgencies in Indian his-
tory fore over two decades, signed an agreement with Cong-
ress (I) vice president Arjun Singh. Under the agreement 
he was to share power with Congress (l), with him as the 
Chief Minister, during the interim period between the 
agreement and the inactions in 1987. Mirorara was destined 
to be the 23rd state in the union. A political agreement 
stemed from a clearer understanding the reality of the 
situation on both sides. L^ildenga and his close aides 
were getting increasingly aware that with the Chinese 
preoccupied elsewhere and the change in internal situat-
ion, it was unlikely that their storm-troppers could take 
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on the might of Indian Army's 57 Mountain D based at 
Aizawl, Similarly Congress (i) though unwilling to sacri-
fice power in the manner of Assam and Punjab, saw the wri-
ting on the wall. It had won the last election on the pro-
mise of peace with Laldenga and the delay in carrying 
out the promise had already caxised fissures in the in the 
party. The ten year old attempt an accord finally succeeded 
when both parties realised that they did not have many bar-
gaining chips and needed each other. 
As the year 1987 begins, it may be a fruitful exer-
cise to see how the structure of Indian political leader-
ship is slowly but steadly changing with the opposition 
wearing an innovative look in spite of the fact that 
all power seems to be vest in the assessment of the place 
that Rajiv Gandhi, who seems to tower above everybody else 
both in the structure of his popularity and his power whieh 
eclipses very opposition leader. Yet we know this is not 
the case. Consider for example the firmness with which 
at least four opposition leaders hold their States. 
Mr. M.G. Reuoaachandran although in failing health for 
several years Maintains his strength in Tamil Nadu and, 
indeed treated in matter of Tamil Nadu public opinion as 
touch stone of State's whole preferences in regard to the 
solution of Indo-Sri-Lanka settlement, Mr. N.T. Rama Rao 
in Andhra Pradesh is constantly deemed to have lost Charis-
hma, and it is generally assumed that the Telugu Desam is 
losing ground, but nobody suggests that in elections that 
state, the Congress party will be no match for the old 
warrior in vote catching. Mr. Jyoti Basu in West Bengal 
held his ground firmly in latest Panchayat elections, and 
now that elections for the Assembly have been called for 
March 23, there is general feeling that the Congress 
party - after some thrusts and party in Gorkhaland and 
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then else where in the Prime Minister's tour-will be 
worsted in the fray. Mr, Rama Krishna Hegde in Karnataka 
has made a significant return to popularity with a great 
thrust at a massive decentralisation of Panchayat autonomy 
with resources, which is a new democratic development of 
importance not yet appreciated by the Congress party. It 
is beginning of a greater regional democracy and a means 
of much more vital rural economic development. 
This may look like all that happening biit it does not 
tell the whole story of the arrival of new leaders on the 
political scene. Consider for example. Mr. Hahanta, still 
remarkeably young as leader in Assam, negotiating again 
with Rajiv Gandhi on the Assam accord. Consider Mr. 
Laldenga who having reached an accord with Rajiv Gandhi 
on Mizoram, has now won an election in which Mizoram 
National Front (MNP) secured an absolute majority and 
has now formed a government which claimed, and won state 
hood, on its own Dr. Parooq Abdullah, in the valley of 
Kashmir invented suddenly the doctrine of "Coalition poli-
tics" through which differences with ^r. Rajiv Gandhi Mel-
ted away, and a new partnership between the centre and State 
was invented. Here too elections are being held on March 
23, 1987. No one has any doubt that a result of partner-
ship with an alliance between the National Conference 
(Farooq) and Congress (I), Mr. Parooq Abdullah will be-
come the Chief Minister of State on very different lines 
from those inherited from his distinguished father. 
In a manner full, of romance, in the Punjab full of 
trotible, turmoil and still (alas) Terrorism, that has come 
a seeming miracle. There has emerged a new chrismatic fi-
gure in Surjut Singh Barnala, who in the village of l»ongo-
wal, scared 40 the memory of Late Sant Hanchand Singh 
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Longowal/ called with the Sikhs to measure with him 
their response in a national crises from all over India. 
They seemed to recognize his new pattern of leadership, 
wrestling with the High Priests and Akal Takht itself, 
he obtained full confidence of the great majority of 
the Sikhs, present and voting. How else can be explai-
ned the enthusiasm with which on Feb 20, 1987, they came 
to show their criticism of High Priests and argued, 
rightly that the excon»iunication of the Chief Minister 
of Punjab by the High Priest was not regularly perfor-
med, nor his explanation adequately taken. When Mr. S.S, 
Barnala stood with courage again the High Priests there 
was no doubt as to where his people stood. For the first 
time in Punjab, it was seen that religion emanating from 
the gurudwaras alone was not a decisive factor in Punjab 
politics. A leader, seemingly overcome by the total 
pressures of terrorism, with the Dal divided in his 
ranks and the dual power of the priestly forces, emerged 
as it were triumphant with only the power of Sikh demo-
cracy equal to all. This is the time to look opposition 
parties, not with the critical eye with which it is seen 
in Delhi unable to measure up, in only way, to the Cong-
ress (I) in Parliament largely because of the large num-
bers arrayed on the Treasury benches. Slowly, but marked-
ly in many states of Indian Union, there is a personal 
regional leadership, in which the political power is ap-
parently, smaller inportance than the Prime Minister's. 
They can, however, fight for their states. They enjoy 
not merely a regional backing, but an extra ordinary 
personal popularity partiy derived from their own 
character and determination, and the partly derived from 
the good cause they fight. At least as a witness, the 
tests on March 23, 1987 will be watched in West Bengal 
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and Jararau & Kashmir, Kerala itself is a different case, 
but there is over all the country an indication enough 
that in 1987, unlike in 1986, a chequered pattern of 
leadership leading the country to a division of power, 
or at least a more vital structure of democratic sharing 
of power in several states. The opposition should hold 
its head high. 
The Assembly elections have become 9 grim testa-
ment to Rajiv diminished ability to convert the crowds 
he can atract at rallies into votes for Congress (I). 
His major task is to restore his own credibility not 
only as Prime Minister but as a party boss as well. 
There is little doxibt that his credibility, clout and 
Charisma had been dealt a mega-volt jolt, Rajiv had gam-
bled by putting his personal image and popularity on the 
firing line. More than Congress (I) his personal abili-
ty as a vote catcher was on trial. The Congress (I), a 
national party ruling in 18 states when Rajiv became 
Prime Minister, now rules only in 11, For the first 
time since independence there is no Congress Chief 
Minister in any of the four Southern states. Large 
chunks of the east are already out of Congress control. 
The electoral ntorobers tell their own stark story. Oppo-
sition leaders see a new pattern of support for a opposi-
tion parties. Several opposition leaders, stating that 
Rajiv Gandhi converted the election into an appeal for 
a personal mandate, demanded that the Priiae Minister 
should quite because the electorate had rejected him. 
In Kerala the Shift in votes towards the Left 
Democratic Front was breathtakingly small: a mere one 
per cent swing, but it was enough to fell a government 
The LDP holded only 65,285 votes more than the United 
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Oeraocratic Front (UDF)• Congress men now concede^ that 
the UDP's failure had much to do with a large number of 
seats doled-out to the regional and communal parties. 
All these groups fared poorly at the husting. Many Youth 
Congress (I) leaders also attribute the defeat to the 
party's failure to field young and new candidates. The 
LDF on the other hand did, and it yielded and rich divi-
dents. The detailed results are as follows: 
Total Seats 140 
CPI 16 
Janata 7 
RSP 5 
Congress (S) 6 
Lok Dal 1 
LDF - IHD 5 
Total LDF Seats 76 
Congress (i) 33 
lUML 15 
KG (J) 5 
KC (M) 4 
NEP 1 
UDF - IND 2 
Total UDF Seats 60 
Independents & Others 2 
Elections countermanded of two seats. 
In West Bengal, a political gale blowing from New 
Delhi in December 1984 has stunned the ruling Lef Front 
as the Congress (i) captured 17 of the State's 42 Lok 
Sabha seats but in 27 month the wind had changed direc-
tion more than any one had realised. Every Logical 
5S 
indicator had suggested that the Congress (I) tally of 
seats would surely increased, but e:q>lains Biman Bose 
"Rajiv moved through Bengal like a King expecting people 
to bow down to him. But they only felt insulted when he 
offered them money and Jobs in exchange for votes". Even 
the Congress men in retrospect admit that they badly mis-
calculated their strategy and "heart the ego of Bangali 
electorate in the process". "Our slogan of 10 Lac jobs 
and rice at rupees 2/kg for certain categories of people 
backfired badly"^ explained Saugata Roy. Had it not 
been for the party's unexpected resurgence in the 
Greater Calcutta region where it won 23 seats, the 
Congress (I) 's fate would have been even more pitiable. 
As it is, 21 sitting Congress (I) MLSs lost. The detailed 
results are given below: 
Total Seats 294 
CPI..(M) 187 
Forward Block 26 
RSP 18 
CPI 11 
RCPI 1 
DSP 2 
WBSP 4 
PB (M) 2 
Left Front 251 
Congrass (i) 40 
Others 3 
By all logic a landslide victory for an electoral 
alliance led by Parooq Abdullah in the Jammu & Kashmir 
poll should have been the cause for exuberant rejoining 
in the state. It was not. That it was only state where 
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details of the poll results remain unannounced almost 
a week after polling ended, gave credence to the wide 
Spread opposition charges that there was rigging and 
electoral bungling. In Jaromu and Kashmir the picture 
for Congress (l) is not as bright as the party's leaders 
including Rajiv Gandhi are making it out to be. Every 
Congress (I) candidates was nominated under Parooq's 
veto and a grass roots Congress (i) organisation is virt-
ually non-existent. Most of Congress (I)'s candidates 
were success full in Jammu either due to massive vote 
divisions caused by an unprecedented inflex of indepen-
dents, or because they were Farooq's candidates. Though 
Muslim United Front backed only four seats, it polled 
almost 35 per cent of the popular vote - larger than 
that polled by all Congress (i) candidates in the 
fray. The results in detail: 
National Conference (F) 
Congress (I) 
M U P 
B J P 
Independents 
Total Seats 
36 
24 
4 
2 
4 
76 
Election postponed in three constituencies Result 
declared in 70 constituencies. 
Just like Assam and Punjab, Congress (I) kept its 
tradition of losing elections in those states where ac-
cords had been signed. The Mizo National Front swept 
the polls by winning 24 out of 40 Assembly seats. The 
strength of Congress (I) which had won 20 seats in the 
30 member Assembly in 1984 was reduced to 13 in the 40 
member Assembly Similarly trigadier Sailo's people's 
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Conference saw its strength dwindle from 8 to 3. 
in Haryana Congress (I)'s rout at the hands of 
LOk Dal (B) - BJP Goiribine was total. Of the 87 seats 
for which the results were annbunced, the Congress (I) 
could win only a humiliating five. An across the elec-
toral divide the triuB^h of Devi Lai's Lok Dal (B) was 
was con^jlete. With three seats remaining to be fitted 
in the 90 member legislature the Lok Dal (B) Now con-
trol a hefty Block of 59 seats and the BJP controls 
15: An unprecedented 4/5 majority for the partners. 
The man from Meham had created mayhem on the country's 
political stage. The fragile edifice of the Punjab 
accord was further fuffeted by Devi Lai's assault. 
"We don't accept the Punjab accord" he thundered after 
being sworn in. The new Chief Minister also rejected 
the Eradi Commission's verdict on sharing the Ravi -
Beas waters, threatend to hold on to Chandigarh and 
reopen the question of Fazilka - Abohar, which had been 
delinked from Chandigarh by the Mathew Commission. The 
detailed party position in the Haryana Assembly after 
the 1987 election: 
Total Seats 90 
Lok Dal (B) 59 
B J P 15 
Congress (i) 5 
C p I (M) 1 
C p I 1 
Independents 6 
Elections countarmanded three. 
SI 
The Eradi panel's jp^ ae^ l ^  report on the allocation 
of Ravi - Beas water to Punjab and Haryana appears tailor 
made to satisfy both states. However the catch with re-
gard to the additional water which the commission has dis-
covered. The report claims to have located an additional 
4.613 million acre feet of water in the two river systems, 
although it estimates that only 40 per cent of this amount 
is utilisable only 60 per cent of this utilisable amount 
should to be allocated to Punjab and Haryana now, leav-
ing the remaining to be distributed later. Both the 
Akali Dal and BJP has expressed surprise at the Conatniss-
ion's discovery, pointing out that additional water being 
available at the rira stations between Madhopur and the 
Ravi siphon or between the Mandi plain and Ferozepur. Of 
course, the Eradi panel was concerned with the allocated 
amounts, apart from actual use. It was pointed out that 
by choosing July 1, 1985 as the date for measuring actual 
use, the Centre had written in a pro-Punjab bias in the 
Eradi-panel's terms of reference. That Haryana's share 
been increased despite this limitation may help the rul-
ing party in the forth coming poll. Taking a longer 
term view, however, what should concern all the parties 
is the sharp decline in the ground water level both in 
Punjab and Haryana, 
The selection of a candidate for the electionop 
eight/tPresident of India caused a lot of heart-burning 
among the opposition parties. Initially they tried to 
rope in Giani Zail Singh to stand for a second term. 
But due to the opposition from the two communist parties 
consensus could not be reached on his candidature. Mr. V. 
R. Krishna Iyer was ultimately chosen as the opposition 
candidate. Congress (I) on his part chose Vice Presi-
dent R, Venkatararaan as its candidate - a Choice which 
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was excellent, wise and proper. The opposition hopes for 
cross voting were conpletely. dashed and Mr. R. Venkataraman 
emerged a winner with a huge margin. 
The steady decline of national institutions has been 
a recurring tune played by the more pessimistic observer 
of Indian political scene. And the events of the first 
half of the current year can only serve to buttress this 
depressing theme whether it is the president. Prime Minis-
ter, other constitutional functionaries and even non 
governmental institution like Press there suddenly seems 
to be no standards of behaviour, no norms of conduct, no 
conventions that are followed. In such circumstances the 
institutions of state must themselvew come under great 
strain. 
At the highest level, both the president and Prime 
Minister have embarked on courses of action that test 
the constitution. The amazing interpretation from Rash-
trapati Bhavan - that the President can dismiss a Prime 
Minister who en^y on ovejcwhelraing majority in Lok Sabha 
is of a piece with Rajiv Gandhi allowing his personal 
predilections to come in the way of discharg his consti-
tutional duty of keeping the President informed of events. 
A short distance away from this degrading action Par-
liament sees endless ponderaonium and repeated walkoutg, 
with a 'no confidence* motion against even the speaker 
of the Lok Sabha - for only the second time in over 35 
years. The treasury benches can do little after them 
thump their desks, while no one in the Congress(I) seems 
to find anything amiss in speaker after speaker from the 
party roundly criticising in Parliament the actions of 
V.P. Singh as a leading light of the Congress (I) Govern-
ment. As for the opposition, it is as guilty as the rul-
ing party in failing to attend crucial debaters, so that 
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a vital piece of Ifegislation is voted with just 20 VPs 
in the House, In a fundamental sense, parliament is quite 
sickly non functional. 
The rot goes deeper. In the states, for instance, 
cabinet ministers are publicly named for their links 
with terrorists, or engage in public duels with police 
Chiefs, 
Pdjrtunately, there is no more talk of fostering 
a committed bureaucracy, and it has been some time since 
the last protest resignation from the Supreme Court beca-
use of supersession took place. Nevertheless, Judicial 
appointments do not seem beyond question, even as the 
entire system of dispensing justice creaks under the 
weight of backlog of cases and of corruption. As for 
commissions of inquiry, no one seems to take them seri-
ously any more. Their reports are either not published 
or when published do not find wide acceptance. 
The political parties - supposedly standard -
bearers of democracy - have no internal democracy of 
their own and are by and large unable to hold organisat-
ional elections. Credibility in the system as a whole 
has been eroded to the point where the public is pre-
pared to believe that people in positions of power or 
influence have illegal Swiss bank accounts and can, as 
a result, be blackmailed from aborad. After all the 
talk of a cleansing of public life, this must come as the 
biggest shock of all. 
Two years ago, Rajiv Gandhi had himself referred to 
the decline of national institvrtions, and said that nur-
turing them would be one of his priorities. He could 
take credit for some actions on this score, but he has 
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also personally contributed to the problem. 
The findings of the inquiry conducted by the 
National Audit Bureau of Sweden, into the Coromissions 
paid by hovrtizer - manufacturer Bofors in connection 
with its te. 1,400 - crores deal with India, have served 
as an eye •> opener. The findings have clarified issues 
that had been sought to be obfuscated, silenced orchest-
rated drum - beat about destabilisation, and raised seve-
ral questions about the Governments's eredibility and 
precise intentions. There is little doubt that this 
is now one scandal that cannot be wished away. 
The essential facts stand out clearly. Bofors 
did pay money to an Indian agent; the payment was in 
connection with the controversial deal; it was made into 
Swiss bank accounts; and the sums involved seems much 
too big to be related to general s\q>port services like 
booking airline tickets. The Bofors explanation -
that these were payments connected with winding up the 
arrangement with its Indian agent - may or may not be 
technically corrects, but only the endoringly gullible 
will believe that it is the whole truth. For these can 
be little doubt that the commission was meant to be used 
as bribes. ^  
Swedish Radio now stands vindicated, and the Govern-
ment's and the Congress (I) working committee's some what 
tired war cry about the foreign hand and destablisation 
stands exposed as nothing but cynical slogan - mongering 
designed to pull the wool over people's eyes. The issues 
are real the tribes have been paid, and the stench of 
curruption will not go away. Vital details have been 
held back by both Bofors and the Swedish Government. But 
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on this aspect too the Indian Government's response 
has once again been thoroughtly unsatisfactory. When 
the heat was on in Parliament, it declined to have 
an inquiry conducted by a parliaroentary committee, 
arguing that the Swedish Government had been asked to 
investigate. The two need not have been mutually exclu-
sive. Now when the situation calls for urgent follow up 
measures, the sudden dagerness for a parliamentary in-
quiry can only be interpreted as a flanking manoeuvre. 
Quite apart from the fact that a parliamentary 
committee will have no powers to seek information ab-
road - either from Bofors, or from the Swedish authori-
ties, or from Switserland - the Government seems to be 
dragging its feet on the first steps the actual setting 
up of the committee. Besides all this, there is the 
obvious question of what is being done about the ille-
gal commission of Rs* 30 crores paid on the deal with a 
German company for submarines. 
The Government, of course, still claims complete 
innocence, and the Prime Minister continues to maintain 
that he is as interested in getting to known the culp-
rits, and to catch them, as any one else. But its 
action so far do not measure up to this public stance. 
Indeed, the Government has to e:xplain how it maintained 
complete silence for so long on a Bofors communication 
in i^ril admitting that payments had been made. On this 
account alone, the Government's credibility in the whole 
affair wears dangerously thin. Rajiv Gandhi must straight 
away take a series of obvious steps. He must ask the Swe-
dish authorities for all the information they have with-
held. He must ask Bofors to return the money that has 
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been paid into swiss bank accounts, or reduce by a link 
amount the stun that India has to pay to it for equipment 
supplied. Similarly, Bofors must be asked to provide all 
the information that it has so far withheld from the 
Swedish authorities. The Bofors agent in India should 
not have been allowed to leave the country when it was 
known that the audit bureau's findings were due any day 
He should now be forced to return, by withdrawing his 
passport if necessary. And by registering a case and 
seeking Interpol's help if there is no other option. 
Also, the Government must follow up the matter with the 
Swiss authorities, and enter into an agreement for tack-
ling economic criminals in either country. 
Without these steps, the Government will stand indi-
cated in the ptiblic mind, if not in any court of law, in 
a case of proven corruption concerning massive defence 
contract abroad. If Rajiv Gandhi is to get on top of 
this explosive situation, and win public trust on the 
issue, he must demonstrate that his government's hands 
are clean, and go after the culprits in a manner that 
leaves no doubt about his commitment to get to the bot-
tom of the whole affair. His government's future could 
depend on it. 
Even in India's dramatic political history, there 
has rarely been instance of a politician plummeting from 
such heights to such depths as Rajiv Gandhi has managed 
to do in under two years. Then, he could do no wrong; 
now he can do nothing right. Once he was Mr. Clean, with 
an open, honest approach. Today, he appears evasive, 
secretive. And the nicer brother's nicer friends have 
been swallowed by swirling ciouds of scandal. Indeed, 
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the nice guy didn't even know how to be nice to the 
head of state. 
What was promised wais a government that works faster; 
what has been offered is government that works faster in 
getting from one mess to other, for an incredible five 
months at Stretch. Most of all from winning 80 per c«nt 
of the seats in his latest election. 
Rajiv Gandhi is in deep trouble, and must know it 
even if he doesn't admit at much. His capacity to lead 
his party to victory in any election is now seriously in 
question Caught in a seemingly unending crisis, he seems 
bereft of Ideas on how to fight hi4 way out of trouble, 
lacking in the judgement required to pick sound advi-
sers. 
Although he has managed to keep the majority in 
the party with him so far, he has failed to build lieute-
nants he can and trust and who have the ability and per-
sonal qualities that merit Prime Ministerial trust. 
Instead, one chosen aide after after another has been 
dropped unceremonioxisly, leaving him without buffers 
to withstand the shocks when things begin to go wrong. 
Rajiv Gandhi must facr up to the reality of his own 
failing if things are to get better for the country. 
He has to realise he is part of the problem, as many of 
his senior partymen are increasingly whispering. Rajiv 
cam also be national acceptable once again, someone 
who can still deliver on at least a part of his early 
promise. 
There are obvious steps he must take all of them 
long overdue. He must put the Bofors and other scandals 
behind him by getting quickly the names of the culprits 
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and ensuring speedy and externplary punishment. He must 
amend the terras of reference for the inquiry coranission 
into the Fairfax issue. And he must fill the vacancies 
in the cabinet, patch up with V.P. Singh and use his grow-
ing stature for the benefit of his party or government 
and then demand the kind of performance V.P. Singh deli-
vered in finance. He must give a fresh sense of direct-
ion to the Government and the party and if he is to pull 
out of the mess that he has landed himself in, he must 
observed some basic do's and don'ts includding the fol-
lowing: 
Be Prime Ministerial, Don't talk of other people's 
grand mothers, don't make wild promises, avoid paranoia, 
and don't keep changing your mind. 
do Don't try to^everything, delegate, get away from 
detail, priorities and keep the broad picture in mind. 
Make good use of lieutenants, let them do some 
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of the fighting. Use them/buffers. 
Distance yourself from the old coterie of advi-
sers, don't bypass normal party channels of communicat-
ion. 
Prune the Prime Minister's secretariat, let the 
rainisteries be their own masters, review their perfor-
mance quarterly. 
Don't given up pushing for change and fall back 
on the status quo-c^ture the country's imagination with 
solid action and clear, achieveable goals. If Rajiv Gandhi 
has in him to do all this and more, he can still rise to 
the challenge of administering a sup<!»remely ungovernable 
country. If he can't he will get swallowed up by yet 
new crises and will eventually have to go. 
part three 
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INDIA, POLITICS, AGITATIONS, GUJRAT, BtjARTIYA KISAN 
SABGU. 
1. FARMERS' Stir, Indian Express, 55, 134; 1987, Mar 24; 
6a-b. 
Editorially coinaents that the failxire of Gujrat 
Government to handle the farmer^ stir with tact is appa-
rent* Although the Bhartiya Kisan Sangh has been agitat-
ing to press its demands for the lower power rates and 
liigher prices for agriculture produce for at least six 
months, the government has vacillated in devising a firm 
and clear cut policy. This is why the Government could 
not head off the "asseoobly gherao" in Gandhinagar and 
"village bandh" in rural areas. Eight people were killed 
in the police firing in the capital and many injured 
there as well as clashes in villages. The outvbreaX of 
violence triggered as usual, noisy scenes in the state 
Assembly, The opposition staged a walkout demanding a 
Judicial inquiry into the police firing. 
2, TOWARDS CASTE WAR, Times of India, 150, 82; 1987, 
Mar, 24; 6a-b. 
Editorially focuses on the farmer's agitation in Gujrat 
which has taken a turn for the worse. After the Bhartiya 
Kisan Sangh's plan last thrusday to "gherao" the Asseaibly 
in Gandhinagar ended in violent clashes with the police. 
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the agitation's leaders gave a call for one day "village 
bandh" on s&turday. The Chief Minister Mr* Amarsinh Chau-
dhary^ could get the agitation leaders to withdraw their 
stir by releasing most of those arrested during the leist 
Thrxisday's violence. The Sangh has demonstrated its capa-
city to cut off milk supply to the major urban centres 
like Ahraedabad and Baroda« This sudden assertion of the 
agriculttirist's clout on a wide scale deserves careful 
scrutiny. In a way« the farmers agitation can be regar-
ded as a rural manifestation of hack-lash against the 
consolidation of gains of KHAM Strategy put in place by 
the congress first in 1980. In 1981-85 the pattidars be-
gan realising the full implications of loss of political 
power whatever hopes the pattidars led intermediate castes 
had of regaining the earlier dominance were belied by 
the congress victories in the district and taluka pancha-
yat poll in Saxx, last. However, the margin of Congress 
triumph was not all that inpressive whereas in the 1985 
assembly election the party has garnered 55.54 % votes. 
Now BJP is capitalising on the acute sense of disillusion-
ment among the intermediate caste. 
-0 -0 -# -* PEASANTS. 
3. THARAMANGALAM (Joseph)« Indian peasant uprisings: Myth 
and reality. Journal of peasant studies, 13, 3? 1986, Apr, 
116-34. 
The author states that this review of some important 
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recent works on peasant movements in India examines 
four major questions concerning (a) the social locus 
of rebellions, (b) the role of capitalism and imperia-
lism, (c) the paxt played by existing state power, and 
(d) the role of parties or organisations. It is argued 
that while there is no unchanging social base, the 
disproportionately high degree of tribal-participation 
in armed rebellion may provide some clue to the relative 
lack of similar participation among the main-stream 
peasantry, that.capitalist imperialism is a multi^faced 
phenomenon impinging on the peasantry in many ways, 
that existing state power plays a major part in rebel-
lions, and that a party or organisation is a necessary 
precondition for any trans-local or trans-tribal move-
ment. It concludes by suggesting that varieties of 
mobilisation within the frame work of parliamentary 
politics should be studied in order to assess the really 
significant role of the political evolution of post-in-
dependence India. 
-t -, -, POLITICAL PARTIES, WEST BENGAL, DARJEELING, 
GORKHALAND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. 
4. MUKHERJEE (Tapas). Another 'Khalistan'. Sunday, 13, 34; 
1986, June, 29; 20-23. 
Author says that Darjeeling, the queen of the 
hills, is in revolt. "Land first, bread and butter later" 
72 
is the war ciry of the brave GoDdas today. Reminisient 
of the bloody Punjab agitation, the Gorkhaland movement 
is avowedly not for economic emancipation but for the 
political identity and due status of the Ghorkha commu-
nity. As in Punjab, the leadership of community has 
slipped away from the hands of moderate to militants. 
And as with Punjab in this case too the authorities 
initially dismissed the demand for a separate GorKha 
State as the brainchild of a frenzied mind. The suc-
cessful Gorkhaland bandh in May organised by GNLF shook 
the powers - that be out of their complacency. Darjeel-
ing may go the Punjab way if firm steps are not taken 
by the centre and the state government. 
«, -,-, _, -^  POLITICAL PARTIES, GORKHALAND NATIONAL 
LIBERATION FRONT. 
5. VIOLENCE IN Darjeeling. Tribune.107, 172; 1987, Jun, 
23; 4a-b. 
Editorially points out that the Delhi is to be 
blamed for the violence and anarcly stalJcing three hill 
sub-divisions of Darjeeling since Saturday, it has not 
been able to make up its mind how to treat Mr. Stibhash 
Ghishing, leader of the Gorkha National Liberation Front. 
Mr. Buta Singh has slided from one position to another 
with great agility. Last week he promised "some positive 
and firm action" on the issue after prolonged talks with 
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the West Bengal Chief Minister Mr. Jyoti Basu. He sup-
ported the GNLF call for regional autonoray for the Dar-
jeellng areas, inclusion of Gorkhali in the Eighth Sche-
dule of the constitution and also agreed to examine other 
to 
economic demands. All this led^gceat e^qpectations in 
Darjeeling. Mr. Ghishing quickly raised the stakes. He 
wanted a telephone call from the Prime Minister himself 
and boasted in public that he would secure "Gorkhaland 
within 1987". OSiere is another aspect to the ongoing 
bandh. The district administration thinks that the GNLP 
has entered a dead end. Bandh, if it turns violent, so 
much the better, and to nobody's surprise, violence 
stalks the land. Ghorkha militants have lynched police-
men and CPM supporters, attacked and set fire to public 
buildings, erected road blocks and have even looted type-
writers from a government office, so Mr. Buta Singh's 
advice to the State Government to adopt a "soft line" on 
the agitation lest the extremists topple Mr. Ghishing. 
6. GHISING HASN'T <:^ anged, Amrita Bazar patrika. 1987, 
Jul, 8; 6a-b. 
Editorially points out that the Gorkhaland National 
Liberation Front leader, Mr. Subhash Ghising, is about to 
modify his demand for a separate Gorkhaland. He said that 
he was not personally aver to accepting regional autonony 
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or a Union Territory status for the - district as a 
first step towards statehood is hedged with so many 
arabiguities that it will be mistake to regard the state-
ment as anything approaching the common stand of the 
centre and West Bengal Government, that there will be 
no partition of the state. Mr, Ghising has taken pains 
to clarify that the collective opinion of the GNLP may 
be different from his. The shrewd political operator 
that he is, he may hint at this so-called difference 
in the GNLP to use it as a gambit for carrying on the 
agitation simultaneously at two levels ; Mr. Ghising 
negotiating with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Mr. Jyoti Basu 
for some soirt of a special status for the hill areas 
and those simulating to hold a different view making ex-
propriate noises in the hills to proclaim that they will 
settle for nothing less than a seperate state. Mr Ghising 
is a skilled politician and the surely knows that regional 
autonomy and status of a Union Territory are not inter-
changeable. 
-, -, -, RESERVATIONS, ANDHRA PRADESH 
7. NINAN (TN) and MUNON (Araarnath). Andhra Pradesh : The 
reservation ruckus. India Today. 11, 16; 1986 Aug., 16-31; 
98-103 
% e authors state that the too many politicians in 
recent Indian history have paid the price for playing 
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caste politics one example Madhavslnh Solankl, who lost 
his Gujrat Chief Ministership last year,seemingly heed-
less o£ this, Andhra Pradesh Chief N.T. Rama Rao went 
ahead last month with announcing increased reservations 
of jobs and college seats for the backward classes, spark-
ing off an tnti-reservation agitation that is now snow-
balling across the state. 
-, -# -, -, GUJRAT 
8, AUCTION POLITICS. Economist. 295, 7395; 1985 May, 25; 48 
States that in the past two mont||is 130 people have 
been killed in India's Western state of Gujrat. The imme-
diate cause of trouble was the pre-election promise of the 
Congress Party to enhance the quota for scheduled castes 
and backward classes, hoping that since the existing 
never 
qjaotes were/fulfilled, there will not be any need for 
enhancement in actuality. It was to prove wrong and the 
upper castes took to street against this new law. The new 
way of political corruption in India is the loan melas 
where-by the politicians distribute "loans" never ex-
pecting them to be repaid. In Gujrat the other major 
disturbing factor has been the role of police which has 
been patently partial and law even joined in roitlng, 
which has resulted in Army being called out. Civil 
disturbances should be handled by civilian authorities 
and not by paramilitary forces or army. 
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9. CRISIS IN Gujrat. Montltly CoHiraentary on Indian Economic 
Conditions, 26, 8; 1985, May, 3;. 
The article traces the deep crisis in Gujrat State 
which has manifested itself in much bloodshed, some arson, 
and continuing unrest and has its roots in many weaknesses 
in a situation full of misunderstanding. The assertion 
of both central and State Governments that the reserva-
tion issue for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe cannot 
be reconsidered does not diminish tension. The extraordi-
nary situation of police force violating the la^ and op-
erating not merely in a wildly, indisciplined manner but 
itself killing and aiding arson has never previously 
seen. A judicial inquiry, is necessary, to show how and 
why the police force erupted in a manner totally unprece-
dented. It is quite iB^propriate that people should ask 
whether the chief Minister of Gujarat however able at 
winning elections, is now an appropriate leader of a 
Government which has not been able over a month to res-
tore order in a manner which conveys the confidence to 
the people of Ahmedabad, The scheduled caste and scheduled 
tribes in the Indian Union do not enjoy equal citizenship 
because of the cgreat handicaps in poverty,- Lack of educat-
ion, which prevents their con5)eting on equal terms with 
others for the limited job available both in 3overnment 
and in private sector. So there is a need, apart from 
Gujrat to have a fair assessment regarding the force of 
public opinion in the matter of reservation policy. 
77 
10. RESPITE IN Guirat. National Herald. 1985, Jul, 24. 
Editorially states that there are perceptible signs 
of inprovements in the political situation after the 
take over by Mr, Amarshing Chaudhary as Chief Ministry 
in Gujrat. The situation, particularly in the walled 
areas of Ahraedabad, continues to be grave after the with-
drawal of the army. Those who led the agitation against 
the reservation policy of the Solanki Ministry are now 
divided and those who are opposed to the agreement rea-
c|ied between the new chief ministry and the two key 
organisations which were a party to the agitation are 
trying to continue the stir. It is clear that the people 
of Gujrat want an early return to normalcy and vested 
interests alone have a stake in the day to day violence. 
The agitation leader must have by now drawn appropriate 
lessons. Now the police have undertaken 'operation comb-
ing* it is to be hoped that things will change appre-
ciably. Those who violated law will have to be put down 
with heavy hand. It is time that thosv who have reached 
an accord with the Government took a lead in promoting 
peace. The chief minister has made several gestures. 
His doors are always open for tal]<s and there is no pro-
blem which cannot be solved through dialogue. The issue 
of reservation is being dealt with on a national level 
and thosv who have any grievances can altg 
appropriate forums. 
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11. HAMLYN (Michael). India's Upper Castes rebel over special 
favours granted untouchables. Tiroes. 620, 75; 1985, Nov, 1; 
12a-c. 
Author points out that the gi§nt central state of 
MacUaya Pradesh was paralysed by a general strike called 
by the students protesting at the proposal by Government 
to increase reserve places at colleges and in State jobs 
for the so-called backward castes, in Gujrat too, conti-
nuing agitation against sindlar plans to increase the 
quotas in higher education, reserved seats for scheduled 
castes. Under the present system with only 49 per cent 
of places reserved, the lowest mark that a student who 
had no reserved place needed to enter Maulana Azad College 
for Technology last ye«r was said to be 80 per cent. The 
lowest mark that would gain entry to reserved place was 
32 per cent. Students in the unreserved category are 
leading the agitation against the change both in Madhya 
Pradesh and Gujrat, where the chief minister Madhav Sinh 
Solanki, is proposing similar action, having waited more 
than a year since the report of the conanission recommend-
ing the changes was presented. 
12. VIOLENCE IN Gujrat. Hindu. 108,54; 198?,Mar, 21; 8. 
The paper editorially comments on the type of vio-
lence that was let loose in Ahroedabad following the deep-
ing stir by the anti_reservation is to lend credence to 
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the view that the operation might have been a planned 
affair^What is matter for serious concern is the fact 
that the agitation should have taJcen a distinctly com-
munal tinge triggering riots in some sensitive areas, 
though Hindu-Muslim trouble is no new feature in the 
walled city. The students decided to continue to fight 
it out. But the government did not take the students 
resolve seriously, and by the tiiae it was realised that 
the movement was gaining added strength it was too late 
to arrest in the normal course. The Home minister's 
statement that it was decided to round up all the anti-
social easements although ^t a late stage migh indicate 
who really were behind the disturbances. The solution 
to the problem consists in the Government taking a 
fresh, practical view of policy of reservations. This 
is not the first time that violence erupted in Gujrat 
over the issue; three years ago the Government had to 
beat a hasty retreat when the anti-reservatiiSte organised 
a mass movement against the enhanced quotas for the 
backward classes in higher institutions of learning — 
professional and technical. 
.-, -, ASSEMBIiIES^, KERi^ LA, CONGRESS (I) COALITION, 
CABINET RESHUFFLE, CONTROVERSIES, PILLAI. 
13. MENON (Venu). For whom the bell tolls. Illustrated Weekly 
^f India. 107, 50; 1986 Dec, 21; 44-5. 
Author points out Pillai's rehabilitation and ensuing 
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contx^versy. The Kerala Government has done a neat volte-
face. A year after banishing Electricity Minister R. Bala-
krishna pillai from the Cabinet? Chief Minister Karunakaran 
has reinstated the beleaguered minister, pillai was 
forced to resign, following a fiery speech he made last 
year, in which he exhosted Kesalites to launch a. Punjab-
like agitation. The Judgement of the Kerala high court 
in the matter is now awaited. 
-# -# -* -, ~, CONTROVERSIES. 
14. KERALA CONGRESS and League Seek time. StateWBUJt. 126, 3613; 
1985, Sec, 13. 
The paper states that the political charade Mr. K. 
Karunakaran, heading the United Democratic Front Govern-
ment in Kerala, has been playing for the past few weeks 
reached a dead end today with the Kerala Congress and the 
Indian Union Mioslim League, two major partners in the rul-
ing coalition, asking for time till December 18, 1985 to 
decide whether they would prefer a thorough reconstitution 
of the Ministry to refurbish its image or go in for raid-
term elections. 
15. MENON (Venu). Kerala: Ideas of March. Illustrated Weekly 
of India. 107, 12; 1986,Mar, 23; 44-5. 
The author says that the crisis of divisive coalition 
continues. Chief Minister K. Karunakaran of the Congress-I, 
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who had earlier sought either a mid-term poll or a cabi-
net resuffle, had to backtrack in the face of intrasig-
ence from his coalition partners, the Kerala Congress and 
Indian Union Muslim league. The author reports on the 
discord within the rulijAg coalition in Kerala, the only 
Congress-I led government in the south. 
16. PRABHAKARAN (G), Behind tensions in Kerala Coalition 
Ministry. Patriot. 1985, Jun, 7; ^ . 
Author points out that the War of attrition between 
coalition partners in Kerala-^the Kerala Congress and the 
Congress - has developed into an explosive situation over 
the centre's allocation for the state plan:^  Are the (Charges 
by Kerala Congress what they appear on the surface ? ^ bwee 
Minister Pillai's resignation over a case brought against 
him in the high court has added to the uncertainties. 
17. STILL ON the hook. Tiroes of India, 149, 48il986 Mar, 11; 
8a-b 
-,/ The paper editorially states that the UDP Ministry 
in Kerala has won a reprieve by working out a conqpromise 
between the two feuding constituents of the coalition -
the Congress and the Kerala Congress. The Chief Minister 
Mr. K. Karunakaran, however, can be under no illusion that 
the patch work is fragile and that he is still on hook. 
He wanted to reshuffle the cabinet thoroughly or go in 
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for a raid-term poll to in^rove the UDF's "tranisheol 
Image". Under the new accord^ reportedly reached with 
the good offices of HTislim League^ . both proposal have 
been shelved. Besides, some of his own party colleagues 
like the Horae Minister, Mr. Vayalar Ravi, and the speaker, 
Mr. V.M. Sudhiran of the Anthony group have also made com-
mon cause in the belief that his moves are also meant to 
cut them down to size. All this is bound to make it even 
more difficult than it now is the ohief Minister to wrest 
key portfolios like that of finance, revenue, industry 
and education for his own committed supporters from the 
Kerala Congress and the Muslim League. Plainly Mr. Kara-
nakaran's latest surrender to his scheming cabinet collea-
gues will do nothing to enchance the UDF prospects in 
the next election whether it is held on schedule in May, 
1987, or a few months in advance. 
-, -, CENTRE - STATE RELATIONS 
18. CENTRE - STATE relations. Democratic World. 14, 9; 1985, 
Mar, 3; 3-4. 
Editorially highlights that the prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi's thought that nonrCongress ministries in states will 
not make *or proper administration seems to lack convict-
ion. The point is that in a federal set up, even if the 
same party is In power in both the states and the centre, 
there will be special problems. The constitution laid 
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down the principle that India is a union of States. The 
tropical nature of Kerala and the desert-Stat« of Rt^as-
than will have different priorities and varying demands 
from the Centre, That has nothing to do with who is in 
political control. Fortunately, the regional parties 
take no interest in foreign policy. There are exception 
though. The BJP, for instance, is critical of India's 
non-alignment^ They think the country should be more 
allied to the US or alternatively should not be too 
friendly to the USSR. But a BJP in jpower in one state 
or even two need not be preaching on foreign af&irs. 
In practice, however, the tendency is not only to retain 
power at* the centre but to extend it to new fields. It was 
because of this that the Left Front and Telugu Desara Par-
ties took some interest in en^haaising the need to provide 
more autonomy to the States unfortunately, the Akalis of 
Punjab starting from same premises allowed themselves to 
be over ridden by religious fanatics like Bhindranwala and 
now the reasonable arguments that states need more powers 
has been equated with separatism and secession. That is 
the saddest blow delivered by the hapless Akalis. 
84 
-, '•, ~, ACCORDS. 
19. NAYAR (Kuldip), Working the two accords. Nagpur Times. 
1985, Nov, 1. 
The author points out that some noises made against 
the accord in Punjab and Assam are understandable. Rajiv 
Gandhi has begun a new chapter in Punjab and Assam. The 
Ra^ l^v Longowal accord said that a commission would decide 
which area of Pubjab would be amputated from the state 
for grafting with Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh's allot-
ment to Punjab. There are^however^ danger signs that 
dilatory tactics, bureaucratic indiscretion, and desire 
to have political gain may \indo what he has done . The 
question is not whether he will allow that to happen but 
whether he will be vigilant enough to nip any mischief 
against them in bud. 
20. SINHA (SK). After the Euphoria : Building a pleuralistic 
democracy. Statesman. 126, 3517, 1985, Sep., 8? 6. 
The author while welcoming the Punjab and Assam 
accords, says that their test will lieu in inclementation. 
Since the Akali Dal and AASU are parties to these agree-
ments, he thinks it necessary to involve them officially 
in the process of execution. In Punjab this can be done 
only if the Akaliacome to power either on their own or 
in coalition with others. Both here and in Assam, the 
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author says, apposition parties would do well to support 
the regional forces and assure them that they are part of 
national mainstream. At the same time he argu6« it is 
necessary to look beyond these accords and come to grips 
with two basic problems of our polity: the culture of 
sycophancy and the absence of a credible national alter-
native to congress (I). Attention has to be paid to these 
issues to safeguard democracy, federalism and political 
plurality. 
_, -, -, _, ASSAM, 1985 
21. ASSAM ACCORD, Economic and Political w&ekly. 20, 33; 
1985, Jul, 17; 1-2. 
Editorially points out that the memorandvim of set-
tlement on Assam appears to be a test rather in a line of 
holy texts of all religions, meaning all things to all 
persons and calculated to please everyone and has indeed 
apparently succeeded in the short time. Such implacable 
foes as the leadership of Assam agitation and chief minis-
ter Hiteswar Saikia have welcomed the accord though their 
interpretation of the terms of the memorandom of settle-
ment naturally vary. However given the fundamentally 
different perceptions of the basic issues in Assam on 
the part of the major protagonists, the present near 
universal welccxae of the accord and accompanying 
8G 
jubilation perhsqps reflect more a sense of relief that 
the days of agitation are over than anything else. For 
about the best thing that one can say about the meoioran-
dmn of settlement signed in small hoxirs of August 15 by 
the Assam agitation leaders and senior officials of 
uxiion and state governments in the presence of Prime 
Minister is that it promises to bring to an end a period 
of extreme tensions within Assam society. If the accord 
were bring to an end; or even halt, the gathering tenden-
cies towards furtl^r disintegration of Assam society it 
would have achieved a lot. 
22. BARUAH (Sanjib)• Immigration, ethnic conflict and poli-
tical turmoil - Assam, 1979-85. Asian Suirvey. 26, 11; 
1986, Nov, 1184-1206. 
Author highlights that the Assam Accord signed 
on Augtist 15, 1985, between Prime Minister and the lea-
ders of the movement that demanded the expulsion and dis-
enfranchisement of "foreigners" marked the end of six 
years of ethnic conflict and political instability in 
the state of Assam in northeastern India. The political 
turmoil began in the fall of 1979 when the AASU and AGS?, 
an adhoc coalition of a few regional political and cul-
tural organisations, sponsored a campaign drawing atten-
tion to the problem of Illegal immigration into the 
state mostly from Bangladesh. The Assam accord In— 
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corporated significant concessions by the Governiaent of 
India to the movement's demands. Fresh elections were 
held to the state Assembly in December 1985 and a new 
regional party, the Assam Gana parishad (AGP), was elec-
ted to power, which marked the return to political nor-
malcy in state. l%is article analyses this episode of 
political turmoil in which ethnic conflict weis a central 
theme. The AGPs stqpport, in particular its ability to 
secure some support among Bengali Muslims immigrants, and 
the some what limited nature of UMF's support indicate 
that the forces of polarization were mediated by the 
forces of accommodation. 
23. PERDESI (Ghanshyam) ( ) • Snd of a night mare. Illus-
trated Weekly of India, 106, 17; 1985, Sep, 1; 14-7. 
Author says that for six long years, Assam has been 
in ferment, divided hy bitter and bloody strife, the 
north eastern state seemed candidate for anarchy. The 
process now seems to have been arrested with the signing 
of an accord between the centre and Assam agitators. 
After nearly ten hours of intense negotiations, the ac-
cord was reached at 2.45 A.M. on Augvist 15, 1985.P.M. 
Rajiv Gandhi had led the negotiations personally for 
three hours, in the accord central government has firmly 
committed itself to stop any further foreign infiltration 
8S 
into Assam. The accord also commits the Central Govern-
ment to provide legislative and administrative safeguards 
to protect the Assamese cultural identity. Another iB^ por-
tant point in accord regards Assam's economic development. 
As Prime Minister announced the setting up of oil refinery 
in Assam in the private sector, the jute mill at Siiighat 
and paper mill at Jogigahopa will be reopened and an IIT 
will be set vcp in State. AASU and AAC^p had never accep-
ted the Hi»teshwar Saikia government. Rajiv Gandhi was 
able to pursuade the movement leaders to allow Saikia to 
continue as caretaker chief Minister till the new govern-
ment is formed. 
-, _, -, -, -, IMPLEMENTATION, MINORTTIES, PEARS. 
24. SRI RAMAN (J). Which 'accord' has won in Assam ? Link, 
28, 21; 1985, Dec.^ 29; 4-5. 
Author writes that the prospect of political 
instability for Assam in strengthened by evidences of 
conflicting interpretation of the accord inside the State 
riding party itself. The second electoral event,, made 
possible by the "politics of accord" has passed off. But, 
the outcome seems hardly likely to usher in an era of 
Assam politics free from destablising discords. The 
danger had been warned against before by State Congress 
leaders, reportedly including former Chief Minister 
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Hlteswar Saikla. There is little need to argue that 
the accord had accentuated the minorities' sense of in-
security which in turn, needs no esq^ lanatlon after the 
Nellie massacre of 1983 for the most memorable instance 
of the passions packed into the movement. The minorities 
have cast their vote in other words, with an eye on the 
in5)lementation of the accord, which Chief Minister prafulla 
Kumar Mahanta has described as the "top priority" of his 
government along with "elimination of corruption". 
., .^  ., .^  .^  PROBLEMS. 
25. TO SAVE the accord. Statesmen. 127, 8426; 1987, Mar, 12; 
6b>c. 
The paper editorially consnents that the although 
Mr. prafulla Kumar Mahanta has again expressed dissatis-
faction over the Centre's attitude regarding implement-
ing the Assam accord, his tone is somewhat less aggresive 
than before. Last year he darkly hinted that New Delh's 
failtire to take a'positive Interest" regarding the imple-
mentation of Assam accord, he now concedes that "some 
progress" has been made although he is still not "fully 
satisfied". The AGP has a point when it argues - that 
it is tinrealistic to expect neighbours to prove someon«*s 
citizenehip status as the entire locality may be packed 
with aliens^ Since the very plank on which the AQP 
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attained power has undermined its ioopartiality, it is 
hardly possible for centre to accept its proposals, know-
ing that unrestrained authority in the matter of detecting 
illegal immigrants will only result in fiorther harassment 
of the lingviistic and religious minorities. If the AGP 
government is keen on a proper inplementation of the 
accord, it should desist from trying to change the terras 
of Illegal Migrants Act and allow it to follow its own, 
admittedly slow, but basically fair and legal procedure. 
-, -, -, -, MIZORAM, 1986. 
26. BUCH (MN) . IS Insurgency t>ie- only way ? Times of India 
1986, Jul, 26. 
The author states that Prime Minister has recently 
caused an accord to be signed between the central govern-
ment and Mr. Laldenga, the leader of the Mizo National 
Pront (M.N.F)• It is a matter of record that Mr. Laldenga 
led a Mizo insurgency that has taken many lives, required 
massive police and army intervention and almost led to 
the break away of a vitally inportant territorial area 
from the nation. The containing and ultimate suppression 
of this insurgency albe'it a great deal of avoidable suf-
fering for Mizo people is one of success stories of the 
Indian Araay, assisted by the Assam lifles^C.R.P. and armed 
police of several states. Nevertheless one is happy that 
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a nasty chapter of tribal revolt has been closed. The 
entire tribal population of Northeast would fit into 
Bastar district of M.S. One lesson is clear and loud. If 
you take up arms and kill innocents you may have to pay 
the price of retaliation by the government, but you will 
also recieve a great deal of attention. Money will be 
poxired in for development in an effort to buy peace. The 
Northeastern tribes are welcome to accords, agreements 
and large central grants. i£ 35 per cent of Indian tribal 
population rise in revolt because it feels that only vio-
lence permits its voice to be heard, the nation will have 
to pay a very heavy price in blood. 
27. aiAKARABORTY (Sujit K^ Mlzo accord in sight. Link. 28, 
13; 1985, Nov, 3; 19. 
The article points out a major political 
volte-face is expected shortly after the Laladenga -
Centre accord is signed, the Mizo Peace Fortmi and Mizo 
convention will join Laldenga's new political the MNF 
Renunei en-masse. The Mizo Zvilai Pawl, a militant 
student wing in Mizoram will also join the new party. 
The HZ3P general secretary K Lalthawnmawia told the party's 
decision to join Laldenga after the successful solution of 
the two decade old Mizo problem. The Chief consultant of 
the Mizo Peace Forum, Thanglawta, charged that the centre 
92 
seemed reluctant to find a quick solution to the Mizo 
problem. It was especially galling because the centre 
and had overreached itself in resolving the Punjab 
and Assam tangle. Two major issues were responsible 
for holding up the peace talks. One Laldenga was de-
manding a general amnesty for all MNF rebels serving 
prison terms. Secondly, there was this question of 
surrenders: whom would the Mizo rebels surrender to 
once the accord was signed. 
-, _, -, _, _, PROSPECTS. 
28. PRABHARARA (MS). Mizoram: Hopes and fears. Frontline. 
3,5; 1986 Mar, 8-21. 
The author examines that the political issues 
concerning Mizoram still revolve round Laldenga and 
his Mizo National Front, however much the centre would 
like to wish tbem away. A solution to the 20 years 
old problem of instirgency appears so near and yet so 
far. In April 1984 elections to the Mizoram Assembly, 
the Congress (I) was returned to power, having canpaig-
ned on a vitually pro-MNF platform. It promised that if 
it came to power, if would facilitate the negotiations 
between the MNF and central Government. It was thus on 
a settlement-and-peace ticket that the Congress came to 
power in Mizoram in Apr 1984 and, as chief Minister 
Lalthanhawla claims, within a few months it was able 
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to persuade the centre to resume talk with Laldenga« 
Laldenga landed in Delhi the day Indira Gandhi was assasi-
nated and talks were resumed less than a month later on 
November 23, 1985. 
-, -^  -, -, PUNJAB, 1985. 
29, BAKSHI (Rajini), Scarred psyche. Illustrated weekly 
of India, 106, 16; 1985 August 25, 30. 
The author points out that the irecent accord bet-
ween the government and the Akalis has been touted as 
a tjirning point in the blood splattered canvas of Punjab 
politics. However, in the ensuing jubilation, only cur-
sory attention has been paid to the festering wounds 
among the Sikh cosnminity. Wounds that have scarred the 
Sikh psyche. The author reports on how the government's 
attitude and common prejudices have both led to an alie-
nation still prevalent among the Sikhs. 
30. EMERGING IN India: More than peace. New York Times, 134, 
46360; 1985, Jul, 26; A26a^. 
Editorial praises Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Sikh politi-
cal leader Harchand Singh Longowal for negotiating agree-
ment that addresses both original key demands of Sikhs 
and new ones occassioned by violence and repression, says 
from 
that while opposition can be expected^^litant Sikhs majo-
rity of Mr. Longowal constituency will hopeful:^support 
accord. 
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31. IRQDOV (S). Sunjab Settlement. News Tlwes. 32,1985 Aug, 2. 
Author conmients that the talk between the Fr±ta& 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President of Akali Dal, Longo-
wal culminated in the signing in Delhi on July 24 of a 
settlement of political crises in Punjab. The Akali Dal 
is most influential Sikh political organisation. All the 
leading political parties have welcomed the settlement 
as an important step towards the normalisation of situa-
tion in Punjab, which has been extremely tense for past 
three years, it is generally agreed that the 11 point 
settlement meets the principal demands of the Sikh com-
munity, particularly, it provides the inclusion in Punjab 
of the city of Chandigarh, which for many years has been 
the coital of two states Punjab and Haryana, for the 
of 
rehabilation^Sikhs who left the army after the assault 
of armed forces on the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritaar 
etc. Disputed question relating to territorial borders 
and the distribution of the waters of a numiber of rivers 
between the two neighbouring states are to be specially 
examined. And the question of granting greater autonomy 
to Punjab within the Republic of India is to be sulxnit-
ted for consideration by an authoritative government 
commission. Longowal qualified the settlement as symboliz-
ing the end of "Confrontation between the government and 
the Sikhs". 
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32. IT MAY have worked. Sconomlst, 296, 7407; 1985, Aug, 17 j 
36-9. 
States that the Punjab agreement reached by the 
prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Mr, Longowal, head 
of Akali Dal, seens to be acceptable to most Sikhs. The 
agreement helped to end the conflict between Hindus and 
Sikhs caused by Operation Blue-Star. The accord has been 
critislsed by the militant faction of the Akali Dal, and 
the politicians in the states of Haryana and Rajasthan, 
for different causes, in case of latter being the fear 
that their share of water will be cut and Haryana will 
lose Chandigarh to. Punjab. Elections are due in Punjab 
by Oct. 5th, which may revive communal discord. Mr Longo-
wal may be taokled to play on Sikhs feelings. The militants 
in his party may gain control and try to oust Mr. Longcwal 
and reject the Punjab accord. 
33. NAGI (SaroJ). To this night a da?wn ? Illustrated Weekly 
of India. 106, 14? 1985, Aug, II7 20. 
Author points out that With the signing of the 
momen-tous accord between the Union Government and the 
Akali Dal on July 24th, 1985, a fresh chapter has opened 
in the convoluted history of Punjab. A chapter which holds 
out the tHKat real possibility, however faint, of peace 
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breaking out at long last in the trotibled frontier 
state. On July 24, 1985 a safforn-coloured Khalistan 
flag was hdisted by sorae unidentified persons on a 
water tank in the Goldent Temple. On July 25th, 1985, 
in Anan<%>ur Sahib, when he was seeking endorsement for 
the accord from the 200 strong contingent of former MPs, 
MLAs, jathedars and ShJromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Consait-
tee officials, AISSF, and two senior colleagues, prakash 
Singh Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra, loudly declaimed 
the agreement "We have not got anything from if* "Only 
ruination". The terrorist had shown their claws on July 
27th 1985. "we reject the accord outright", said Surat 
Singh Khalsa, office secretary of the United Akali Dal. 
"It was not signed by the Akali Dal we are the Akali 
Dal and Babaji is the leader, not Longowal. This 
agreement is between as an individual and not the 
Government, not between the Panth and the Centre." 
34. NOORANI (AG). Punjab accord: Balance Sheet. Illustrated 
Weekly of India. 106, 14? 1985, Aug, 11; 24-5. 
Author examines the recent accord in the light of 
past negotiations. For nearly four years, the centre and 
the Akali Dal held a series of conferences in a bid to 
resolve the festering Punjab problem. Negotiations which 
were marked by one-up-raanship and inevitably ended in 
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discord. This time,however^ both sides were determined 
to avoid the pitfalls which prevented a treaty earlier. 
The nation will be grateful to Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi and Akali Dal Chief (lOngowal, for closing that 
sorry chapter in its history by concluding an agreement 
which is fair and statesman-like.Both man show the qua-
lities of leadership by overruling the hardliners in 
their respective canps. Their sincerity and determina-
tion cut through all the obstacles. The memorandum of 
and 
settlement signed by the Prime Minister^Sant Longowal 
on July 24th« 1985 has a past as well as future. The 
memorandum of settlement runs into 11 clauses of vary-
ing degrees of importance. 
33. SATHYAMURTHY (TV) . India's Punjab problem: Edging 
towards a solution? World Today. 42; 1986, Mar, 46-50. 
!nie September 1985 election to the Punjab Vidhan 
Sabha, called after the signing of the Rajiv Gandhi -
Longowal agreement was preceded by a crisis (1982-85) 
in the relations between the Punjab State and the centre 
over a variety of grievances. These grievances, embodied 
in the Ahandpur Sahib Resolution (1973), were used by the 
centre to outmanoeuvre the Akali Dal, which had enjoyed 
a brief spell in power after the end of the Emergency 
(1977-80). Sikh extremism, thus given a political outlet 
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turned, tinder Bhindranwalla's leadership, against tlie 
Centre when the congress (z) was returned to power in 
1981. Within three years the Punjab situation had become 
so esqplosive that a military operation was launched by 
the centre to remove "teitroristi^  from the Golden Teiqple. 
This set off reverberation culminating in Mrs. Gandhi's 
assassination (Oct. 1984). Events since the signing of 
the agreement between the centre and Akali Dal are likely 
to terser the Punjab situation temporarily although the 
xinderlying causes have not yet been removed. 
-, -, -, -, -, HARYANA'S STAND. 
36. HARXANA's STAND. Hindustan Times. 64, 193; 1987,Jul,13; 
9a>b. 
Editorially states that it is in the fitness of 
things that Devi Lai Government has spelt out its stand 
on the Punjab accord and indicated to what extent it is 
willing to accoimiiodate the neighbouring state on the 
territorial and river water issues. The Haryana Governor 
has made it clear that the 1970 Indira Gandhi award Is 
acceptable to Haryana and clauses 7 and 9 should not 
have been incorporated into the Punjab accord without 
consulting it. The state Government's stand is that in 
case CSiandigarh goes to Punjab, Abohar and Fazilka must 
be given to Haryana and the centre should bear the cost 
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of construction of a new capital for the state. It will 
be unfair to say that the Devi Lai Government has made a 
solution to the Punjab problem more difficult. A review 
of the Punjab situation is called for in the wake of the 
change of government in Haryana. It is significant that 
the Governor has stressed that the inteirests of Punjab 
and Haryana are inseparable. He has stated that the State 
Government is willing to "sit across the table with the 
Punjab Government in this quest". Such a dialogue would 
have been possible had there been a popular government 
in Punjab as well, president's rule provides neither 
the atmosphere nor the mechanism of such talks. Now 
that a non-Congx^ss- I ministry is in thesaddle in Har-
yana the centre is not in a position to thrxist its deci-
sion on the state. A fresh exercise, therefore, is called 
for to settle the territorial and river water Issues but 
that does not mean that the centre should act in haste. 
It looks like tha* the Haryana Government's stand on 
Chandigarh and river waters will remain on record for 
quite some time. 
-# -# -« -« -# IMPLEMEMTATION PROBLEMS. 
37. ACCORD AND disquiet. Boonomic Times. 1986, Jan, 4; 5a-b. 
Editorially points out that Rajiv-Longowal accord, it 
had been hoped would be ushering abiding peace in Punjab 
to the prolonged turmQil witnessed by the state since 1980. 
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In recent weelcs the law and order situation In Punjab 
has been deteriorating and both the Prime Minister and 
the union Minister of State for horae^  Mr. Arun Nehru 
have had occasslon to escpress their dissatisfaction with 
the state of affair in Punjab to the state Qiief Minister 
Mr. Barnala. Akalisln power enjoy the si^port of large 
Hindu minority of the state. This, in tvccn, threatens the 
accord in terms of which certain adjustments are to be 
made between Punjab and Haryana. On its part«to put it 
mildly - the political leadership in Haryana of both the 
opposition and of the ruling party has not helped to 
pave the way for smooth inqplementation of the accord^ 
a situation has arisen in Heuryana where there are mis-
givings even as in Punjab there is some scepticism by 
terrorists and chauvinists to debunk the accord. The 
issues Involved are emotive. Chandigarh is to become 
the capital of Punjab from January 26. The construetil^n 
of SYL canal is scheduled to be conpleted by August 15 
but work on the Link canal remains suspended because of 
agitation by hostile segments in Punjab. Further more« 
there is the issue of grouping the villages that are to go 
to Haryana. Census as a method of deciding which of dis-
puted village should go to state has been ruled out by 
the Mathew commission which has called for a negotiated 
settlement. 
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38. GUPTA (Shekhar) . Punjab: An escalating crisis.- India 
Today, 11, 13; 1986, Jul, 1-15; 26-8. 
Author states that last fortnight, Punjab seemed 
headed for a new crunch. Sxirjit Singh Barnala*s Govern-
ment stood isolated and weak after new coinplications 
arose on the vexatious issue of transfer of Chandigarh 
to Punjab, Its diminishing strength also raised doubts 
on the survival of the Rajiv-Longowal accord which had, 
less than a year ago, promised to bring peirmanent peace 
to Punjab. On the contrary now, violence in the State 
had even crossed the heights scaled in the pre-Blue 
Star period, worse it had spilled into the streets as 
communal roob violence giving a frightful dimension to 
the perennial crisis forcing the Government to devise 
a new security plan for the state, 
39. SEN (Mohit). Multi-pronged strategy of destabilisation. 
Patriot. 23, 342; 1986, Mar, 8; 7a-b. 
She Author says that the nation's heart bleeds at 
what the distabilisers are doing in Punjab. The innocent 
are being murdered; India is being wounded; we are all 
again within the ring of mortal and immediate danger. 
This danger is most acute in Punjab; but it is not iso-
lated there* Destabilisation of India has always has 
been attenpted as a multirpronged Strategy. The danger 
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is not either external or internal; it is posed to the 
totality which is India today* its unity, its democracy 
and its role in the present critical world situation. 
There seems to be a persistent and powerful trend and 
the decision - making quarters of our country do not seem 
to be convinced that US iiqperialism and the present ac-
centuation of its inherent aggressive policy represents 
a danger to our freedom and unity. 
-, -, -, -, -, LONGOWAL (Harchand Singh), ASSASSINAT-
ION, EFFECTS. 
40. BIRD (David)• Moderate Sikh in shadow of militants. New 
York Tiroes^  134, 46508? 1985, Aug, 21; A8a-f. 
Author highlights that the Sikh leader, Longowal 
who was assassinated in Punjab on 20 August 85, had signed 
an accord with the Government last month. After signing 
ceremony, Mr. Longowal said that he was "very satisfied", 
but that the accord was only part of the battle. The other 
part, he sed.d, was with the militant faction of the party 
that wanted to continue the fight. Eventually Mr. Longo-
wal won unanimous party support. The agreement he signed 
last month with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was to have 
settled, as Mr. Longowal described it, the issue of 
••restoring Sikh pride and honour**. 
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41. UNEASY PORTENT in Punjab. Economic and Political Weekly. 
20, 34; 1985, Aug, 24; 1. 
The article editorially highlights that the assassi-
nation of Longowal on 20th Augxi^t, 1985 has undoubtedly put 
back the restoration of aorroalcy-4n PunJ'ab initiated with 
the signing of the raeinorandura of settlement by the Govern-
ment of India and the Shtromani Akali Dal on July 24, 1985. 
It is true that Longowal had been unable initially to se-
cure the support of prominent Akali leaders like SGPC 
president G.S. Tohra and former chief minister Badal for 
the agreement* These leaders were unsure how agreement 
would be recieved by the Sikhs in Punjab. Available re-
ports during the brief period of less than a month between 
the signing of agreement and LongowaPs death had been wel-
comed all over the Punjab or at the vary least greeted 
with relief. The government-!' Akali Dal agreement, even 
without Longowal to guide the Akali Dal constitutes a 
viable basis for the restoration of the normalcy and peace 
in Punjab, it is difficult to be as certain about the go-
vernment's wisdom in rushing through the election in the 
state. Despite the known reservation of Akali Dal, the 
government fixed the elections for September 22 and Longo-
wal *s assassination has now persuaded it to postpone them 
by just three days to septeniber 25th. What Punjab does not 
need just now is an acrimonious election canpaign with the 
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Congress (z) and Akall Dal going hell for leather for 
votes and seats. 
-, _, -, _, -, PROBLEMS, CHANDIGARH TRANSFER, VENKATA-
RAMIAH COMMISSION. 
42, NOORANI (AG), One year after: The Punjab accord. Illus-
trated Wfeekly, 107, 29; 1986, Jul, 27; 42-5. 
Author analyses that a year ago, the Punjab accord 
was signed bringing with it more than a ray of hope that 
peace would at last descend on the Punjab. The prcxnise 
of an end of terror and violence that had asked the land 
But that hope has been largly belied. . The assassination 
of Longowal notwithstanding, not even the labotirs of the 
Matnew and venkatacamiah conmissions have brought the 
seemingly intractable problem closer to a solution. The 
author analyses what went wrong with the iiqplementation 
of the accord. The Prime Minister's prestige and credi-
bility have suffered in consequence. It can be repaired. 
But only by the fullest implementation of the Punjab 
accord. 
-# -# -# -# -# -, GOLDEN TEMPLE CAPTURE. 
43. PERA (Ivan). Blitzkrieg. Illustrated Weekly of India. 
107, 7; 1986, Feb, 16; 26-2. 
The author highlights the capture of the Golden 
Ter^le by extremists on January 26, 1986 and the usur-
pation its very priesthood as a coup by the Kahlon faction. 
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the most radical wing of All India Sikh Student's Fede-
ration, The coup was a cold blooded violation of an ac-
cord between the extremists and the Akall Government , 
which allowed only a symbolic demolition of Akal Takht 
and ruled out any attempt to remove or replace the priests 
to the Teraple. 
-, -, -, _, -, -, MATHEW COMMISSION. 
44 SALAMAT ALL Militant backlash. Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 131, 6; 1986, Feb, 6; 28-9. 
Author says that six months after Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi made his peace with the moderate Sikh lea-
dership of Punjab, the accord has ran into trouble. Police 
opened fire on protesters in Haryana state killing two du-
ring demonstrations against the transfer of the Joint Pun-
jab Haryana capital of Chandigarh to Punjab, Sikh militants 
condemned the death sentences handed down in Indira assas-
sination trial. A religious convention attend by some 
20,000 Sikhs in Ararltaar recleved a call for a "holy war" 
for seperate Sikh homeland. Although the July 85 agreement 
was hailed as a master stroke of political realism, it 
left several problems to be resolved by 26 Jan - Republic 
day of India, New Delhi appointed Mathew Conanisslon headed 
by a retired Supreme Cotirt Judge to determine which cotton 
belt areas are Hindi and which are Punjabi speaking, and 
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to recoraraond their Inclvislon In Haryana and Punjab res-
pectively. Militants have replaced almost ^11 the top 
to 
priests, and awarded the honours^those killed in Operat-
ion Blue Star. They declared that Punjab would not share 
its water with another state and released a list of "ene-
mies" of the Sikh coratmanity which included Gandhi, some 
Indian Array generals and top journalists and even the 
entire Akali cabinet in Punjab. The tension in Amrit-
sar resembles the period which led to the Army crack down. 
-, _, -, _, -, PROSPECTS. 
45. CONGRESS (I) AND Punjab. Economic and Political Weekly^ 
20, 2; 1985, Jan, 12; 1. 
The article editorially states that in the first 
broad-cast to the nation after the Congress sweeping vic-
tory, the Prin^ Minister declared that the government would 
give top priority to finding solutions to the problems of 
Punjab and Assam, and following quickly on the heels of 
this assurance, two seperate union cabinet sub-committees 
have been set up to deal with these issue. The union govern-
ment latest moves for a settlement in Assam seem, on the 
other hand, to be aimed at winning over a section of the 
leaders of the movement , particularly from the AASU to 
the Congress (i). The union Government's approach to Pun-
jab problem is likely to be very different. Most in5)ortant 
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factor that helped the Congress(I) to virtually sweep 
the Lok Sabha election in North India was its proclaiiaed 
opposition to the alleged afforts of the Sikhsled by Akali 
to 
Dal,^break up the nation; this propaganda provided the 
political issue to conplenient the emotions roused by Indira 
Gandhi's assassination. The reason is that the Congress(l) 
massive and highly successful, election propaganda about 
the alleged threat to the country's unity and integrity 
has now acq\iired a life of his own. The ruling party does 
not want to risk losing the over-whelming caste Hindu 
suppost it recieved in U.P., Bihar, M.P., Rajasthan 
Haryana and Delhi in Lok Sabha poll. 
-, -, -, _, -, -, LONGOWAL (Harchand Singh), RELEASE 
FROM JAIL. 
46. HARMINDER KAUR. Free man at last. Illustrated Weekly 
of India. 105, 48> 1985, Apr, 7; 20-1. 
States that the festering Punjab issue is once 
again the focus of nedia attention with the release from 
detention by the Central Government of Akali Dal presi-
dent Longowal and seven other party leaders, on March 11, 
1985. Thi« was a significant move on part of the govern-
ment in search for a peaceful solution to Punjab problem. 
Longowal talks to the author about the various aspects of 
the complex Punjab problem. A problem which has claimed 
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too jnany lives, aroused too many passions and spawned 
too much violence to be left unresolved. 
47. SIKH, SET free, denounces Gandhi. New York Tiraes. l34, 
46347; 1985, Mar, 13; 5b-d. 
States that a prominent Sikh leader freed today 
after nine months in prison Charged that the government 
had failed to address any of the grievances of the Sikhs. 
Longowal said that prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was pre-
venting a "conducive atmosphere" for negotiations by 
refusing to consider Sikh demands for self rule. Mr. 
Longowal said that before negotiations could occur with 
the Government, it would have released the Sikh prisners 
and show a willingness to punish them who attacked Sikhs 
in the rioting after the assassination of prime Minister 
Mrs. Gandhi last year. His comments came as Mr. Gandhi 
made new moves towards resolving the conflict with the 
Sikhs. In an unexpected move Mr. Gandhi chose a top 
party leader and close adviser, Arjun Singh, a Sikh as 
the new Governor of Punjab State, which has a majority 
Sikh population. 
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», _, -, -, -, PROTEST AGAINST, DELHI. 
48. HAMLIN (Michael)• Sikh pact leads to clashes in Delhi. 
TiBies. 62326? 1985^ Dec, 20; 7c-f. 
Author points out that the processional heart of 
Delhi was briefly cut off from the rest of the city yes-
terday as thousands of farmers from the state of Haryana 
defied the authorities to protest against the accord with 
the leaders of the Si}dbs which brought peace and election 
to Punjab. Teargas and bate charge were used to rest-
rain the demonstrators. Haryana still has not reconciled 
itself fully to the loss of Chandigarh as its Capital 
and a proposal to exchange it for two other Hindi - speak-
ing villageshas not yet been agreed. Yesterday farmers 
marched towards parliament from old Delhi carrying 
placards and shouting slogans, and then, in the Jargon 
of active politics here "courted arrest" Opposition 
leaders in parliament staged a walkout of the Upper 
House, the Rajya Sabha, protesting at the central Govern-
ment neglect of Haryana's interests in the aftermath of 
the Pujtjab agreement. 
-• -# -# "*• POLITICAL PARTIES, ROLE. 
49. SATHYAMURTy(TV). Indian nationalism and "national 
question" Millennium. 14, 2; 85, Summer; 172-94. 
Points out that post-independence Indian leadership 
consciously sought to apply the nineteenth century European 
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nation state raodel in the formation of India. This 
involved a process of fusion from above which was aimed 
at uniting the linguistically and culturally unique nat-
ional identities of India into a single entity. At the 
same time, the forces of fission have presented a formid-
able challenge to this policy. The author places these 
two antithetical movements within the context of centre-
state relations in India and brings forth the class nat-
ure of nationalist struggle. 
-, -, COMMUNALISM, PUHJAB, TERRORISM. 
50. GUPTA (pranay). Cul-De-Sac. Illustrated Weekly of India. 
106, 18; 1985, Sep, 8; 14-7. 
Author complains that Punjab once synonymous with 
harmony and success, today evokes a bitter montage of 
hate, distrust and separatism. As is reflected in the 
all pervasive hostility between the Sikh and Hindu com-
munities and the growing incidence of terrorism which has 
India's cichest state in thrall. Author traces the gene-
ses of the growing conflict and discusses, why despite 
recent accord, , it may take a long time for the wounds 
to heal. Sikhs say that they feel different from other 
Indians because they are treated differently. 
I l l 
51. NAGi (Saroj) . Fear is the key. Illtistrated Weekly of 
India. 106, 18? 1985, Sep, 8; 10-3. 
Author states that by any standard of reckoning, 
Punjab has been passing through the most tratuaatic phase 
of its history in centuries, A phase replete with assasi-
nation, terrorism, communal strife and the haunting after-
math of army action on the Golden Temple. The latest in 
the long list of tragedies is the assassination of sant 
Longowal. He was the sole leader in the state who had 
the courage to biiry the violent past and initiate a 
new begining. After his violent death last week at the 
hand of terrorists, author analyses Punjab to assess the 
prevalent mood there and the impact it may have on the 
ensuing elections. Are the elections worth these stakes ? 
The justification was provided by Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi himself in Parliament on August 23, 1985. Elect-
ions according to Arjun Singh "would help the process of 
normalisation in Punjab inherent in the accord". The 
cracks in the UAD are opening fast, after the assassinat-
ion of Longowal. Talwandi is preparing to go it alone as 
Badal's supporters, in the party work overtime for on 
eventual regrouping of the two Akali Dais. 
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-, -, _, -, _, effect of PRESIDEIiUte RULE. 
52. BANGING THE table. Economist. 303, 7498; 1987, May, 16; 
30. 
The article points out that the Indian government 
has at last acknowledged that violence in Punjab is out 
of control. On May 11th it in|>osed "president's" that 
is, direct - rule on the state where more than 900 people 
have died in the past 18 months as Sikh extremists cam-
paigned for an independent homeland. Most people in Pun-
Jab have welcomed the move. As they see it. Prime Minis-
ter, now accepts that the Punjab government formed by 
the Akali Dal, which was voted into power 21 months ago, 
has lost whatever credibility it once enjoyed. The party 
itself Sikh, was already splitting, and joined hands 
with a faction of the militant AISSU'S to form a new 
unified Akali Dal. Mr. Gandhi now has shown how he 
proposes to bring peace to Punjab. He signed an accord 
on July 24, 1985 with Akali leader, Longowal. This S€ULd 
that C3iandigarh would be transferred to Punjab; that 
Punjab's share of the waters of three Himalayan rivers 
flowing through the state should be safeguarded; and 
t^at the people who helped the massacre of Sikhs that 
followed the murder of Mrs. Gandhi in 1984 should be p\in-
ished. In Delhi no signs of an imminent change of policy 
can be detected, in the past few weeks the Punjab police 
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have co»e under pressxire from local politicians, includ-
ing a nufflber of Akall ministers, to go easy on suspected 
terrorists and to release some of those in custody. 
53. HARD OPTION. Times of India. 150, 132; 1987 May, 13; 
6a-b. 
Editorially points out that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has 
finally taken a plunge in Punjab. The union government 
has assumed direct responsibility for fighting the ex-
tremists and the terrorists•in the State. Opposition 
leaders have criticised the decision to impose president's 
rule in Punjab on the ground that it has been taken with 
the eye on the forthcoming elections in Haryana. Mr. 
Gandhi's decision is open to criticism on some other 
counts as well. First he and his ministers have till 
recently spoken warmly of the dismissed Punjab Chief 
Minister, Mr, Barnala, his defiance of the Sikh head 
priests who have declared him a "tankhayiya", and his 
efforts to restore law and order. Secondly the innposit-
ion of President's rule removes the mediatory agency in 
the form of Barnala government between the law enforce-
ment agencies and the Sikh community and could aggravate 
its alienation. Thirdly, feeling can spread among the 
Sikhs that the Centre does not trust, Mr. Barnala, who 
has never wavered in his commitment to the cause of the 
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country's unity and integrity. Fourthly, Mr. Barnala's 
refusal to step down as Cheif Minister w ^ the main obs-
tacle in the reunification of the Akali Dal, His removal 
is likely to revive moves to reunite the Akali Dal, espe-
cially if the support for him among Akali legislators dec-
lines, as it is most likely to. And a reunited Akali Dal 
is almost certain to adopt a platform favoiurable to the 
extremists and their demands. 
54. PRESIDENTIAL RULE for Punjab, islamic World Review. 6, 
70; 1987, Jun, 19. ' 
The article states thtit the Prime Minister of India 
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, in^osed presidential Rule on Punjab on 
Tuesday, 12 May, 1987, dismissing his own previous nominee, 
the moderate Sikh Chief Minister, S\irjit Singh Barnala, 
and his Akali administration. Mr. Barnala said at a 
press conference the next day that this dismissal was 
"merely aimed at promoting the interests of the con-
gxress (i) party in the June elections in neighbouring 
state of Haryana? This view is widely held in India 
and outside. The Akali Dal and moderate Sikhs want the 
return of Sikh area from Haryana, and the shared state 
capital of Chandigarh to be given back, a restructured 
Punjab that would approximate to the old Punjab province 
of British India. Mr. Gandhi has been losing ground in 
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many parts of India, and it is thought that not only 
does the President of India, Mr. Zail Singh, want his 
removal but also strong elements in the Congress (I) 
party itself, Gandhi needs some successes to recover 
lost ground. The Delhi administration must be haunted 
by the nightmare prospect of a resurgence of the mili-
tancy associated with the movement of the late Bhindran-
wale, and demand for an Independent or at least autono-
mous- Khalistan. An independent or autonomous Khalistan 
would weaken seriously the country's defences. The Pun-
jab is strategically vital to Indian security as it 
borders Pakistan. 
55. TALKS ON Punjab. Hindustan Times, 64, 160; 1987, Jun, 
lO; lla-b. 
Paper editorially comments that the Union Home 
Secretary C.G. Somiah's statement in Shimla that centre 
is not against talks to find out a solution to the Pun-
Jab problem is qualified by his observation that Govern-
ment is not clear as to whom to talk. His loud thinking 
in no way contradicts the Prime Minister's declaration 
that President's rule in Punjab will not be lifted till 
the problem of terrorism is solved. The right atmosphere 
for talks should prevail but the Government need not wait 
for the complete elimination of terrorism in order to 
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hold negotiations. The Home Secretary, has posed a 
valid question: Whom to talk to ? There is no single 
leader or organisation which can claim to be role repre-
sentative of Sikhs, Even the terrorists are divided, 
not clear in their minds vrhat exactly they want to 
achieve. President's rule became inevitable only when 
the Barnala Government failed to measure up to its tasks^ 
Some might suggest that the Government shotild negotiate 
with Akal Takht Chief Darshan Singh Ragi; some other 
suggested that it should talk to leaders belonging 
to other streams of present day politics. They could 
be Tohra or Mr. Prakash Singh Badal, who are willing 
to bring about negotiated settlement of Punjab problem. 
-^  ., ., -, ., KILLINGS, BUS PASSAMGERS, lAlAV. 
56. GHASTLY OUTRAGE. Times of India. 150, 188; 1987, Jul, 
8; 6a-b. 
Editorially states that in 1983 Mr. Barbara Singh's 
ministry fell because terrorists killed six bus passen-
gers. Six times that ntamber died on the spot on Monday 
night, four more died s\ibsequently in hospital, and 
nearly 28 others are battling for life in hospitals. 
Punjab has slowly but inexorably moved towards becoming 
a gigantic Beirut where the state is in no position to 
ensure the security of innocent lives, it would be com-
forting to think that the latest grisly episode is an 
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expression of the terrorists' growing frustration. Offi-
cials tried to suggest that the indiscriminate killings 
in South Delhi on June 13 were prompted by the terrorist's 
inability to do anything spectacular inside Punjab. The 
till 
relief however, will last only/the next outrage. Like 
Muktasar and Khudda, Lalru's memory too will fade, it is 
abundantly clear that terrorist operations have little 
connexion with the political complexion of the adminis-
tration. Killings of bus passengers have taken place with 
unfailing regularity regardless of whether Punjab has been 
under congress, Akali or President's rule. Therefore, to 
say that President's rule has totally ineffective would 
not only be premature but also unfair. 
57. TERRORISTS STRIKE Again. Amrita Bazar patrika. 1987, 
Jul, 8; 6a-b. 
The paper editorially states that the massacre of 
40 unarmed, innocent bus passengers, including several 
women and children, by stengun wielding terrorists near 
Lalru township of Punjab's patiala district has demoiished 
the Punjab administration's claim that with the introduc-
tion of President's rule in the state the situation has 
iB^roved perceptibly. The familiar argument that the 
police were hamstrung by political interference no 
longer holds,for politicians of all hues have been sent 
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out of business by Presidents rule. Yet the terrorists 
have been able to enact the ghastliet tragedy ever since 
they took to wanton ourder to gain their secessionist aim. 
The majority of victims were bound for Rardwar and Rishi-
kesh which suggestes that they were pilgrims. By a single 
stroke/ the terrorists have shown how hollow the adminis-
tration's claim was. The Punjab Governor, Mr. S.S. Ray 
has said that the weapons used by the terrorists could 
be of Chinese make, it is difficult to understand how 
that is relevant* for the hands that wielded the guns 
were of the terrorists, who for all the reports about the 
recent decimation of their leadership and ranks, it has 
been noticed that the terrorist generally time their ac-
, tion with some political development to have the maxiraaam 
effect, the terrorists might have had in mind the presi-
dential election also, which is just five days away. It 
is their way of stealing the limelight for a while when 
the country's attention is focuased on other issues. 
-# -# -# -# -# PROTEST, BANDH, DELHI. 
58. PROVCaciNG A reaction. Statesman. 127, 8507; 1987, Jup, 
16; 6b-c . 
Editorially points out that the real motive of the 
terrorist was to provoke an anti-Sikh reaction among a 
people gripped by panic. The success of the Delhi bandh 
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called by the BJP on Monday, and the hardening of the 
popular mood in the Hindi heartland, suggest that the 
strategy has been partly successful. But it should also 
be remembered that 17 Sikhs had been killed in Punjab on 
the same day. The major cause of this sudden increase in 
terrorism is Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's belligerence in wake of 
Haryana elections, and the pro-H»ryana verdict of Eradi 
Tribunal. Having abandoned the Punjab accord for petty 
partisan gains in Haryana, Mr. Gandhi has not yet indi-
cated whether his Punjab policy has any more positive 
content than the dangerously self-defeating threats of 
using violence against violence. 
-, -, -, -, -, VAIDYA (AS), ASSASSINATION, EFFECTS. 
59. PERA (Ivan). In cold blood. Illustrated Weekly of India. 
107, 33; 1986, Augi. 24; 8-15. 
Author reports on the assassination of India's 
highest decorated soldier and its ramifications. The 
shocking and dastardly assassination of General AS 
Vaidya five days before the nation celebrated its inde-
pendence day was a grim reminder that day of terrorist 
was not oveSJ. Far from it, it may well be their dawn. 
For the terrorists have deraanitrated that they can 
strike at will, anywhere, any time. Security precautions 
notwithstanding* in the already charged atmosphere over 
Punjab,Valdya«s death has once again precipitated Hindu-
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Sikh tension and nervoiisness, Sikhs across the country 
were once again victinas of stray incidnets of violence 
a violence which the terrorists badly want to provoke, 
to polarise Hindu-Sikh sentiments. 
-, -, -, RIOTS. 
60. JAISINGH (H). National perspective needed. Indian Express» 
53, 162/ 1985, ^r, 17; 8c-e. 
Author points out that the Punjab-Assam riots and 
now reservation are the New problems which have cropped up 
while old one are still unresolved. A developing polity 
is basically a problem polity where the interests of vari-
ous groups and sections constantly clash. This is turn 
blurs the national perspective and upsets National prio-
rities. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi means business. He is sincere 
and has shown his Mllingness to take initiative as well 
as risks, in Punjab, he has already accepted their 
preconditions by ordering an inquiry into Delhi riots 
and lifting the ban 6n the All India Sikh Students* 
Federation. These steps have helped to defuse the iiuoe-
diate crises and have warded off confrontation with the 
Akalis. The tragedy of Punjab has been adhocism and 
sheer expediency. What is obvious should be done grace-
fully. What is the broad national perspective on Punjab'! 
In the first place we want total communal harmony to be 
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maintained among all sections of the population especi-
ally between Hindus and Sikhs, we want to Isolate and 
eliminate the extremists and all those who preach seces-
slonlsm and practice violence. Mr. Darbara Singh the 
former Chief Minister of Punj ab has alleged that Akall 
Dal was neither capable nor Interested In a negotiated 
settlement of Punjab problem. There Is always a keen 
competition for leadership in Akall Dal. Congress (I) 
does not have firm and deep roots In Punjab, nor is it 
In position to challenge Akall oriented Gurdawara poli-
tics. 
61. RUSTAMJI (KP). Legacy of blood. Illustrated Weekly of 
India. 106, 3; 1985, May, 26; 56-7. 
The author states that the Assam, Bhlwandi, Punjab, 
Delhi, Ahmedabad, all over the country is pock marked with 
violent conflagrations that have extracted a bloody toll 
and left behind a residue of Indelible hatred. Violence 
has thus become part of our ethos, the convenient instru-
ment to prove a point and settle scores. As the Issutfat 
stake fade into insignificance before the horrar of human 
brutality, author dissects the irreparable damage to the 
nations psyche. 
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., ., ., ., HINDU-MUSLIM. 
62. THIS CANKER o£ coaoMuialism. Frontline, 4, 11; 1987, May 
30 - Jun, 12; 15. 
Editorially ccwnients that the prolonged spasm of 
violence in Meerut and the eruptions in Delhi are grim 
reminders of the substantial presence of communal elements 
bent \xpon indulging in dangerous mischief and serious 
crime. Meerut*s proneness to communal flareups has for 
long been recognised and indeed it was only in i^ril that 
the city was rocked by a bout of violence. A great deal 
of blaroe for the inaction rests with the Administration. 
In the immediate aftermath of the rioting, the district 
administration was handicapped 1;^  an inadequate police 
forte. I^e divide in Punjab and Haryana and the riots 
that break out with alarming frequency in Gujrat« Utter 
Pradevh, Maharashtra and Delhi have had the unfortunate 
effect of inuring the nation to the manifestations of 
comraunalism. There is no alternative in a coranunally 
troubled situation to putting down the criminals with 
a firm hand and any dithering or inefficiency would have 
tcagic consequences. 
-# -# -# -# -/ BABRI MASJID-RAM JANAMABHOOMI CONTROVERSY. 
63. BHATNAGER (Ashwini). Opening the flood gates, illustrated 
Weekly of India. 107, 14; 1986, Apr, 6; 32-5. 
The author points out the controversial unlocking 
of the aates of Ram Janam Bhooral within the Babri Mas-i id 
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In Ayodhya« unleashed a torrent of cooamunal passions, 
stoking fires in regions as remote as Janmu and Kashmir^ 
even Pakistan, apart from Uttar Pradesh which is tradi-
tionally noted for its coraraunal sensitivity. Now that 
the heat and dust have abated to a certain extent, an 
uneasy calm prevails, provoking observers to forecast 
grim sceneries in the near future. Obscured by myths 
and clouded by historical distortions, the real issues 
behind the Ram Janam Bhoomi controversy have disspeared. 
Half truths are being fed to the masses by leaders. While 
the Hindus have presented the version that through the 
court ruling, they can now built a temple at Ram Janam 
Bhoomi, Muslim leaders, on the other hand, say that the 
Babri Masjid is as sacred to them as Ram Janam Bhoomi is 
to the Hindus. 
64. THREAT FROM Communalism. Democratic World. 16, 15; 1987, 
Apr, 12; 4. 
Editorially comments that the virus of communalism 
and social unrest has eroded many parts of the country, 
threatening to let loose a mass upsurge. The recent meet-
ing at the Boat Cltib by the itdnority community and the 
provocative speeches made by some of their leaders added 
to the tension. Then comes the massive congregation at 
Ayodhya by the majority community and the same sort of 
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Utterance there. The virus is spreading from region 
to region^ engulfing the entire oation. The scenario 
in U.P.# particularly in some religious centres, is 
with 
fraught^danger. The local government has taken the pre-
ventive actions, but this alone ccumot stop the menace* 
It is the duty of secular parties and organisations to 
intervene iannediately and stop the rot. We may not be 
able to solve the teiqple or mas J id issue overnight. But 
without communal harmony«, no issue can be solved. 
-, -, -, -, -, MUSLIM RALLY, DELHI. 
65. SHOW OF Strength. Times of India. 150, 90; 1987, Apr, 
i; 6c-e. 
The paper editorially comnents that never since 
independence have Indian Muslims sho%inup in the capital 
in such strength as they did on Monday in response to a 
call given by Babri MasJid Movement coordination commit-
tee. In particular, the Shahi imam of Delhi's Jama MasJid 
Syed Abdulla Bulchari thought it fit to call on his co-
religionist not to recognise the "Judicial system or the 
government which has not been able to protect the reli-
gious places of Muslims". Muslim leaders have proposed 
the setting up of special bench of a High Court in South 
India consisting of three judges who are neither Muslim 
nor Hindu to examine the Ram Janam Bhoomi - Babri Masj id 
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Issue. This Issue if it is at all open to a solution 
need to be examined at the social and the political level 
with the participation of moderate elements on both sides. 
For a show of strength by Mtisliros is certain to inspire 
Hindu organisations to demonstrate their capacity to 
bring out larger crowds. Any further aggravations of 
comrminal feelings, esqpressed in mass demonstrations and 
counter demonstrations, can only harden attitudes on 
both sides. But there can be no guarantee that similar 
demonstrations in the future will not degenerate into 
violence which could spread. The time is long over due 
for both the state and the central government to open 
channels of coHHminication with all those who are still 
prepared to work for a cos^romise solution. 
-, _, _, _, -, -, _, SYED SHAHABUDDIN, ROLE. 
66. SHAHABXJDDIN SYNDROME. Demooratic World. 16, 3; 1987, 
Jan, 18; 3-4. 
Editorially states that the judging by the react-
ion among a large number of Muslim leaders and organisa-
tions throughout the coiintry to the call for the boycott 
by Muslims of the Republic Day celebrations, it is clear 
that those who issued the call are in a hopeless minority* 
Despite this Janata Pairty leader syed Shahabuddin and 
his colleagues in the Babri Masjid Action Committee 
have refused to withdraw the call; on the contrary, they 
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have reiterated their appeal. Shahabuddin and Ibrahim Sulai-
man Sait, the two cahn5)ions of the call, have taken the posi-
tion that the call is neither anti-national nor unconstitut-
ional. This is also unacceptable since the Republic Day is 
not a symbol associated with Hindus or Muslims, or Christians 
or any other religious groups of the countiry, but it is a 
national symbol embracing each and every Indian. The call is 
clearly menat to play up minority fears on an issue which can 
be easily settled through negotiations. In this context, two 
points are noteworthy. Fitst all the political parties in the 
country, and a wide majority of Muslim intellectuals and 
politicians and religious heads have condemned the call. 
Secondly it has been convincingly pointed out that a majority 
of the members of Mushawarsat were absent from the meeting 
which took the decision to issue the boycott call. The .most 
significant absentee was Maulana Abdul Ali Nadvi, one of 
the three surviving founders of the Mushawarsat and President 
of Muslim Personal law board. 
-/ -, -, -, -, -, UTTAR PRADESH. 
67. BKHAY (Ambikanand). Communalism in U.P. Statesman. 127,3652 
1986, May, 21; la- & 7b. 
The author states that in a top secret official report 
on "Growth of Communalism in U.P". which was coiwnunicated 
through proper channels to the centre about raonth-and-half 
before the Barabanki police firing on April 30, 1986, the 
U.P. Government has pointed out that "the polarization bet-
ween Hindu and Muslims over the isue of Ram Janam Bhoomi, is 
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_, -, -, -, -, GUJRAT. 
68, CC»4MUNAL VIOLENCE : Qujrat; Rath Yatra havoc. Secular 
D«Biocraey. 20# 6; 1987, Jun/ 26. 
The article focuses that Ironically enough, Ouj^ -
rat, bitth place of Mahatma Gandhi, is coning to the 
forefront as an area of coramunal violence. During the 
last two years major towns in the state have witnessed 
sharp ccMBBiunalisation, reflected in the communal forces 
gaining the upper hand in the corporation elections. Re-
cent incidents show that the rural areas are also getting 
under the influence of communalists. Kheda district, 
with a population of 35 lakhs, has remained in the grip 
of conmunal violence. The worst affected was Vixpur town 
which has a mixed (Hindu and Muslim) population of about 
ten thousand. Violence took place in the wake of the Ram 
Janaki Rath Yatra procession organised by Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad. The main procession passed off peacefully in 
the vicinity of the mosque but confusion arose with the 
people at the tail end of the procession raising an alarm 
about stone pelting. Within seconds all hell broke loose 
with arson and stone throwing. Within two hours of the 
incident adivasis from surrounding villages joined the 
mayhem and there was large scale loot and arson in which 
the victims were mostly Muslims. 
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69. FORD (Richard). Curfew widened In Gujrat to halt acid 
bomb rioters. Times. 62179? 1985, Jul, 2; 7g-h. 
Author highlights that the curfew has been li^osed 
In parts of three cities In Gujrat as bombing and riot-
ing continue to plague the state. The effect of four 
months of violence followed by curfew restrictions are 
severely hitting the econosoy of the State, Considered 
one of India's most prosperous. After two days of trou-
ble the state authorities last night in^osed an indefi-
nite curfew on parts of Jamnagar, Baroda and Surat and 
extended until the end of month the ban on assemblies 
of more than four people in the walled city of Ahmedabad. 
70. GUJRAT : Communal divide. Economic and political Weekly. 
22, 8; 1987, ^ eb, 21; 298. 
States that the last Sunday's violence in Ahmeda-
bad following the arrest of a recently-elected corpora-
tor, Abdul Lateef. Shaikh, on the charge of violating an 
old-externment order is one more pointer to the polarisa-
tion which has ta]cen place on communal lines in Urban 
areas in Gujrat. Shaikh who contested and won five 
seats in Ahmedabad was a crucial factor in the Congress 
(I) 's desultory performance. He had been detained under 
the Prevention of Anti-Social Activities (PASA) Legis-
lation and was released on parole by a Supreme Court 
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order a day prior to the election. In none of the four 
municipal corporations has the Congress (I) managed to 
gain control. In Ahmedabad, which was witnessing commu-
nal incidents throughout the last two years, the Cong-
ress (I) has managed to capture only 27 seats in the 
127 member house, BJP gaining the absolute majority. 
While the State Government has ejcprassed syrnpathy for 
the victims of the communal riots, who have become in-
creasingly impoverished with every episode of violence, 
it has done little for them either in terms of immedi-
ate relief and safety and security or in the matter 
of easing communal tensions. BJP has also been able 
to take advantage of the situation to consolidate its 
Hindu vote bank. Communalism is not a new factor in 
Gujrat politics, there smallest incidents have been 
enough to spark violence. The Congress (I) has contri-
buted in no small measure to this. 
71. KOTHARI (Rajni). Gandhi's Gujrat: Behind the facade. 
Illustrated Weekly of India. 106, 6; 1985, Jun, l6;l4-7. 
The author highlights that for the past three months 
Gujrat has been trapped in a whirlpool of violence. The 
country continues to be shocked and intrigued at the lat-
est scene of unabated violence and communal carnage in 
Gujrat. The fact is that Gujrat is a highly conservative 
society intolerant of lower classes and minorities 
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and hostile to change. A society that has fallen prey 
to the engineers of ttorniaoil and ruin. As the nexus 
between crisae« class and comnunalism deepens, and vio-
lence acquires its autonoray, even political parties, 
who are supposed to be "secular" and "mediate" in tiroes 
of criais, are found to follow the same modus operandi. 
_, -, _, -, -, -, AHMEDABAD. 
72. AGONY OF Ahroedabad. Tribue. 1986, Jul, 12; 4. 
Editorially states that the communal riots threaten 
to become an annual visitation to Ahmedabad, a city wash-
ed by the Sabarmati river and once blessed by Mahatma 
Gandhi. It happened last year at the time of the "rath 
yatra" of the local Jagannath temple; it happened on 
Wednesday, again during the same festival. This time 
the intensity of hatred and murderous intent was stronger 
than what it was 12 months ago, as is obvious from the 
higher toll of human lives and the fact that half of them 
fell victim to police bullets. Trouble was brewing days 
before the "Rath" trundled out. The city authorities 
first tried to persuade the organisers to put off the 
procession and when this plea was rejected, sought to 
divert the route away fr<»B two sensitive localities. A 
few hotheads insisted on going ahead with "y^tra* with 
redoubled vigour. Ahmedabad has become a home of bloody 
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dashes between Hindus and Muslims, rather between non-
Gujratl Hlndi-speaklng migrant labour families and local 
artisans. The state capital has shown on alarming ten-
dency to turn brutal on the "rath yatra" day. Last year 
was much more shameful in the sense that the anti-reser-
vation agitation provided a fillip to anarchy. This time 
it was peace until the hour of the "yatra" and then 
bloody bedlam. 
-, -, -, _, -, JAMMU & KASHMIR. 
73. BEYCaiD FIRE fighting. Indian Express. 1986, Feb, 28; 8. 
The paper editorially states that the situation in 
Jammu and Kashmir is extremely disturbing. A protest move-
ment on the disputed place of worship in Ayodhya launched 
by Shiv Sena in Jammu sparked violence which engulfed the 
city and region lO days ago, producing militant reaction 
in the valleyof Kashmir where the Jamaat-i-islaroi seems 
to have been at the fore. The long tradition of comminal 
amity for which Jammu and Kashmir has an enviable reputa-
tion, despite some recent stra4.n, has suffered a heavy 
blow. There have been incidents of desecration of places 
of worship and attacks on shops and property of the 
minority cosnunity wherever locally vulnerable, which 
musts shame all men and women of good will and the vast 
majority of the people in the state who remain staunchly 
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committed to the secular Ideal. The centre was suffi-
ciently concerned to send the Home Minister, Mr. S.B. 
Chavan dashing to Srlnagar. Mr. Farooq Abdullah has 
protested that he was prevented from going to Anantnag 
by the authorities last Saturday to provide succour and 
comfort to the afflicted. The ruling National Conference 
(K) president. Begum Khallda Shah has called on the ad-
ministration to repair all the damaged places of wor-
ship and there are reports that the state government 
is considering liqg>oslng a ban on the Jamaat-1-lslaml 
and Shlv Sena. Restoring law and order Is not enough 
and does not go beyond flreflghtlng. Reviving communal 
accord Is going to be more delicate and coii{>lex task. 
74. DANGEROUS PORTENTS In Kashmir. Hindu.l09, 46; 1986, 
Feb, 24; 8a. 
The paper editorially states that It Is a matter 
of deep concern that the State of Jannau and Kashmir should 
be passing through a period of tense communallsm. In the 
last few weeks, antl-Indlan elements who were lying low 
have made bold to come out In the open and even take out 
a procession raising pro-Pakistani slogans and indulging 
in destructive activities right in heart of State Capital. 
The police seems to have a tough time bringing the cul-
prits to book. TroTible soon spread to Jammu as a 
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retaliatory step. The iBnraediate cause of the conflag-
ration is stated to be the order by U.P. session Judge 
ordering the unlocking of the gates of Ram Janam Bhooral 
teinple at Ayodhya after 35 years of closure. It Is un-
fortunate that the Ayodhya affair should have been used 
by the religious bigots to rouse coneiunal passions. 
Worse still was the State Govermoent's failure to anti-
cipate the events In spite of the clear warning signals. 
Firm steps are necessary to stem the rise of the funda-
mentalist groups, whether Hindu or Muslim, on the other 
hand the Centre cannot afford to let the developments 
In the sensitive state go beyond certain limits. 
75. FRESH VIOLENCE In Janrau. Hindustan Times. 63, 65; 1986, 
Mar, 6; 9a-b. 
States that fresh violence erupted in Jammu when 
the colleges opened there today. At least In three col-
leges students came out of the classes and Indulged In 
indiscriminate stone-throwing as a iresult of which the 
police had to use tear gas shells and later order a mild 
lathicharge. Today's Incidents were in retaliation for 
the happening in Kashmir valley during the last fortnight. 
Reports from Srinagar said that in a number of towns shops, 
remained closed today because people protest against the 
incidents In Kashmir valley the town which were badly 
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affected were Srinagar and Anantnag. In Anantaag« people 
have been demanding the reinstatement of both the Deputy 
Commissioner, Mr. Wahid and the Superitendent of Police, 
Mr, Mir who have been placed under suspension by the 
Government for their alleged failure to deal with the si-
tuation in Anantnag district suitably. 
«, -, -, -, -, UTTAR PRADESH, MEERUT. 
76. CHAKRAVARTTY (Nikhil). Hitlerite barbarities in Meerut. 
Time of India, Sunday Review. 150, 164; 1987, Jan, 14; 
3a-d. 
The author points out that what we normally under-
stand by a ccxrairunal riot is only the half story of what 
happened in Meerut last month. A communal riot has come 
to be known as the outbreak of clash between the members 
of two communities very often between Hindus and Muslims 
in a city or in a part of it. The fxill story of the Meerut 
happenings in May is something which far oversteps this 
traditional dimension of a consminal riot. There were 
the usual stories of harassment of innocent citiaens, 
the cvirfew, etc. But something more happened in Meerut 
which has never happened in this country. Here is a 
clear case of a wing of the state going out with cold— 
blooded calculation to (raid and sound up a gro\;^  of citi-
zens, whisk them laway, shoot them while in custody and 
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then throw their bodies into the river. Such a fiendish 
act has never taken place before. Let it be repeated these 
persons were not arrested while actually engaged in any 
violent act; the police produced no charge against them; 
they were not told where they were being taken, and they 
were liquidated. The U.P. Chief Minister was canping at 
Meerut. The Prime Minister after putting off his trip 
and did visit Meerut. But the PAC was not reprimanded, 
nor the officer incharge suspended. The PAC of U.P. has 
of course a shameful record of coBsnunal brutalities. 
77. CITY UNDER Siege. Sunday. 14, 29; 1987, Jun/ 7-13. 
The article points that the i^ril and May were 
dark months in Meerut when Lunpens ruled the roots Hun-
dred died in the communal violence that raged for days, 
thanks to the communal organisation ever ready to stoke 
the fires of hatred between Hindus and Muslims,. Why do 
riots erupt with such regularity in Meerut^whenever 
there are elections riots are sure to be round the 
corner. In 1973, 1968, 1969 were the election years, 
there were riots, it is not that Muslims and Hindus of 
Meerut are at each other's throats perpetually, it 
suits politicians to whip up tension and sow the seeds 
of hatred so that they can reap a harvest of votes dur-
ing the election. 
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78. COMMUNALISM IN U.P. Times of India. 150# 141; 1987, 
May, 21; 6a-b. 
Editorially cororoents that the authorities have 
moved with speed to get Meerut under control where one 
of the worst coinraunal riots in state in recent tiroes 
took place, but there are some aspects of the way in 
which the affair has been handled that are disturbing. 
The warning signals were there. Only one month ago, 10 
people died when communal frenzy emipted. Another distur-
bing aspect is the tight-lipped silence of the ministers 
sent from the centre to Meerut. To a large extent, what 
has happened at Meerut undermines the credibility of 
the U.P. Government just when this has been somewhat 
enchanced by Lucknow's welcome decision to ban religious 
processions following tensions in Faizabad district. 
There, the Bajrang Dal, an offshoot of the equally per-
nicious Adam Sena set up by Imam Bukhari of Jama Mas J id, 
has been very active in stocking fires. To be sure, as 
Meerut has shown banning religious processions tempora-
rily is by no means enough. Where the processions are 
allowed, there must be under conditions that are strictly 
adhered to. Long processions from one city to another 
must be banned. The record of the last years shows that 
the frequency of communal rioting has grown as also the 
occassions when such riots have been sparked off by public 
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festivities and processions. Even in Meerut, the first 
round of violence last month took place on the day of 
Shab-e-Barat. 
79. WAKE UP. Indian Express. 55, 199; 1987, May, 28; 6a-b. 
The paqper editorially comments that the communal 
carnage in Meerut and adjoining area is a severe indict-
ment of U.P. administration. It is iB5)OSsible to resist 
this conclusion even after making full allowance for the 
con5>lexity of the problem. But reports of killings and 
destruction of houses are continuing to pour in from 
other parts of U.P. 20 persons were killed in Modinagar, 
Four persons were killed in a bomb blast in Sikandrabad. 
According to police the blast occured when the bomb were 
being made. Another bomb explosion took place in Amroha 
in which one person was killed. There is no doubt that 
they are alarming signs of spread of wave of violance 
from Meerut. U.P, has never had a reputation as one 
of the best governed states. But the communal riots 
show that even the better governed western part is slid-
ing into administratiwa paralysis. And now, there is 
good rsason to suspect that Mr. Vir Bhadur Singh, Chief 
Minister is too, preoccupied with such periphrel issues 
as the fear of Mr. V.P. Singh increasing his prestige 
among the people to take a full measure of communal 
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danger. If the Punjab government was disealssdd due to 
its failure to check the violence, unleashed by terro-
rists the centre should leave Mr, Vir Bhadur Singh is 
no dotibt of similar action in U.P. if he fails to give 
concrete probf that he has the will and capacity to ar-
rest the deterioration of law and order in WesteiwU.P. 
-* -/ -/ -* HINDU-SIKH, DELHI. 
80. TRIDENT AND the sword. Economist. 300, 7457; 1986, Aug, 
2-8; 20-1. 
The article high-lights that the riots in Delhi 
on July 26th, 1986 in which five people were killed, 
could have been worse. Some Indians feared that the 
repeat of violence that followed the shooting of Indira 
Gandhi in Nov. 1984, When Hindus killed around 3,000 
Sikhs. The trouble started just as Punjab's police force 
and government were begining to think they had terrorism 
on the run. Processions in west Delhi led by Hindus tur-
ned violent after the massacre. As in 1984 the protestors 
had lists of Sikh hoiises and shop which they attacked 
ai^ burned. But the riots were not as well organised 
as the last rotmd, which, by most reliable accounts, 
had the backing of some top politicians in Mr. Raj'iv 
Gandhi's Congress party. This time, Sikhs were out on 
the streets with their swords - one of the symbols of 
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the Sikh faith but with the cutting edge as well to 
match the Hindu tridents. In 1984, the government ap-
parently condoned their inaction: the aacray was brought 
out in force only after three days of rioting. Until 
this bout of violence, the governiaent was beginning to 
congratulate itself on its progress in Punjab. The Cen-
tral Qovernment seeras to have given \3p trying to incle-
ment last years' agreement with Punjab's state govern-
ment. The first stage, placing CJiandigarh, the joint 
state capital of Punjab and Haryana, under Punjab's 
sole control, has not been carried out despite several 
tries. The sectarian killing inside Punjab has gone on. 
If politics won't work, better policing seems at least 
a short term answer. 
-, -, CONTROVERSIES, CABINET, RESHUFFLE. 
81. LAKSHMAN (Nikhil). Game plan. Illustrated weekly of India. 
106, 23; 1985, Oct, 13; 8-13. 
Author analyses the ruiBOurs of major changes in 
the luiion cabinet were rife for several months but no 
one knew exactly when Rajiv Gandhi would strike, and how. 
Suddenly, unannounced, on sep 25, 1985, he made his moves. 
Swiftly and without warning. Several people were dropped. 
New ones came in.portfolios were changed. Even ministries 
were restructured^ The game plan was obviotisly carefully 
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thought out and meticulously irapleraented. To psove that 
performance is the ultimate criterion by which ministers 
would be judged, everything else matters little. Will 
this help the prime Minister achieve the ambitious tar-
gets he has set himself and the nation ? will the new 
cabinet function better than earlier one ? Do the changes 
pyovide any clues of Rajiv Gandhi's political game plan ? 
or are they mere short - term gambits that would yield 
quick advantages in terms of consolidating his control 
over the party machinery ? Rajiv Gandhi himself has 
made it clear that this minister would have to perform 
if they had to survive. "No minister who does not produce 
results, will continue", he once said. 
82. PARTY SHAKE up. Hindustan Times. 63, 21; 1986, Jan, 21; 
9a.b. 
The paper editorially noticed that the shake-up in 
Congress l might have come with what seems to be amazing 
suddenness, but a little reflection will reveal that it 
follows naturally from the pledges made during the presi-
dential address at the centenary celebrations in Bombay 
recently. According the Prime Minister Mr. Gandhi^ s^ 
iecheme to revamp and rivitalise the Congress party, three 
of his ministerial colleagues, Mr. Arjun Singh (Commerce), 
Mr. Anjaih (Labour) and Mr. Naval Kishore Sharma (Petroleum) < 
who have been appointed Vice-President and General Secrator: 
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respectively, have resigned, paving the way for a minor 
cabinet reshxiffle which was also possible not altogether 
unintended. An aspect that has surprised a lot of per-
sons is that Arjun Singh should have been moved at a 
time when he was continuing to take a benign interest in 
Punjab, where the situation is hotting up again. But one 
supposes that what he could do cis Union coranerce Minister, 
he can do as well as the Party Vice-President, and per-
haps even better. The worst suffererin the new dispensa-
tion has been Pranab Mukherjee who had been dropped from 
the party's working coninittee and the Parliamentary 
Board. That is inexorable truth of politics: when you 
are really out, you are out all the way. 
-# -# -# -, ANDHRA PRADESH. 
83. CURIOUS RESHUFFLE. Hindustan Times. 64, 195; 1987, 
Jul, 15; lla-b. 
Editorially states that nothing illustrates Chief 
Minister N.T, Rama Rao's peculiar style of functioning 
as the timing of llth July 1987's cabinet reshuffle in 
Andhra Pradesh. The Telugu Desam leader, whose word is 
law in the party, had full three months to select his 
new team. Yet the chose the very hour the budget session 
of the Assembly was to IsaK^ e opened for the swearing - in 
ceremony, without realising that he was showing disrespect 
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to the House. If the axing of raost of the nine Ministers 
did not make much sense« the selection of some of the new 
entrants can hardly be said to have enhanced NTR'S image 
at a time when he is engaged in a moral crusade at the 
national level. The significant aspect of the reshuffle, 
how-ever, is the induction of N.T.R's eldes son-in-lay. 
Dr. D. Venkateswara Rao. For one who is never tired of 
criticising the Congress I's predilection for "dynastic 
rule" N.T.R. Seems to have made his values somewhat elastic. 
The Teluge Desam is a one man show, the new line of leader-
ship encouraged to grow with "ministerial berths by rota-
tion" must stay in the family. There is also the dan^ Fer 
that the Ministemwho have been eased out from the gov<^n-
ment will not keep c[uiet and encourage dissidence, N.T.R. 
may have to watch his step hence forth. 
-, -, -, -, SINGH (V.P.), RESIGNATION. 
84. MR. GHANDHI fails the test. Times. 62794; 1987, Mar, 16; 
I9a-c. 
Editorially states that the resignation from Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi's cabinet earlier this week of Mr. V.p. Singh, laie for-
mer. Defence Minister, has deprived India of a rare politician 
His personal incorruptibility made him stand out in a field 
crowded withracketeers. As a finance minister - the port-
folio he held since January and later as defence Minister 
he instituted inquiries into the illegal foreign accounts 
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held by many Indians and into the scandalous "kick-back" 
payments that have accoB^anied India's defence deals^ In 
each case it was thought that Mr, Singh's efforts risked 
unearthing thinly concealed "business activities" of 
friends and associates of Mr. Gandhi himself^ Inquiries 
soon came to represent the first real test of Mr. Gandhi's 
much truapeted commitment to clean up public life. This 
test Mr. Gandhi has failed. But Mr. Singh's resignation 
also focuses attention on the wider crisis in Indian po-
litics^ It is the culmination of a series of political 
failureswhich point to growing credibility problem of 
Mr. Gandhi. In the last three months the Prime Minister 
has shown damaging signs of immaturity. 
85. RAJIV'S SWIVEL. Economist. 303, 7497; 1987, May, 9; 
24-6. 
The article points out that when it comes to corrup-
tion, India's voters want one thing from their Prime Minis-
ter and the Congress party wants another. The struggle 
between Mr. Gandhi and his former finance Minister 
Mr. V.p. Singh which ended in Mr. Singh's resignation on 
April 12th, 1987, suggested that Mr. Gandhi had opted to 
please the party . The sacking on May 4th of another cabi-
net minister, Mr. Ghani Khan Chaudhury, suggests that 
Mr. Gandhi has now remembered the voters. Rajiv Gandhi's 
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original determination to clean things up thus struck 
a chord with the voters. In March 1985 the government 
quietly repealed the ban on conqpany donations, A month 
later^ it decided to eliminate all middlemen from de-
fence contracts and to negotiate every deal through its 
own team of everts and officials. In the past few months^ 
however people have begun to wonder how sincere Mr. Gandhi 
is.Mr. Singh was shifted from finance to defence after he 
got too many rich people's backs up; then; under attack 
by the party, resigned. There have been accusations 
that a deal signed with the Swedish Arms company Bofor 
in March 1986 involved a ^ 15 m pay off to Indian agents. 
No body has proved it, and early fears that in-vestigat-
ions of it might lead to a constitutional clash between 
Mr. Gandhi and the president, Zail Singh, have died down. 
But it sounds just like the sort of deal the Congress 
party uaed to leave off. 
86. CHOPRA (V.D.) New pressures on the system, patriot. 
25, 24, 1987; Mar, 23; 4c-h. 
Author coimnents on the new pressure from the poli-
tical parties for change in the present political or par-
liamentary system in view of the controversy over the 
relationship between the President and Pri^ Minister. 
The B.J.P. has openly come out in support of the presi-
dential political system. In the recent years, separatist 
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forces have raised their ugly head on the sensitive 
area of our borders - Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and 
the north eastern region. The trauma and turmoil follow-
ing the military operation In Golden Temple, Ararltsar, 
the assassination of Mrs, Gandhi, attempt at the life 
of prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi all these are links in 
chain of 'Operation Balkanlsatlon"* Anyone of these 
crises could have provided a pretext for the suspension 
of the democratic system in any other develc^ing country. 
However Indian parllamentary'Cum-<!ablnet system survived 
all these challenges. India is witnessing two parallel 
developments - the rise of fundamentalism and communa-
llsm on the one hand, and deepening national conciousness 
on the other. Both internal reaction and their eikternal 
mentors have come to realise that without changing the 
political system, they cannot achieve their objectives. 
-, -0 -, PRESIDENT ^ PRIME MINISTER. 
87. CONTROVERSY AT its peak. Democratic World. 16, 19; 1987, 
May, 10; 3-4, 
Editorially coiraaents that the controversy bet-
lias 
ween prime Minister and the President/not ended. The en-
tire scenario has turned political and is not limited to 
constitutional or legal Issues. The first salvo was fired 
by Prime Minister in his speech at Salem .Rajiv Gandhi did 
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not name the president but it is evident from his state-
ment that "If any one individual tried to interpret the 
constitution to suit h4s aspirations, it would only be 
for his personal gains and the country cannot allow it". 
He lashed out against those people who were levelling 
corruption charges against his Government* The next day the 
President spoke from Bombay. In an extenpore comment 
Mr. Singh said "How can I see my Government being made 
weak "? "There are some people in our country who change 
according to their interests. They aay something.and do 
something else. This is not a good thing. The Rashtra-
pati Bhawan came out with a statement, denying all the 
press reports about the intention of the President to 
"dismiss Rajiv Gandhi from the office of the Prime Minis-
ter". The general expectation was that the Presidential 
clarifications would put an end to the controversy. The 
ruling party has taken crisis situation as a big challenge . 
The senior leaders see in the latest communication from 
the President, seeking more information on the B<efor^  gun 
deal, some sinister motives. As the events are taking 
place at fast pace, it will be difficult to predict any 
thing at this stage, {.When country is facing lot of pro-
blems both internal and external, it is time to put an 
end to the present controversy. 
147 
88. FAMILIAR TWADDLE. Indian Express. 55, 130; 1987, Mar, 
20; 8a-b. 
The paper editorially comments that the Congress (I) 
is perfectly entitled to hold its views on the events of 
the past few days concerning the letters exchangedbetween 
the President and prime Minister and the arrest and haras-
sment of Mr. S, Gururaurthy and a business associate. But 
it betrays a complete absence of sanity when it trots out 
the kind of twaddle we have been hearing in the last few 
days. Now, a general secretary of party's id.gh Command, 
Mr. Nawal Kishore Sharraa says that "the Prime Minister's 
credibility is with the masses", and "is not created in 
the drawingrooms of the affluent or in cocktail parties". 
The issue is not subversion of democracy or the credibi-
lity of the Prime Minister in cocktail parties - attended 
regularly, incidently, by a certain brand of Congress 
toembers or espionage or national security. It is, in a 
word, truth. The government has been stonewalling in 
Parliament, using its brute strength and conPivance of 
speaker and chairman in the two Houses to prevent debate. 
It has incarcerated a man who e:q)osed fraud even as the 
perpetrators of that fraud go scot free. The sooner the 
country knows exactly what has been going on in the Govern-
ment, between President and prime Minister, and in the 
context of Reliance Industries Ltd., the sooner will it 
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be spared the puerile utterances of the likes of Mr. Sharma. 
89. NOORANI (A.G.) Collision course. Illustrated Weekly of 
India. 106, 18; 1985, Sep, 8; 22-3. 
Author states that the nation has been taken un-
awares by the growing schism between the President Zail 
Singh and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. A conflict between 
the head of state and the head of the government, however, 
is not unusual. The phenomenon of one-tipmanship has exis-
ted since the early days of the republic. The author high-
lights the relationship between the President and prime 
Minister in the light of recent revelations. 
90. RAJIV - OAIL Rift:Presidential challenge. India Today. 
12, 4; 1987, Feb, 16-28: 32-9. 
For the first time in India's constitutional history, 
contact between the head of the government and head of the 
State has been kept to the minimum and the President has 
not been consulted on vital matters, in the process the 
rift between the Prime Minister, Mr. Gandhi and President 
Giani Zail Singh has become the most debated and intrigu-
ing public issue. After two years of growing isolation. 
President Giani Zail Singh finally seems to have decided 
to assert himself, in the last few months, Singh has 
been increasingly questioning the Government's decisions 
much to Rajiv Gandhi's embarrassment. 
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91. SALAMT ALL Clash of heads. Far Eastern Economic Review. 
129, 27; 1985, Jul, 11; 18. 
The article points out that despite denials, it is 
becoming obvious that relations between the Prime Minister 
and president are strained. The cause of friction between 
the Prime Minister and president is probably Gandhi's be-
lief that Zail Singh, a prominent Sikh is to be blamed for 
what went wrong in Punjab which he first dealt directly as 
Chief Minister and then indirectly as Home Minister before 
becoming President, The controversy died down until the 
end of May when the Indian press reported that the Prime 
Minister was consistently ignoring the conventions of re-
porting to President on Internal and external matters. 
There is unlikely to be an open war between the Prime 
Minister and President. However, differences between 
holders of the two officers are not unprecedented. Former 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had strong differences 
with the President Rajendra Prasad on the issue of Hindu 
code Bill and the prerogative of the dffice of the presi-
dent. Janata Prime Minister Morarji Desai's strained rela-
tions with President Reddy were widely known. But neither 
Prime Minister failed to call on the President regularly. 
There was a hint that the two men many have decided,pub-
licly at leasts to patch up there differences when Rajiv 
Gandhi attended a medal giving ceremony at the President's 
house on Jxine 27, 1985. 
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., -^  -^  -^  DISMISSAL, PRIME MINISTER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS. 
92. JAIN (Girilal). President's Obligations : Constituion 
and Conventions, Tiraes of India, 150, 90; 1987, Mar, 1; 
6c-e. 
Author laments the unnecessary controvery between 
President and Prime Minister, Gandhi, and says that it 
is tragic that he should feel obliged even to raise the 
issue whether a President can dismiss a Prime Minister 
without violating both the letter and the spirit of the 
constitution and possibly setting in motion a process 
which can lead to the demise of democracy in the land. 
The rumour that the present occupant of Rashtrapati Bhawan 
was thinking in those terms began to circulate i-n Delhi 
several months ago, present controversy broke out follow-
ing the prime Miijiister's claim in Parliament that his 
government had kept the Presient informed on developments 
of national interests, its repudiction by Giani Zail Singh 
through a letter to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and its publication. 
The Indian President did not enjoy any special power, 
that his position was comparable to that of the British 
monarch and that he was bound to act on advice of the 
council of ministers, Gianiji has without doxibt been 
able to arouse widespread synpathy and support for him-
self on the ground that Mr. Gandhi has not shown the 
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respect due to his office. But the tide will turn 
against him if he is seen to be acting in a manner that 
seeks to negate the mandate the Prime Minister won in 
Dec./ 1984. 
93. NANDY (Pritish). My dear Rajiv ... Illustrated Weekly 
of India, 1987, May, 31; 8-15. 
The author questions whether President Zail Singh 
called a truce in his constitutional tussle with Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi or his latest letter, vrtiich he 
has described as his last missive on the subject of the 
disputed Article 78 of the constitution, yet another 
subtle political manoeurvre to keep the government on 
tenterhooks ? it is difficult to say yet, argues the 
author. The Giani is obviously keeping his options open, 
amidst disinformation from the other side that the crises 
is over, and the deoks have been cleared for a new tenant 
to enter Rashtrapati Bhawan a couple of months now. As 
political analysts and constitutional experts fiercely 
debate over what the President can or will, actually do 
they forget the simple reality that when the two most 
powerful men in the land are locked in deadly combat 
even as they share laddoos and Smiles, anything can 
happen, and usually does. That does not simply mean the 
Giani will dismiss the government, or resign and go pub-
lic. These options are certainly available to the first 
m 
citizen, but it's unlikely he will exercise such a predic-
table choice, Zail Singh has a yen for the unusual and may 
well try out trick or two that no one has thought of. That 
is exactly where the crux of the problem lies. It is the 
fact that Giani has kept all his option open, to play as 
he wills. At the right moment, given the right opportunity, 
if he plays his cards right he may even come up with an ace 
or two, 
•", •", ••, ••, -•, —, PliEA FOR* 
94, JAIN (Girilal)• Dangerous plea to president: Subverting 
Indian democracy. Times of India. 150, 104; 1987, Apr, 15; 
6c-e. 
The author says that President Zail Singh is one of 
the shrewdest and roost experienced politicians in the land 
today. It is therefore inconcievable that he would walk in-
to the trap that is being laid for him and precipitate a 
constitutional crisis of such frightening proportions as 
would put into jeopardy the future of democracy itself. 
Not to put too fine a point „ out it is being said 
that he has secured Mr, V,P, Singws resignation precisely 
because the former defence minister had ordered on inquiry 
into an arms deal which might have exposed him and that 
therefore, the president should dismiss him. According to 
article 78 the prime Minister's obligation to keep the 
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president informed of his governioent does not confer 
even formally on the latter power to dismiss the former. 
It is rather surprising that anyone should now be argu-
ing that situation can arise when a president can dismiss a 
prime Minister with a ma^ Jority in Lok Sabha. This kind of 
approach can only spell disaster for Indian democracy 
and country. It has therefore became necessary to sound 
a warning that the support of the clear majority for a 
prime Minister can not be disregarded without placing 
democracy at risk. Rumour mills have been over active 
in the country. They have managed to bring Prime Minis-
ter into dispute Array could emerge as the arbiter of the 
fate of country. 
-, _, -, -, INFORMATION, DENIAL* PRESIDENT'S PROTEST. 
95. MALHOTRA (inder). Shades of the Seventies. Times of 
India. 150, 78; 1987, Mar, 20; 6c-e. 
Author points out that the uneasy relationship bet-
ween the Prime Minister and President has been New Delhi's 
most open secret for close to two years. The crux of the 
President's complaint, as confirmed by his letter on March 
9, 1987 is that he has been denied information to which he 
is entitled both constitutionally and by convention, and 
that as a head of state, he has not been shown due res-
pect by the Bead of the government. The P.M. is side of 
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the case, as reported, has been that Rashtrapati Bhavan 
leaks, not like a sieve but like a baby's crib. It is 
therefore not considered a "safe" reciepient of sensitive 
infoirmation. Since it was no part of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's 
scheme of things to take Zail Singh into confidence about 
his plan and policies on such issues as Punjab, the Prime 
Minister seeins to have decided not to spend time calling 
on President just to exchange pleasantries. The souring 
of relationship continued as it was bound to and came 
a stage when the President's foreign travels were obs-
tructed and so were his plans to visit the states. 
_, -, -, _, PRESIDENT'S LETTER. 
96. SHADOW BC8CING. Sunday. 14, 19; 1987, Mar, 29; 44. 
The article states that the feud between the Presi-
dent and the prime Minister enters its last three months. 
In three months president Zail Singh will lay down office. 
The last phase of his Presidentship has been the most 
controversial. Not only has his relations with the Prime 
Minister become strained, the president has charged Rajiv 
Gandhi misinforming Parliament. The Giani is not satis-
fied with Prime Minister's reply to his letter. The 
President would have been satisfied with a sort of apo-
logy coupled with an appeal to let by-gones be by-gones 
He does not regard the it-was^all-a-misunderstanding line 
as being convincing. 
155 
., _, _, _, VIEWS, DANDAVATE (Madhu). 
97. "PRIME MINISTERSHIP may belong to him but the nation 
belongs to all of us". Probe. 9, 3; 1987, May/ 8-11. 
The article points out that the Parliamentatian* 
social worker and politician, Madhu Dandvate, over the 
years, has distinguished himself as a powerful voice in 
the country's hightst legislative forum. In the fourth 
consecutive term in Lok Sabha, the Janata leader's 
voice has once again been at the forefront of opposition 
attack on Rajiv Gandhi and his government in connection 
with the President - versus - Prime Minister controversy, 
the Fairfax and other related issues. His determined and 
principled stand saw him scoring some forceful points dur-
ing the noisy discussions on these matters - the table -
thxioping tactic of the occxjpants of the treasury benches 
not withstanding. The article gives the views about style 
of functioning of the Prime Minister as well as the dis-
turbing issues that have been dominating the parliamen-
tary discussions ever since the coming to light of the 
Fairfax affair. 
-, 1-, CORRUPTION, ENQUIRIES, DEFENCE DEALS. 
98. WE'VE HEARD this before. Economic and Political Weekly 
22, 17; 1987, Apr, 25; 727. 
The article editorially states that the pretence 
of shocked innocence combined with »elf righteous pro-
testations of patriotism with which our politician greet 
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exposures of scandal InaXe Indian politics ludlczrus 
affair. It Is well known that oxir government has been 
buying arms from abroad through agents who are paid com-
mission by the suppliers, a chunk of the commissions 
being siphoned off to the ruling party's funds and rul-
ing politicians, secret accounts. Arun Singh the junior 
minister in the defence ministry asserts that no agents 
were Involved in the controversial deals. At the Cong-
ress parliamentary meeting Rajiv Gandhi opposing the 
proposal of an inquiry into deal said that sensitive 
material concerning defence would come out incourse of 
such an Inquiry and it would prejudice national secu-
rity. President Zail Singh's cos^laints against the 
Prime Minister that l»e had not been kept informed about 
affairs of state as required under the constitution, the 
Fairfax investigation and the inquiry into the ^Bst Ger-
man submarine deal, both ordered by V.P. Singh and the 
latest revelations about graft in connection with armaments 
deal with the Swedish firm as constituting "beyond doubt 
a pattern of destabUisation in which external forces hos-
tile to India, are working together with internal forces 
of political and economic subversion'.' . The ruling party 
no doubt also has on eye on the elections to the Haryana 
assembly due within next two months. 
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-, -, _, -, -, BOPOR. 
99. KOTTARY (Sailesh) . Bofor deal. Illxistrated Weekly of 
India. 108, 16; 1987, Apr, 26; 2.0-3. 
The author reports on the latest imbroglio over the 
country's armament acquisitions. The rough patch that the 
Rajiv Gandhi administration has been riding over, has not 
yet ended. After the poor showing of the Congress in the 
three state polls, the confrontation with the President, 
the Fairfax affair, the resignation of V.P, Singh and 
the controversy over the West German svibmarine pay off, 
yet another scandal was exposed in the media last week. 
It dealt with the pay off of $ 16 million in the purchase 
of field guns from the Swedish firm, Bofor, a deal which 
could finally cost the exchequer ever Rs. 3,000 crores. 
Such a kick back, if proved true, is in direct violation 
of Government of India's long established policy of eli-
minating middle men in all defence deals. The controversy 
gathered momentum last week with Sveriges Radio, which 
broke the story, reiterating its charges despite govern-
ment denials. The network further enphasised that it had 
all the evidence to back the allegations about the scan-
dalous deal. 
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100. MALHOTRA (Inder). Political Commentary : After the 
Bofor Gun-Pire. Times of India. 150/ 112; 1987, Apr, 
23; 6c-e. 
Author states that at the time of writing the 
Bofors issue appears to have been faught to a stand still 
Mr. Gandhi's government has categorically contradicted 
the Swedish radio's allegation that Bofors, the Swedish 
arms conglomerate, had bribed "senior Indian politician 
and Key defence figures" to clinch the $ 1.3 billion 
deal to sell India 155 mm field gun. Leaders of most 
opposition parties have made much of the fact that the 
government's credibility is low. This indeed is their 
main Justification for their demand for a parliamentary 
probe. 
-» -, -# -/ -, PARLIMENTARY COMMITTEE. 
101. WELCOME PROBE. Hindustan Times. 64, 156; 1987, Jun, 6; 
lla-b. 
The paper editorially highlights that in ordering 
a parliamentary probe into the Swedish National Audit 
Bureau's report on the Bofors gun deal the Government 
has taken a major step towards unravelling the mystery 
surrounding the deal. There are some questions needing 
answers and by deciding to appoint a parliamentary com-
mittee the Government has tried to show that it is not 
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afraid of answers. The Prime Minister's assurance in 
the last session of parliament that the giiilty, however 
highly placed, will be punished, makes the probe by a 
parliamentary committee all the more purposeful. Undoub-
tedly the work of Indian parliamentary committee will 
be tough. But the Indian Government can force the Bofor 
corapany to give details with a threat to break the con-
tract. The Bofor deal has aroused considerable pass-
ions. Now when the Government has decide to appoint 
the parliamentary committee, the tendency to jtanj) to 
conclusions needs to be resisted.Fairness would demand 
that guilty are punished^, but only after the committee 
submits its report to the two houj^es. 
-, _, _, _, _, PROOF, SWEDISH NATIONAL AUDIT BUREAU. 
102, BOFORS : Protof positive, grontline. 4, 12; 1987, Jun, 
13-26; 115. 
The article focusses that the Swedish National 
Audit Bureau has confirmed beyond doubt that large-scale 
payments had been made in connection with the Bofor -
India howitzer deal, vindicating the basic position 
taken by the Swedish radio which brought the scandal to 
light. Where does it all leave those who, while criti-
cising the radio insisted that they were pursuing truth 
and had nothing to hide. The government has at last de-
cided on a parliamentary probe but revelations will be 
followed up effectively. 
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103. END THIS Controversy, Tribune. 107, 155; 1987/ Jun, 6; 
4a>b. 
Editorially poihts out that the report of the Nat-
ional Accounting and Audit Bureau of Sweden has brought 
a bad name to Bofors and not to the Indian Government. 
When it has categorically stated that no Indian cot^any 
or Indian citizen recleved any kickbacks from the huge 
arm deal with the Swedish firm, it would be better for 
the country to put all arguments at rest for the moment 
at least, until the Parllamentai^ conanittee con5>lete its 
investigation. Thus joint committee must remember two 
things one to set a deadline and respect its thereafter. 
Second and more importantly, its Investigation should 
be conclusive. It should not recommend the setting up 
of more commissions to enquire more deeply into specific 
cases, thereby making the whole process virtually unend-
ing. 
<•# -# -/ -# -, SINGH (V.P.)/ ROLE. 
104. GANDHI REPUTES repeated charges of bribery in Swedish 
arms deal. Times,62748; 1986, Apr, 21; fa-c. 
The article focusses that Mr, RaJ-iv Gandhi, his 
image as "Mr clean" tarnished by newspaper allegations 
of payoff in defence deals, told a stomry session of 
Parliament, that no such payments had been made in re-
lation to artilleiry purchases from a Swedish coitpany. 
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Opposition members in the Lower House hurled charges of 
bribery and payoff amid strong protests from members of 
the ruling Ctongress party. Mr, Garidhi said: "you show 
us any evidence of corruption or pay off or bribery and 
we will take action and we will see that nobody, however 
high up/ is allowed to go free". The charges are linked 
to a $ 1,3 billion contract India signed with Swedish 
conpany, Bofor, for arbillery. "It is matter of serious 
concern that one after another serious charges of cor-
ruption are being made against the Government". Mr. V.P. 
Singh India's best known corruption fighter, resigned 
last week as Defence Minister after ordering investiga-
tions into newspaper allegation of a $ 23 million pay off 
involving the purchase of submarines from West Germany in 
1981. The resignation embarassed the Government, Mr. Singh 
had been severely critisized by his colleagues for probing 
illegal deals. The opposition, hopelessly out-numbered 
in the Lower House, forced a debate on the defence deals. 
105. HAMEYN (Michael). Defence Minister resigns in Delhi poli-
tical storm. Times. 62741; 1987, Apr, 13; 9g-h. 
Author points out that the Defence minister, Mr. V.P. 
Singh resigned on April 12, 1987 and Mr. K.C. Pant was ap-
pointed Defence Minister. His own portfolio covering steel 
and mines is to be looked after ten?)orarily by Mr. Vasftnt 
Sathe, the minister of energy. Mr. Singh is seen as the 
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target of judicial inquiry that the Government set-up 
last week to discover in what circumstances the Pair-
fax Croupous detective agency, was appointed to inves-
tigate funds that may or may not have been illegally 
disbursed. Mr, Singh announced an inquiry into alle-
gations that a middleman earned as much as 300 million 
rupees from a defence contract. Thus the contract in 
cjuestion is reported to be for the purchase of w^st 
German submarines - which was signed during Mrs. Gandhi's 
rule - the inquiry was seen as an attack on the integrity 
of the Prime Minister, since its scope was wide enough 
to include other defence contracts including a huge 
one for the Swedish 155 nm Bofors gun, v^ich was pushed 
through by Mr. Gandhi. A*Defence Minister, Mr. Singh was 
accused of disloyalty, of failing to consult his cabinet 
colleagues or the Prime Minister, and of vindictiveness. 
106. JAIN (Girilal) . Fairfax and stibmarine deal : Two inqui-
ries cannot be delinked. Times of India. 150, 111; 1987, 
Apr, 22; 6c-e. 
Author points out that Mr. V.P. Singh has run away, 
though perhaps only for the time - being with Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi's constituency among the self-righteous and morally 
indignant section of Indian intelligentia. But he cannot 
get away equally easily with the case which he presented 
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in his favour in the Lok Sabha on Monday. On a surface 
view it would appear that he has used the device of a 
personal explanation to indicate his willingness to 
challenge Mr, Rajiv Gandhi's leadership at an appropri-
ate stage. What he has disclosed does not include his 
oral comraunication to the Prime Minister on the subject 
of the inquiry he had ordered as defence minister into 
the conffnission that is said to have been paid to an agent 
in the West German svibmarine deal. But unfortunately for 
hiro, the facts are not on his side. Broadly speaking, he 
has made two points. First point, that he ordered the 
inquiry into the submarine deal on March 11 while the 
terms of the commission which is to look into the Pair-
fax affair were announced on April 6^  Secondly, that he 
got the press release on the subject issued on April 9 
four and a half hours after he had sent the file to the 
Prime Minister's office. V.p. Singh could not have con-
vinced himself that such a poor defence could clinch 
the two relevant issues in his favour. 
107. SINGH SPEAKS out. Demogratjc World. 16, 17; 1987, Apr, 
26; 4. 
Editorially focuses that the pay off scandals re-
garding the defence deals have confused every one inclu-
ding the ruling congress party members, the opposition 
and the media, people have started for-getting the Fairfax 
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deal, the one which triggered off the original contro-
versy. Perhaps, it may be for the twowfioeinber judges conv-
raission to \inearth the details of the episode. It is now 
more or les's certain that the former Defence Minister 
V.P. Singh is out to defend himself and in that process 
has clashed with Prime Minister and his men. He had 
given a clear picture of situation, leading the people 
he had ordered on the suLbmarine deal. The Prime Minister 
was perhaps shocked. "I have not asked Vishwanathji to 
resign", Rajiv Gandhi told the parliament. But the 
explanation given by the Prime Minister is not quite 
convincing. The demand for a parliamentary probe int# the 
Defence deal is not practical one. The murky happening 
in the country has cast a shadow of unrest and uneasiness. 
We cannot shut a debate outside this country. The media 
in the West has noted with concern that Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi was in "grave political trouble". There 
is a sharp divide among the Indian media too. The sor-
did drama is edging towards a crisis. 
108. M6&!K2flffiSinilG OP V.P. Singh. Probe. 9, 3; 1987, May; 12-4. 
Article states that Rajiv Gandhi having suffered 
the blows of the opposition over his constitutional ob-
ligation to the President and Fairfax and other issues, 
instead of containing tt by showing the guts to stop 
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the iHudslinging and revealing the facts and taking 
action hiinself/ has appointed a coincaission o£ inquiry 
at a stage and in a manner which seemed more an inqui-
sition than an atten5>t to find the truth. Mr. V.P. Singh 
resigned, but after a surfeit of malicious rumours and 
being literally pushed into a corner by the suddenly 
aggressive Dinesh Singh, Bali Ram Bhagat and Kumara-
mangalam, who took up cudgels against him reportedly 
after a briefing from P. Shiv Shankar and Home Minister 
Buta Singh. Accused of disloyalty of Gandhi and in dan-
ger of being branded a traitor, Singh hit back by an-
nouncing a probe into a defence delil in which the Indian 
agent was said to have been paid around Rs. 30 crore as 
commission. All hell broke loose. The country has been 
stripped bare of its dignity and the ruling party deeply 
wounded. Now we hear of motivated siibmarine deals, of 
155 itm guns of suspect quality being purchased at high 
prices, of project SuraJ - a plan for purchase of radar 
equipment. These are mere rumours. But even they indi-
cate that there is something rotten in the "clean" King-
dom. More than V.p. Singh and his probes, more than the 
Prime Minister's image, it is the credibility of the system 
that is at stake. 
16B 
_,-,_,-, -, -, SUBMARINE,CHOPRA SUICIDE. 
109. NAYAR (Kuldip). Suicide fuels Gandhi attacks. Times. 
62749; 1987, Apr, 22; 7a-c. 
Author points out that the scandal over alleged 
bribery in a sxibmarine deal between India and West Ger-
many has acquired a new intensity after the suicide of 
Commander Naveen Chopra, who was to take charge of the 
first of the country's four Shishumar class submarines. 
Commander Chopra, who shot himself at his bachelor quar-
ters at the Western Naval Command Officer's mess in 
Bombay left a note saying that "nobody shoulS be blamed", 
The police and Naval authorities are investigating. Com-
mander Chopra's suicide encouragedthe opposition, which 
has fiercely attacked Mr. Rajiv Gandhi over the deal. 
-# -# -# -# FAIRFAX AFFAIR. 
110. IMPECCABLE MOVE. Times of India. 150, 97; 1987, Apr, 
8; 6a-b. 
The paper editorially states that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 
deserves to be commended for his decision to set up a 
commission of inquiry to look into the Fairfax atffair. 
The commission is to consist of two judges of the high-
est court in the land; it is to function under the com-
mission of inquiry Act; it is to submit its report in 
three months; and its terms of reference 3Lre both fair 
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and coEPprehensive. exposition parties have not welcomed 
the decision. Opposition parties would of course have pre-
ferred an inquiry committee of Aok Sabha, because it would 
have given them an opportunity to keep the controversy 
alive. The consnittee would inevitably have been dominated 
by Congress MPs ^  . in view of their over-whelming majority 
in the house. Some strange arguments are being enployed 
to oppose the inquiry and possibly to pave the way for 
challenging it in the Supreme Ck>urt. The Supreme Coxirt 
cannot spare two judges for an inquiry even into a matter 
which has been threatening to undermine the government's 
legitimacy and authority. The judges will be dealing with 
an essentially political issue; as such, their report will 
be subject to criticism; they will not answer this criti-
cism because judges do not do so; as a result, the Supreme 
court will suffer in popular esteem. Some of issues, which 
the inquiry coranission will took into figure in the> cases 
which the C.B.I, has launched against Mr. S. Gurumurthy 
and Mr. Janakiraaan. Two conclusions follow. First, the 
pressecution continuesduring the period of the inquiry 
and its subsequent relevance or otherwise will depend 
on report. Secondly, the C.B.i. cannot in fairness as-
sist the coiranission in its task. 
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111. MALHOTRA (inder). Political Comnentary": Fairfax flurry 
and after. Tiroes of India. 150, 98; 1987, Apr, 9; 6c-e. 
Author highliftfhts that with the Fairfax affair 
having been referred to a judicial comnission of inqui-
ry it is reasonable to expect a lull in the perfervid 
discussions over this messy business, at any rate in 
parliament. Indeed the truth of the matter is the fran-
tic flurry and strong emotion over the Fairfax issue re-
present not so much a conflict between the opposition 
and the government as a problem within the ruling party 
itself. To be sure the opposition has tried to take 
full advantage of this schism within the Congress ranks 
and of the Fairfax issue in general , just as it had 
earlier seized the president's leaked letter to end its 
two year long lethargy, torpor and ineffectualness. its 
syi^athies have, by and large, been with Mr. V.P, Singh 
and its attempt has been to show that he was shifted 
from finance to defence,With all due respect, it must 
be recorded that neither Mr. Justice Mathew nor Mr. Jus-
tic venkataranian covered himself with glozry while ad-
judicating delicate issues connected with the Punjab 
accord, Mr, justice Ranganath Mishra's report on the 
anti-Sikh riots in Delhi speaks for itself. The resul-
tant dismay of the public has been turned into despair 
by the government's curious decision to treat the Thakkar 
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Conroission's report on Indira Gandhi's assassination 
a "top secret". 
112. OUR MAN in Virginia. Tiroes of India. 150, 128; 1987, 
May, 9; 6a-b. 
The paper editorially comments that the contro-
versy regarding Fairfax, the U.S. Agency the Eir.force-
Directorate 
mentj/of the finance ministry engaged last year when 
Mr, V.P. Singh was finance minister has taken a dramatic 
turn with the latest interview by its Chairman Mr. Hersh-
man, to the statesman. The appointovent of a two aembers 
commission of inquiry, the interview has come admist a 
new escalation between President Zail Singh and Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Giani*s advisers who argue not 
he 
only that^has the power under the constitution to dis-
miss the Prime Minister, but also that he should use 
is 
this power. Mr, Hershamar^angry that a commission should 
have been appointed to investigate the arrangement which 
the former cheif of the enforcement directorate, Mr. Bhure 
Lai had made with Piarfax. Mr. Hershman is intervening 
in the cvirrent upheaval in India against Mr. Gandhi and 
therefore on the side of detractors and trying to black-
mail the Prime Minister. Mr. Hershman is very concerned 
that Mr, Rajiv Gandhi confront the issue of corruption. 
is 
Mr, Hershmar^quoted as having said that "high U.S. gov-
ernment law enforcement officials collaborated with 
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Indian corporations and individuals and U.S. corpora-
tion's and that "he arranged a series of intergovern-
mental gatherings both in the nation's capital and in 
the New York"? This ipaises several questions which Mr.V. 
P. Singh must answer. Did he sanction this government^ 
to government liasion ? Was he aware of meetings ? The 
nation would need to await answer to these questions 
before it draws any inference on this latest disclosSixe 
by "Our man" in Virginia. 
.., ,., -, _, -, -, -, SINGH (V.P.), RDJLE. 
113. FAIRFAX AFFAIR. Times of India. 150, 91? 1987, Apr, 2; 
6a-b. 
The p^er editorially states that the debate on 
the Fairfax Affair in Lok Sabha on Tuesday has not hel-
ped clarify tba issues which have been engaging the 
natiorte attiention for over a fortnight. But Mr. Braham 
Dutt could not have got away as lightly as he did if 
Mr. Danda«ate had not been as ill prepared and inadequate 
as he turned out to be. He alleged that Mr. Brahm Dutt 
himself visited Switzerland as a part of cover xip 
operation and that as finance Minister V^P. Singh, had 
on January 22.^ taken to Prime Minister a file contain-
ing the names of individuals and sought Mr. Gandhi's 
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permission to raid them which was refused.Mr. Brahm 
Dutt could easily dispose of both charges. Mr. Dandvate's 
target was Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and he could not have got at 
him unless he had established the fact regarding Mr. V.P. 
Singh's role in Fairfax Affair. Mr. Brahm Dutt intent-
ion was clearly to evade the relevant issues perhaps in 
order to avoid a discussion on Mr. V.P, Singh's role in 
the arrangement with Fairfax. Mr. Singh himself has made 
a curious statement. He said that he "shares respon-
sibility". Mr. Singh agreed to go along with a decision 
which was taken by someone else. But who was some-ene 
else ? what was his interest in recommending Fairfax ? 
Why did Fairfax agree to act as an "informer" without 
an agreed fee ? was this "infoirmation" handed to Indian 
who was in contact with it ? We can only pose certain 
have 
questions which is what we^done strictly on the basis 
of what had been said on the floor of the Lok Sabha. We 
have also assumed that there must be good reasons why 
has 
Mr. Gandhi^not accepted Mr. Singh's resignation and why 
he has either not sxibraitted his resignation or pressed 
it. But we must en^hasise once again that the govern-
ment must give the nation a reasonably full and honest 
account of what was happening. 
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114. JAIN (Girilal)• Fairfax affair : Possible external 
ramifications. Times of India. 150, 96? 1987, Apr, 7; 
6c-e. 
Author points out that the once again the "foreign 
hand" theory has been put forward in aid, if not on be-
half, of the Incumbent Prime Minister in connection with 
Fairfax affair and once again it has generally been pooh-
poohed. The theory may be wholly unfounded. It is cjuite 
possible that the aides and sxjpporters of the besieged 
Prime Minister may have thought of this device in order 
to disccedit or discourage these who are pressing, the 
attack on him. Mr. V.P. Singh, one of the major actors 
in the Fairfax drama have invented the theory with a 
view to embarrassing him. Author[shys that intention is 
not to suggest that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is a victim of 
conspiracy with or without external ramifications. He 
wishes to indicate is that we should not rush to any 
conclusion and that we should wait till enough reliable 
and verifiable details are available. A conspiracy theory 
conjures up the picttire of a sinister figure who master 
minds the whole operation. The reality may often be a 
a^essy. affair. He cannot identify that someone since 
the chairman of Fairfax has said in many words that his 
firm was not asked to and did not look into the affairs 
of Mr. Ajitabh Bachehan who is at the heart of the cur-
rent controversy in view of Mr. Amitabh Bachchan^s close 
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friendship with Mr, Rajiv Gandhi and Mr. Ajitabh Bach-
chan's alleged partnership with some Italians with strong 
connection in India, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is himself largely 
to blame for the present turmoil. 
_, -, -, _, -, THAKKAR COMMISSION. 
115. "THAKKAR "Coimnission probe. Democratic World. 16, 15; 
1987, Apr, 12; 3-4. 
Editorially points out that the another "Thakkar" 
coimnission has been announced by the government. The two 
member commission headed by Justice M.P. Thakkar would 
inquire into the controversial Fairfax deal. The other 
judge is S.Natarajan. The government took this decision 
after consulting the Chief justice of the Supreme Court 
The opposition and some Congressmen are not satisfied 
with such a step. They feel that the main objective 
of the government is to put a lid on an qpen discuss-
ion on the subject. The political fallout from this 
step has engulfed the entire rtiling party and has vir-
tually created a division in its ranks. The pro and anti 
V^P, Singh lobbies are quite active now. The lobby hea-
ded by former Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh has started 
its attack against V.p. Singh. During the earlier debate 
Dinesh Singh launched a direct attack against V.P. Singh 
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and questioned his right to appoint the American agency 
Fairfax, which, he said, was a CIA outfit. Singh made the 
timely move and owned up the responsibility. He said "I 
am happy that those who were sitting in the comforts of 
their homes when Mrs, Gandhi was facing the handcuffs 
and left her in lurch during 1977-80 are now talking 
about party loyalty". The Thakkar coimnission has three 
month's time to probe into the entire Fairfax affair. 
The probe will focus on the appointment of Fairfax, its 
work and all connected matters. 
-, -, ELECTIONS, ASSEMBLIES, t984, TAMIL NAEU, POLI-
TICAL PARTIES, PROSPECTS. 
116. RAJAPPA (s). Tamil Nadu on Way to coalition raj- States-
man. 125, 3254; 1984, Dec, 7; 7a-b. 
Author says that the Tamil Nadu is heading for a 
era of coalition government as no party is contesting 
all 234 State Assembly seats up for election on Decem-
ber 24, 1984 simultaneously with the Lok Sabha election-
though there are a record number of 1,468 candidates in 
the field, cornpared to 1,029 in the last elections. The 
alliance between a national party and a regional party 
which had worked wonders for the Lok Sabha elections, 
came a cropper for the Assembly elections, WOuld the 
grounds-well of sympathy for the ailing chief Minister 
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and the son of the assassinated Prime Minister turn 
the tide is the (juestion upper roost in the minds of 
psephologists in Tamil Nadu right now, 
117. TAMIL NADU line up. Indian Express. 53, 30; 1984,Dec, 
4, 6a<-b. 
Editorially points out that the Tamil Nadu being 
the only major state with a simultaneous Lolc Sabha and 
Assembly poil, the main political parties have had a 
doubly difficult task in apportioning the seats to the 
satisfaction of their respective partners, and finalis-
ing the two lists. The process was smooth in the case 
of the DMK. The AIADMK had more difficulty, while the 
Congress (i) faced embarrassing last minute con^licat-
ions caused by Sivaji Ganesan's emotion - charged 
threat to walk out of the party. In the obsence of MGR, 
due to serious illness, the Congress (I) extracted from 
the second line AiADMK leadership as the price for con-
ceding the demand for a simultaneous Assembly poll, an 
aggregate of seats within their alliance vastly dispro-
portionate to the forvaef^s inherent political following 
in the State 26 out of 39 Lok Sabha seats and 72 out of 
234 Assembly seats. The unseemly public wranglings in 
the Congress (I) and AiADMK have inevitably eroded the 
sympathy factor generated by the assassination of 
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Mrs. Gandhi and MGR's illness, which till a fottnight 
back, was believed capable of neutralising Mr. Karuna-
nidhi's organisational advantage. The two parties will 
have to work hard to regain lost ground and be able to 
present an effective joint strategy, especially with 
the DMK asserting Stat^ "rights against the centre" 
and calling for the abolition of Governor's and of 
President's rule in view of their alleged misuse. 
-, -, -, -, 1985, ANDHRA PRADESH POLITICAL PARTIES, 
PERFORMANCE*TELUGU DESAM. 
118. ACCENT ON VMIlfare. Indian Express. 1985, Mar, 16; 8. 
Editorially points out that the renewed and massive 
mandate which the Telugu Desam Party recieved in this month 
to 
election^the State Assembly has both emboldened and chaste-
ned the NTR government. This is clear from the coinposit-
ion of the new council of ministers which is weighted in 
favour of backward classes. Contrary to the in^ression 
that the TeluguDesam's popularity is built on Mr. N.T. 
Rama Rao's cinematic glamour and regional appeal, both 
the Governor's Address and interim budget svemt by per-
formance and offer time-bound programmes. The care with 
which Mr. Rama Rao has chosen his new 24 member council 
of Minister - 15 of cabinet rank and the rest juniors -
shows the importance he attaches to the political instru-
ments for carrying out the task in hand. He did not 
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hesitate to drop controversial naembers of his team 
so that the new cabinet should have a clean Image. By 
adhering to the traditional two-to-one ratio between 
the Andhra and Telengana regions he has obviated the 
danger of a blacklash from disgruntled elements. Nearly 
half the ministerial team is con^osed of new faces ttlme 
will tell how they shape. 
_, _, -, -, ASSAM,POLITICAL PARTIES,PERFORMANCE, A-SOM 
GANA PARISHAD. 
119. AGITATION TO power. Frontline. 2, 26; 1986, Jan, 10; 
14. 
Editorially highlights that the installation of 
the AQE> Government headed by Prafulla Mohanta marks a 
new era in the politics of border state. As in Punjab, 
the people of Assam too chose to turn away from the 
Congress (I) which worked out a compromise towards a 
party that seeks to promote the special interests of 
Assam. The focus of Assam agitation, "the foreigners", 
remains within the state and in a sense the problem is 
still Internal underlying the care and the sensitivity 
that the new party needsto bring to the administration. 
Though the AGP fought and stands for the rights of the 
original Assamese and has voiced resentment over the 
Influence of "outsiders" in the State, it has promised 
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to safeguard the interests of the Bengali - speaking 
minority as well. The minorities would need some addi-
tional reassurance in terms of administrative action 
and the new Government would do well to keep this aspect 
in mind as it settles down. The enthusiaftothat the lea-
ders and the legislaters of the AGP have shown is ref-
reshing but the party is short of persons with poli-
tical and administrative experience. The AGP leaders 
ought to address themselves seriously to the challanges 
on the development front and try to carry with them all 
sections in the state. 
120. WITH NEW hopes. Democratic World. 14, 52; 1985, Dec, 
29; 3-4. 
Editorially highlights that the Assam begins the 
New "year with new hopes for peace and stability and 
more inportantly, economic progress, under a 21 member 
two-tiered government formed by Mr. Prafulla Kumar 
Mohanta, the victorious leader of victorious Aca> which 
convincingly trounced the combined opposition in the 
Dec 16, 1985 Assembly election and secured an adbsolute 
majority in the 126 member House. The assamese themselves 
had seemed to be in no doubt about the outcome of the 
polls in which they participated with an unprecedented 
enthusiatsxi,although the congress (I), which contested 
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all the Assembly seats, had hoped to return to power. 
In the event not only did the Congress (I) recieve the 
worst drxibbing of its long career in the state but other 
national parties like the Janata, the CPI the BJP and the 
CPI(W) performed miserably, some of them not even figur-
ing on the result score board. The AASU and AAGSP had 
kept up the pressure on the centre for a solution of 
the problem of illegal migrants regardless of the con-
sequences in terms of the scholarstic career of the 
students, the economic progress of the State and normal 
day to day civic life. The defeat of the Congress party 
in Assam and other States undoubtly is a grim lesson to 
be learnt from the party's poor performance during the 
year. 
-# -# -/ -# -# -/ -# -# -0 WIN. 
121 STUDENT POWER. Economist. 297, 7425 - 6; 1985, Dec, 
21; 37-8. 
Points out that the results of Assam's election 
on Dec 16th still trickling in two days later, it al-
ready seemed certain that the people who have been 
leading the violent unrest in the State had beaten the 
Congress pairty of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. The AGP is dedica-
ted to keeping Assam Assamese and Hindu. In Assam dur-
ing the last election held in 1983 around 5,000 Bengalis 
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were murdered. More than 75 % of the lO m registered 
voters In Assam went to the polls. Mr Gandhi succeeded 
in bringing some hope o£ peace to both Punjab and Assam 
by making deals with violent extremists in those states. 
The Punjab election in septeniber produced a stable Akali 
Dal government and seemed to have snuffed out most of 
the violence. In Assam the election was fought on one 
issue : was the accord signed by the Prime Minister 
and the Assam for the Assamese student activists last 
August to be carried out ? In Punjab some people rekon-
ed that Mr. Gandhi was happy to see the Sikh Akali Dal 
party win, because with them in government his peace 
agreement would have a better chance. The upper caste 
Assamese speaking Hindu voted for the urqpleasant stu-
dent activists now recycled as candidates in the new 
AQP.Congress was committed to the accord but would some 
how look after the minorities. 
-* -, -/ -# -, -, -, CONGRESS (I), DEFEAT. 
122. PANDIT (CS). Days of national parties over ? Amrita 
Bazar Patrika., 1985, Dec, 26. 
The author comments that so soon after the debacle 
in Punjab, the Assam election results both for Assembly 
and Lok Sabha have come as a major shock to the majority 
of the rank and file of Congress (I), whatever explanation 
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the party managers may put forward for the party's 
dismal showing. The party has lost to regional parties 
in some major states in South particularly Andhra Pra-
desh and Karnataka, in the state elections . it has been 
in the making ever since 1971 when Mrs. Gandhi returned 
with a massive mandate though not as big as Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi's in 1985. It may be argued that the Congress 
(I) might have lost a large number of seats but their 
percentage of votes has not gone down too drastically 
as in Punjab. Some political thinkers say that the 
days of national parties in India are over. Even the 
Congress (I) gradually, being reduced to a party of 
the Hindi heart-land . and this, according to them, is 
a big challenge to the integrity and unity of country. 
This is a s«)enario that does not augur well for the 
party's future. One notices that other all India 
parties like the BJP and janta party have had worse 
luck. This is the challenge to Mr. Gandhi has to face 
with courage and determination. 
123. RAM (M). Upset in Assam. Far Eastern Economic Review. 
131, 1; 1986, jan, 2; 27. 
The article is based on the election to Assam 
State legislature and some parliamentary seats mark a 
set back for the ruling congress party in India. Des-
pite the erosion of the party's electoral base, it 
does not effect the power structure at the centre or 
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In the states under Congress nile. In Assam a three 
month - old ethnocentric local party the AGP emerged 
as the largest single group in a 126 - member legisla-
ture, with the Congress running a poor second. Assam 
is second State the Congress lost in three months : in 
September 1985, the AJcall Dal w&n Punjab, a Sikh majo-
rity state. The emergence of a dominant AGP and the 
polarised ethnic situation presages more conflict 
over the Assam agreement. It could lead to a new con-
frontation between Assam and New Delhi which has to 
reckon with international implications of deporting 
aliens with Dhaka claiming that none of its citizens 
have entered India illegally. 
-/ -/ -# -* -, -# -/ -/ PROSPECTS. 
124. PRABHKARA (MS) Assam : The high stakes. Frontline. 
2, 25; 1985, Dec, 14-27; 14-21^ 
States that the after nearly six years of vio-
lent spasm on the 'foreigner' issue election are being 
held in Assam on Dec. 16, 1985 for both the Assembly 
and the Lok Sabha seats. With a powerful, new region-
al party in the fray, the stakes are high. Author 
analyses the polities, problems and prospects of the 
main contestants, also interviews the Congress (i) 
1S3 
Chief Hiteswar SadLkia and Bhrigu Kximar Phukhan, student 
leader - turned general secretary of the Asom Gana Pari-
shad. 
_,_, -, _, -, POLITICAL PARTIES, CONGRESS (I), CANDI-
DATES, SELECTION. 
125. SIREN SONG of lobbyists. Link. 27, 31; 1985, Mar, lO; 
3. 
The article editorially states that Rajiv Gandhi 
took a calculated risk when he wielded the big broom in 
cleansing the party of undesirable elen»ents in the se-
lection of candidates for the Assembly elections. The 
gamble paid off, and the success achieved by the Cong-
ress in retaining power in eight states, even if with 
reduced majorities in some, would not have been possible 
had the party not gone to the people with a cleaner and 
brighter image. Some of those who escaped scrutiny at 
the time were ousted by the electorate, Rajiv Gandhi 
is being persuaded to believe that the massive mandate 
he has got for a new look, a brighter and cleaner regime, 
demands a break with the past - and as a consequence the 
first step he should take is to remove all symbols of 
continuity. 
184 
-, -, -, -, -, -, PERFORMANCE, CONGRESS (I). 
126. BYE-ELECTIONS of i^ril, 1985. Monthly Commentary on 
Indian Economic conditions. 26, 8; 1985, Mar; 3. 
States that after the setback the congress (I) 
experienced in March Assembly elections in 11 states, 
there has come a major jolt in the by elections in the 
last week of April, There were 26 state Assembly and 
3 Lok Sabha seats involved in these elections. The 
Congress (I) did, indeed, obtain two Lok Sabha seats 
out of the 36 Assembly, seats, in terms of seats, and 
as far as can be measured on incon^lete figures, in 
terms of smaller popular vote, this is major reverse. 
The reverses in the Assembly seats are in Andhra where 
the Congress (I) won no seat in the four Assembly seats 
contested and in Karnataka where the Congress (i) lost 
both seats to Janata, All in all one can look upon 
the results as being dominated by the location of con-
tests. The opposition benefitted,in the Weat Bengal 
where the Left Front won all the three seats showing 
the Prime Minister's claim that the Congress (i) would 
win an election now was in error. The Congress fared 
badly because of the strength of the TeljJptxDesam in 
Andhra and Janata Party in Karnataka, There is no doubt 
that in Jammu & Kashmir where the National Cbnference 
(Farooq) won three seats earlier is still much more 
1S5 
powerful than the Congress, Overall recognise that the 
gilt is off the ginger bread. The people seem to be not 
only returning to normal but are encouraging the opposi-
tion. 
127. DEWAN BERINDRANATH, Assenibly polls - The second refe-
rendxain. Democratic World. 14, 11; 1985, Mar, 17; 5. 
Author points out that the elections in India ^are 
increasingly getting transformed into referendums. The 
State Assembly elections were vastly different from 
those for Lok Sabha elections, they too have represen-
ted a referendum though of a different type. This time 
the referendum, was not on 'Yes' or 'No' for Rajiv 
Gandhi backed by the unquestioned synpathy and adulat-
ion for his martyred mother. During the state Assembly 
polls the referendum centred on the crucial issue of 
whether a vote for Rajiv as a prime Minister of India 
was synonymous with an affirmation for his 'subedars' 
in the states too. Other factors contributing to the 
massive Congress (I) win in Hindi belt could be the 
cohesive political culture in ^ he entire area, a close 
identification with the image of the Prime Minister, 
and a massive response to the strong rationalistic line 
Rajiv Gandhi had adopted during electioneering. The 
second referendum has demolished the myth, associated 
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with the talk of opposition unity, but it has failed 
to provide any party except the Congress (l) with a 
national image. £ven where the non-Congress (i) has 
done con|)aratively better, the success story of each 
is restricted to its own state borders, it is Janata in 
Karnataka, Telugu Desam in Andhra, the Congress (I) in 
Maharashtra. Whenever elections are held in States like 
Punjab, Assam and Kashmir the fate of Congress (I) may 
not be very different from what happened in other non-
Hindi States. 
128. HAMLYN (Michael), Voters deal blow to Gandhi. Tiiftes. 
62080; 1985, Mar, 7; 5a-d. 
Author states that the Indian voters-especially 
in the south of the country - significantly set back 
the hitherto unstoppable progress of the Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi, In election to State legislatiue asseinbl*-
ies the voters returned anti-Congress (I) Government to 
power in Andhra, Karnataka and Sikkim and came within 
an ace of doing so in the important west coast state 
of Maharashtra. Others states returning Congress majo-
rities, yesterday, were U.P., Bihar, Orissa, Gujrat, 
Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan. In the federally admi-
nistrated territory of Pondicherry, Congress returned 
in the coalition with the regional Tamil Nadu party, 
the AIADMK. 
1S7 
-, -, -, _, -, -, -, -, DEFEAT. 
129. NABOODIRIPAD (E.M.S.). Unity, depaocracy and secularism. 
Seminar, 315; 1985, Nov;J.;l6-9. 
Author points out that"a loss to the Congress Party, 
a gain for national unity"' - such was the comment made by 
Prime Minister, Mr. Gandhi when the result of Lok Sabha 
and Assembly elections in Punjab were announced. During 
his conpaign for the Lok Sabha elections in Dec. his fire 
had been concentrated against the Akali party and its 
Anandpur Sahib. Resolution, he had gone to the extent 
of making wild allegations against the other opposition 
parties that they were all in support of the Anandpur 
Sahib Resolution. The Punjab elections were thus tak-
ing place with the Akalis pitted against the Congress but 
after the results were announced, the very same Prime 
Minister called the defeat of his party 'a gain for nat-
ional unity', even though the Akalis have not withdrawn, 
the Anane^ur Sahib Resolution. What is the essence of 
national unity in a raulti-lingual, raulti-conraninal and 
multi-caste country like India ? parties like the DMK, 
the Kashmir National Conference and Telugu Desam etc. 
oppose the congress concept of national unity with the 
concept of state autbnomy stretched to the point of deny-
ing the need for national unity. The party's proposals 
are: equality of all national languages in Parliament 
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and central administration shall be recognised. The 
Punjab accord and the election that followed should 
lull no one into complacency, Authorit^ian, caste, 
coinmunal, separatist and other forms of national disrup-
tion are active in whole country in Punjab itself. 
130. OVERHAULING THE Monolith: Task before Rajiv . Nagpur 
Tiroes. 1986, Jan., 25. 
The paper states that Rajiv went ahead with his 
promise and signed an accord with Longowal to bring 
back the peace to the touble-torn Punjab.Elections were 
declared without delay and state went to polls in Sep., 
85. The Akali Dal trounced the Congress and won the 
seat of power in unexpectedly peaceful election. The 
election result in Assam which again have gone in fa-
vour of a purely regional party for almost similar rea-
sons as in Punjab. It can be said that the defeat was 
not a bolt from the blue for the Congress. Congress 
has lost and the AQP has won with a comfortable margin. 
The political events after the death of Mrs. Gandhi, 
thus present a two diraentional picture. The emecgency 
of Rajiv Gandhi as a force who would not only provide 
new «rigoxir to his party but wouid lead the people into 
forming a strong integrated national fabric, is the one 
side of it. The present ineffective state of opposition 
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parties is proof enough to show that be has become suc-
cessful in gaining people's confidence as the right per-
son to lead the country. Congress defeat in Punjab and 
Assam have been turned into the 'victory for democracy'. 
The party defeat in other areas can be attributed to two 
reasons infighting and factionalism within the party^ 
and the growing menance, of regionalisni.Mr. Gandhi's 
primary task should therefore be to overhaul his party 
machinery in order to lead the nation towards a bright 
future. 
_, -, _, -, -, _, CONGRESS (I)^ PROSPECT. 
131. ONE RAH for Rajiv» Economist 294, 7383; 1985, Mar, 3; 
13. 
Rajiv Gandhi has started making some of the changes 
India needs. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, who faces Indian voters for 
the second time in lO weeks when 11 of the country's 22 
states choose new assemblies on march 2nd and 5th has 
so far not done so. With one notable gap - the problem 
of rebellioui Sikhs - he has started well. The high 
expectations Mr, Gandhi aroused when he took over from 
his murdered mother last November produced a whole fmiit 
salad of metaphors. He was supposed to loosen Delhi's 
stranglehold on power, flush out corruption, cut the 
red tape that has throttled private enterprises, pull 
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together a fragmenting nation. The cliches concealed 
the fact that nobody really knew how he was to do it. 
Mr. Gandhi also seems to be resisting the tenptation to 
centralise power in Delhi and in the Prime Minister's 
office. He is helping to shelter the state assemblies 
from Delhi's interferenc by introducing a bill which 
would outlaw hismotter's practice of buying defectors 
in state assemblies in order to install Congress party 
governments. Some high technology goods can now be 
imported more freely* and part of the industrial licen-
sing system has been simplified. The main hole in this 
good start in Punjab and the Sikhs fc»ur months ago, 
Mr. Gandhi described the Sikh question as his first 
task. But violence continues in Punjab, the state has yet 
not elected its representative, to the new parliament i^i 
Delhi, The rudiments of a deal with the Sikhs do exist 
more river watezjsfor Punjab, Chandigarh as the undivided 
state capital, a new mechanism for resolving disputes. 
Most Sikhs should accept such a deal. But first Mr. 
Gandhi has to reassure tl?^  Sikh majority of his con-
ciliating good intentions. 
-, _, _, -, -, _, PROSPECTS. 
132. DOWN SOUTH. Hindustan Tiiaes. 61, 351;, 1984, Dec, 20; 9a-b. 
Editorially States that the question how the South 
will vote in the coming election emerges part from the 
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frail asstiinption that the four southern states Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala - Constitute 
a homogeneous political region. Politics and poll issues 
differ from state to state. Regional parties are-in po-
wer in thli0C' states, Janata, which has only the outer 
shell of an all- India party, is at the helm of affairs 
in Karnataka and the Congress-I heads a coalition govern-
ment in Kerala. How the people will vote is unpredict-
able but there are strtNs in wind. It is inipossible 
for Congress I to repeat its 1980 performance in 
Andhra Pradesh. In Karnataka also, as a ruling party, 
Janata is handicapped in campaigning. In Tamil Nadu, 
the absence of »MGR' from the poj^ l scene is a big set -
back not only to the AIADMK but also to the Congress(i) 
which has fielded several candidates in the State. The 
DHK might roR^ home. In Kerala the race seems to neck 
and n e ^ between the Congress- I and its allies and 
the left Democratic Front. But irrespective of the 
region, political reality stares the voter in the face. 
Most of them are likely to vote for the stable govern-
ment. 
-* -/ -# -# -# PROSPECTS. 
133. HAMLYN (Michael). Gandhi faces another electoral test. 
Times. 62043; 1985, Jan, 23; 8d. 
Author points out that the three quarters of 
India's voters will be going to the poll again at the 
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begining of March 1985 to elect local legislature in 
10 states and one union territory. Voting will be on 
March 2 and 5 in the populous state of Maharashtra, 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The others will vote on March 
5 only. They are A.p. Gujrat, KaranataJcpi, Madhya Pra-
desh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Sikkim and the union territory 
of Pondicherry. In Karnataka the Janata party chief 
Minister Mr. Hegde resigned and called for election 
after Mr. Gandhi's sweeping victory last month. No 
election to be held in Punjab and Assam. In Punjab 
Presidents rule will continue and no date has been set 
for election there or in Assam. 
+# -# -/ -/ -/ PUNJAB. 
134. BUTLER (David). Punjab : Gandhi's softly softly gamble. 
Tiroes. 62252; 1985, Sep, 25; 12b-e. 
Author states that the ten million Punjabis have 
the chance to vote today in a most unsual election, it 
is free contest despite a ubquitous police and military 
presence that can have no democratic parallel. Ra^iv 
Gandhi's first promise after the election victory (in 
Dec 1984) was the solution of Punjab problem. Against 
the expection, he reached an "accord" in July with one 
Sikh leader, Longowal which granted many demands but 
assured the unity of India. Sant Longowal was murdered 
193 
for his pains and it seemed that the promised elect-
ion, if not postponed, wou^d be accon5>ained by murder 
and intimidation. As a referendum on the "accord" the 
election cannot help yielding a favourable answer. It 
is straight fight between Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I) 
and the Sikh Akali Dal, the two parties to the accord* 
Si^js will express their desire for peace and Solidarity 
by actually voting - and voting for Akali Dal, with 
its new voice of moderation. Hindus will follow the 
lead of the neighbouring states who gave a massive 
victory to Gandhi last December, In this election Gandhi 
the Prime Minister must be in conflict with Gandhi the 
Congress politician. It seems to be in higher interest 
for his party to lose. If communal peace to be maintained, 
the best chance may be with moderate Akali Dal Govern-
ment and not with prominently Hindu Congress Government, 
as being managed from Delhi. Gandhi has campaigned in 
a low key refraining from attracks on Akali Dal, and 
congress has chosen to field a weak team of candidates. 
-# -# -# -, -, -, POLITICAL PARTIRS, AKALI DAL, PROS-
PECTS . 
135. NAYAR (Kuldip). Sikhs agree to fight Punjab poll. 
Times» 62221; 1985, Aug. 20; 6d. 
Author says that the Akali Dal, announced yester-
day it would contest elections for the Punjab Assembly 
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despite the boycott by its leaders, Mr. Prakash Singh 
Badal and G,S. Tohra, who controls the Sikh tenples and 
their funds. At a meeting in Longowal, the party autho-
rized its president, Longowal, to nominate candidates 
for the election. This indicates that the Akali Dal 
may come to an unofficial arrangement witfi Congress (I) 
whose predominant support is among Hindus, on some candi-
dates to ensure that they do not defeat each other. 
_, _, -, _, -, _, -, CONGRESS (I), PROSPECTS. 
136. ELECTION UNDER the gun. India Today. 10, 18/ 1985, Sep., 
16-30; 56. 
Article traces that the can^aign for the Punjab 
elections threatened by violence and states that calls 
for boycott got off to a late start amidst unpreceden-
ted security and a widespread feeling that the Congress 
(I) has fielded weak candidates in order to let the 
Akalis win. Porroer foreign minister Swaran Singh says 
there is no harm in giving new candidates experience 
when they are faced with stal-^warts, "There is no 
understanding between the Akalis and Congress. Whether 
a candidate is strong or weak isn't the issue, people 
will vote for the party, for Rajiv Gandhi". But he con-
cedes that if the feeling gains wider currency, it will 
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damage the Congress (I)'s poll prospects, keeping back 
some wavering supporters who may feel they'd rather not 
vote if the party isn't serious about forming a govern-
ment. 
-, », -, -, -, -, -, PERFORMANCE, AKALI DAL. 
137. DANG (Satyapal), Punjab: Onset of Turmoil. Mainstream. 
24, 29; 1986, Mar, 22; 4. 
Author states that there was a time when Hindus 
had faith in GRP and the Sikhs had faith in the Punjab 
police, that is now a past story. Quite a few of the 
Punjab Police have risked cuid even paid with their 
lives for doing their duty. High hopes roused by 
Rajiv-Longowal accord do not seem to be coming true, 
its inplementation would have to be fought for. Rajiv 
himself should have campaigned in Haryana. "Whether 
you get Abohar or Pazilka or some other villages in 
iieta of Chandigarh is not inportant. »!»What is inportant 
is that the unity and Integrity of the country is safe-
guarded". Thanks to Rajiv, the Akalis won power even 
though they got only to one per cent more votes than 
the Congress. Badal was angry because he could not 
become Chief Minister. He would not join hands with 
Barnala to rally Sikhs against extremism and terrorism. 
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138. FORD (Richard). Gandhi pledges new development to woo 
Punjab voters. Tiroes. 62,239; 1985, Sep, 11; 7g-h. 
Author states that the extravagant Punjab elect-
ion promises are already pouring from the Indian govern-
ment party although can5)aigning for the polls in the 
north Indian states has been low key. Mr, Gandhi and 
his party want preferring the Sikh Akali Dal party to 
form an administration and then have to deal with the 
problem of Sikh extremists - the Congress (I) manifes-
to is ambitious in its promises. The prime Minister 
has denied that the party does not want to win.. The 
main manifesto enqphasis is^ as expected, on the agree-
ment between the Prime Minister and Akali Dal leader, 
Longowal. It pleged to iiqplement the agreement in 
"letter and spirit". As the manifesto was launched, 
the conanission set up to determine which Hindu speak-
ing parts of Punjab should be transferred to Haryana 
state, asked both state administrations to sxibmit their 
claims within 12 days. The transfer part of the agree-
ment, is compensation to Haryana for giving Chandigarh, 
presently joint capital of both states, to Punjab. 
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_, _, _, -, -, _, -, -, -, WIN< effect of LONGOWAL 
(Harchand Singh) ASSASSINATION* 
139. PUNJAB ELECTION and after. Democratic World. 14, 40; 
1985, Oct., 6; 3-4. 
Editorially highlights that the Akali, Dal (L) 
has good cause to congratualate itself on a runway 
victory at the polls in Punjab. The credit for the 
Akali Dal victory should go to Longowal who sacrefi^edd 
his life for the peace and commutial harmony in Punjab... 
The seperatists are not in great numbers, what is 
disturbing, however, is the ease with which they get 
sophisticated weapons, Sten guns and other machine 
guns seems freely available. The Barnala government 
must act firmly to supress this illegal arms trade. If 
the arms are coming from Pakistan, then obviously the 
border has to be patrolled in a more effective manner. 
A state Government that cannot keep law and order will 
fall into a stute of ch|#os '. The Barnala government 
has to be both conciliatory and firm. There is no doubt 
that much of patronage enjoyed by the separatists comes 
from abroad, particularly from the US, Qanada and U.K. 
Our missions abraod have to keep a wttCY eye on these 
elements, it his' become more iirgent now that India is 
about to set on a course of rapid modernisation of its 
industry and agriculture. Events in Punjab should enliven 
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our decision to fight off all disruptive forces. 
There is no other course before us. 
-, _, -, -, _, -, PROSPECTS. 
140. DIRECT CONGRESS - Akali fight for most seats, Amrita 
Bazar Patrika. 1985, Sep, 3; 
The paper states that there is going to be direct 
fight between the Congress (I) and the Akali Dal (L) in 
most Lok Sabha seats and Afisembly constitutencies in 
Punjab. This picture became clear with the last date 
of filing nominations for contesting elections in Pun-
jab being over today, the Congress (I) working President 
Mr. Tripathi said the main issue for the election cam-
paign would be the Punjab accord. A record number of 
178 nominations had been filed for 13 Lok Sabha seats 
from Punjab as the last date for the filing papers for 
the September 25 elections passed off today. The Lok 
Dal today decided not to participate in the elections 
in Punjab* Mr. Satya prakash Malviya general secretary 
announced. The party also decided to direct its workers 
to campaign for the defeat of Congress (i) candidates 
in the State. 
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141. PUNJAB To the polls. Democratic World. 14, 35; 1985, 
Sep, 1; 3. 
Editorially highlights that the Prime Minister's 
strategy in calling for early election in Punjab seems 
to be two pronged. One, it gives a chance to the Cong-
ress (I) and Akali Dal to make some adjustments and 
secure a combined victory what is the positive in this 
development is the containment and isolation of the ex-
tremists. They were at no time large in number. But for 
some time, they were able to creat conditions of disor-
der. This was when the responsible Akalis failed. They 
could have prevented the build up of the Golden Teiqple 
as a fortress, it was a blatant piece of blaspheaiy 
that a religious place of worship should have been 
bristling with guns. Blue-star could have been avoided 
and many lives saved. The matter has assumed national 
inportance because many communal groups are masquerad-
ing as proper political parties. The recent split of 
the All India Muslim League from the Left Democratic 
front in Kerala is a pointer to the same. The Akalis 
are in the mainstream of India politics insofar as their 
past is concerned. They have taken a leading part in 
the struggle for independence. Punjab can again become 
the number one state of India, Its industries and tal-
ented people can give off their best only under condit-
ions of normalcy and stability. This can be assured only 
if religion is delinked from politics. 
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142. VOTING FOR peace. Economist. 296, 7409; 1985, Augv 31; 
43-4. 
States that Punjab elections due on September 
25th present Mr. Gandhi with a dileimna. It is possible 
that the Congress(I)may win them but it would be better 
for India if it lost. Mr, Gandhi is keen to end the Pre-
sident's rule in Punjab and that is why he postponed 
them by only three days although roost opposition Parties 
including Akali Dal were against holding them so soon. 
The Punjab agreement seems to have survived Mr. Longowal's 
murder and 90 % of the Sikhs in Punjab are now in favour 
of the agreement. Three years of terrorism in Punjab 
have left it a two party race between Congress and 
Akali Dal, the former getting most of the non-Sikh 
votes and the latter banking on the Sikh votes. An 
Akali Dal government might just be able to keep peace 
because the violent fringe of Sikhs may not tolerate a 
Congress government. 
-# -# -# -# 1986, ASSAM. 
143. INSAF ( ) Psiiud. Round the States. Nagpur Times. 1985, 
Oct., 1-7. 
The author says that Assam is beginning to get 
New Delhi•s overdue attention, now that Punj ab is back 
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uhder popular rule. Quiet preparations are on for 
election to the State Assembly which is likely to be 
held some time in Dec. or early in January. The 
decision of state Chief Minister Mr. Hiteshwar Saikia, 
to cut down the strength of his Ministry from 17 to 10 
Ministers in overall poll strategy. AASU leader-ship 
continues to be strongly opposed to the continuance 
of the caretaker Government and wanted president's 
Rule in the State,Eventually, they and other agitation 
leaders bowed to the centre's firm stand and agreed to 
Saikia's continuance as a caretaker tC^ hief Minister- so 
long as the Assembly was dissolved and fresh elections 
ordered. AASU leaders have subsequently been highly 
critical of the large size of the caretaker Government* 
Meanwhile Mr. Gandhi himself witnessed a singificant 
phenomenon during his visit to State. Lakhs of people 
especially youth, turned out to greet him wherever he 
went and shouted slogan of "Rajriv Gandhi Zindabad", At 
the s^ffloe time they also shouted slogan against the caiB • 
taker Government. 
-/ -, -# -# -# -* POLITICAL PARTIES, MINORITIES FRONT, 
STAND AGAINST ACCORD. 
144. HAMLYN (MiclMi«l) . United minorities pose a poll threat. 
Times. 62296; 1985, Nov., 5; 8g-h. 
Author states that a serious threat to the Cong-
ress (I) the party of Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, 
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winning in |$ssain' forthcoming state elections is 
posed by the formation of a new political party to re-
present the interests of the state's minority communi-
ties. The Muslims are angry with the Congress party for 
signing the Assam accord with the anti-foreigner agita-
tors of the AASU. The accord says that all immigrants 
who arrived after 1971 will be sent back to Bangla-
desh, and all immigrants from 1966 to 1971 will be 
disenfranchised and forced to register as foreigners 
for ten years. The Congress party has long depended on 
minority support not only in Assam but also in most 
other states.Assamese support the party founded by the 
agitators, the AQP and the Muslims sixpport candidates 
of new party. Minorities Front, or other anti-accord 
parties in those constitutenceis where no Front candi-
dates stands, the Congress will be outnximbered. It is 
possible too, that some of the other backward classes 
and some of the tribes will regard themselves as suppor-
ters of the AGP. It would not be hard for new party to 
withdraw, since it has been formed too late to regis-
ter as a party proper^ and will have to fight those 
seat it chooses as a collection of independents. 
-, -, -# -# -, -, -, PERFORMANCE, CONGRESS (I), DEFEAT. 
145. ASSAM AFTER Punjab, tiroes of Indi<t. 148,352;l985,Dec, 20?6a-b 
The paper editorially states that the Congress has 
lost the second state during the Rajiv Gandhi's leadership. 
0 03 
Pxinjab and Assam posed a challenge. In neither case 
was it possible to say in all honesty which of the two 
courses open to government would turn out to be less 
dangerous for the country. That is precisely why we 
were justified in speaking of crisis in two states. No 
clear wayout was available in either case.Mr, Gandhi's 
aids misled hira to believe else he would not have been 
in such a great hurry to conclude accords with agitat-
ors. But the serious risks were iitqplicit in any kind 
of agreement in both cases. That where the Prime Minister 
went wrong if he^ -was aware of risks, he did not show it. 
To an extent he was not wholly to blame. Hopefully he 
will not seperate his own from the party's fortunes in 
Assam as he did in Punjab and repeat the slogan the 
nation's interest must have precedence over the Party's. 
In both Punjab and Assam states we have needed an orga-
nisation capable of providing some kind of bridge bet-
ween the rival communities. There was a case for hand-
ling over power to Akalis in Punjab. Similarly there 
is also a case for welcoming victory for the Assam 
Gana parishad. The continuing migration from across 
the border is a grave problem that the AGP leaders can 
alone be depended upon the tackle with sense of urgen-
cy. 
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-, -, -, -, _, HARYANA, POLITICAL PARTIES, PERFOR-
MANCE, CONGRESS (I). 
146. BYE-ELECTION TRENDS, Tribune. 1986, Nov, 26; 4. 
The p^er editorially con^lains that TOSHAM has 
dooi^  what it was always expected to do, but in a sur-
prisingly assertive manner. In electing Mr. Bansl Lai 
the electorate has deraonstrated that it enjoys the 
prestige of being represented by the Chief Minister 
of the state. Beyond this, the poll outcome does not 
indicate anything. Neither the ruling party nor the 
two mutually antogonistic groups of opposition can see 
any positive trend to feel comfortable about, and the 
coming Assembly election in* the state can go either 
way. In a similar manner the electoral status quo has 
been maintained in Bihar and Karnataka. The biggest 
consolation to Congress (I) has come from the defeat 
of Mr. Fernandes, who could have created much noise 
in Parliament, had the verdict gone the other way. 
Shocks have been adminiataedred by the voters of 
Orissa and Tripura to the ruling party at the centre. 
A bit of the benefifcial spin-off will also spill over 
to neibouring West Bengal, where the left Front has 
already launched the election drive. 
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CONGRESS (I), DEFEAT. 
147. HAMLYN (Michael). Gandhi's poll defeat in Mtzoramis 
Victory for his peace policies. Times. 62696; 1987, 
Feb, 19; 8a-c. 
Author highlights that the MfiF gained an overall 
majority in the newly enlarged 40 seats Mizoram /Assem-
bly, and signifiied the third time that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, 
had led his congress (I) party to defeat in state elec-
tions following a peace accord with regional dissidents. 
The election, incidentally, was one of the least violent 
and most honest that western correspondents admitted to 
Mizoram for the first time, have witnessed in the sub-
continent. As in Punjab and tieiglhbouring Assam the 
electoral defeat for the Prime Minister marks a victory 
for his policy of peace making. Through all is still not 
well in Punjab, the polling there certainly indicated a 
willingness among the general public to settle for a 
political solution within the Indian union. 
-/ -* -* -# -, POLITICAL PARTIES, PERFORMANCE, CONGRESS (I). 
148. UNCHANGED LOYALTIES. Indian EXpress. 55, 18; 1986, NOV, 26; 
8a-b. 
The paper editorially points out that the by-elections 
in six states,, have not revealed any marked shift In the 
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voter's allegiances. Of the four Assembly seats at 
stake in Bihar, the Congress (i) has won two, the BJP 
and the Lok Dal one each. The by elections have made no 
difference to the ruling party's strength in the Assem-
bly. In Haryana, too, the Chief Minister, Mr. Bansi 
Lai won by an expected massive margin. The out come in 
Janata ruled Karnataka is identical. The party retained 
all the three seats. In Tripura GPI (M), the main con-
stituent in the ruling Left Front, far from suffereing 
any decline in influence has wrested the seat from the 
Congress (I). It is only in Orissa the Janata party 
won the Rairngpur reserved seat. In M.B Congress (I) 
won three out of four Assembly seats, the fourth having 
been won by BJP. As far as the two by-election to the 
Lok Sabha are concerned, the Congress (I) has emerged 
unscathed though by smaller margins. The fact that 
Karnataka Chief Minister Mr. Hegde, led the campaign 
for his party nominee in Raichur constituency made 
little difference to the outcome, speaks for itself. 
-, -, -, -» 1987. 
149. POLL IN Three States on March 23. Tribune. 107, 31; 
1987, Feb, 6; 4a-b. 
States that the Election Commission announced 
here tonight that the assembly elections in Jammu and 
Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal will be held on March 
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23, 1987. The Commission decided to delink Haryana 
Assembly election With these states as electoral rolls 
could not be pxiblished due to unavoidable ciraumstan-
ces in the state. The Chief Election Commissioner, 
Mr. R.V.S, Perry Sastry said that; after reviewing the 
position with the Chief electoral Officer of Haryana, 
the CoOTtdssion was left with no alternative but to post-
pone the election in state. The Commission would also 
hold Assembly by elections in Gujrat, Maharashtra, U.P. 
and Pondicherry. The byelection for three liok Sabha 
seats one in each state - would also be held on March 
23, 1987 itself. The Commission said the Jaramu and 
Kashmir Assembly was dissolved by the Governor of the 
State on November 7, 1986. The term of existing legis-
lative Assembly of west Bengal is up to June 13, whilst 
the term of existing Legislative Assembly of Kerala and 
Haryana is up to g"une 23, 1987. The commission also 
decided to hold all the remaining byelections, except 
those to the Bhiwani Lok Sabha seats, the Punjab Legis-
lative Assembly (two), the Assam Legislative Assembly 
(one), the Nagaland Assembly (one) and U.P. Legislative 
Assembly (one). 
150. VISWAM (S). Poll in the Feb suggested: Centre Examin-
ing Poll panel proposal. Tribune. 1986, Dec, 27; 4. 
The author states that the Prime Minister's office 
and the Union Home Minister are currently examining an 
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informal suggestion from the Election Coramission that 
elections to the Legislative Assemblies in four states 
where they are constitutionally due and in Mizoram, which 
has just attained State-hood, be held simultaneously in 
the last week of Feb, 1987, West Bengal and Hairy ana are 
the only two States out of the four - others are jarorou 
& Kashmir and Kerala which have unofficially indicated 
their preference in respect of the month in which the 
election should be held. 
_, _, -, _, ~, effect of PRIME MINISTER GANDHI (Rajiv), 
STYLE OP FUNCTIONING. 
151. PACE QUICKENS. Indian Express. 55, 136; 1987, Mar, 26; 
8a«b. 
The paper highlights that the results of the elec-
tion in Kerala, West Bengal and Jammu & Kashmir are 
a severe set back to the Congress, and in particular to 
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi personally. And the setback comes at 
a time when the president is gunning for him at a time 
when the ham-handed way in which the Government has been 
functioning has led many to question whether he can at 
all direct a government purposefully. With these elec-
tions Ra:Jiv Gandhi and his party have lost government in 
every major non-Hindi State, The results show that a 
central leader - even when "there is no alternative to 
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him" - cannot make up for the dismal record of a pro-
vincial government, as in Kerala, or the poor image of 
the local leaders of his party, as in West Bengal.Mr. 
Gandhi's party is now confined to the Hindi belt. If 
his 'charishna' could not overcome the doings of Karuna-
karan in Kerala or the reputation of the Congress ruf--
ians in West Bengal, will it be able to overcome the 
corruption and venality of J.B. Patnaik in Orissa the 
ineptitude and worse of VirBahadtir Singh in U.P., Bin-
deshwari Dubey in Bihar or Moti Lai Vora in MP,? The 
shadow of defeat will dishearten the troopers in Haryana 
all this at a time, while the Prime Minister is in touch 
with fewer and fewer politicians, 'leading' or other -
wise, of other parties or his own. The pace quickens, 
-, _, _, -, -, HARYANA, POLITICAL PARTIES, PERFOR-
MANCE, CONGRESS (I), DEFEAT, REASONS. 
152. PEOPLE ARE angry. Hindxtstan Tiroes. 64, 1170; 1987, Jun, 
20; 11. 
The paper editorially comments that the Congress(I) 
is caught in a deeper crises than it is actually realis-
ing. Some of its functionaries believe that the party 
has suffered total defeat in Haryana mainly because of 
factional infighting or because Mr. Devi Lai made some 
wild promises about writing off farmer's loans that 
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caught voter's fancy. Another easy explanation that is 
being advanced is that Punjab accord had alienated the 
Haryana voter from the Congress (I)^None of these rea-
sons really explained the Kind of defeat the Congress 
(I) has suffered at the hustings. The reason tor the 
Congress (I)'s defeat may have to be looked elsewhere 
and could be related to the party's image and policies. 
The Congress-i leaders must ponder that this could be 
voter's way of rejecting its policies or displaying an-
ger at the manner in which they are being governed. The 
Haryana election perhaps shows growing disenchantment 
of the voter with the Congress (l) which if unchecked 
can play havoc witli the party's prospects in the rest 
of the country even if Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has 413 seats 
in Lok Sabha and the general election thirty months away. 
Successive elections have shown that electoral waves do 
not respect the State boundaries in these parts. Worse 
for Mr. Gandhi the Haryana defeat would embolden Mr. V.p. 
Singh, who is attracting crowds not only in U.P. but, 
as the latest reports suggest in Bihar also, indicating 
that the people's thinking is at variance with that of 
the establishment in Delhi. The opposition morale has 
certainly got a boost and with ample justification. 
Haryana defeat can add to the prime Minister's problems 
particularly because of his strained relations with 
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president Zail Singh and the parting of ways with Mr. V.P. 
Singh and the controvereies surrounding the sub-marine and 
Bofors deals. 
«, », «, -, -, -, POSTPONEMENT. 
153. HELPLESS ELECTION Commission. Economic and Political 
weekly. 22, 6; 1987, Feb, 7; 201-2. 
Editorially points out that the Haryana Government 
has successfully thwarted the election eomraission's ef-
fort to hold elections to the Haryana assembly along with 
those to the janumi & Kashmir, Kerala and West Bengal 
assemblies. The Chief flection Commissioner announced 
in New Delhi on Wednesday, that the election to the 
Assemblies of the latter three states would be held on 
narch 23, 1987. While those to the Haryana assembly had 
been deferred. The Haryana Chief Minister, Bansi Lai, 
had made no secret of his resolve to put off the elect-
ions in this state. The principal issue in the election 
will be Haryana's territorial and water claim vis-a-vis 
Punjab. The two major oppoafition parties, the Lok Dal 
and BJP, have formed a joint front which they have named 
the Haryana Sangharsh Samiti to project their resolve to 
fight for Haryana's right. Bansilal said that he would 
accept whatever area the Vtenkataramaiah Oomraission recom-
mended for transfer from Punjab to Haryana, In lieu of 
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Chandigarh, implying that he was giving up Haryana's 
claim to Abhohar and Fazalika. The Haryana Assembly 
election will be, it is generally acknowledged, politi-
cally in^ jortant for Bansi Lai. The term of Haryana 
assembly does not end till June 23, 1987 and so perhaps 
no constitutional inporpriety is involved in not hold-
ing the Haryana election in March* However, the manner 
in which the postponement of the elections has been 
managed by the State Government raises serious questions 
about the s\;^ posed independence of Election Commission. 
154.. ODD STATE out. Hindu. 109, 369; 1987, Feb, 9; 8a-b. 
The paper editorially comments that the decision 
of the election commission not to hold election in Har-
yana on March 23, 1987 when West Bengal, Kerala and 
Jararou & Kashmir are scheduled to go to the polls has 
come as an anti- climax. The possibility of a simul-
taneous poll in these four states had been talked about 
for quite some time and the ^ ^ection Cbmmission should 
have initiated the proceedings for revising the electo-
ral rolls in Haryana sufficiently early. All this apart 
the elections in the three states have generated more 
than ordinary interest. The circumstances under which 
the Farooq Abdullah Ministry, for instance, was origi-
nally brought down and restored to power a few weeks 
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ago lend to the electoral battle in Jarnrau & Kashmir. 
T^e Congress (I) and the National Conference are now work-
ing in close unison and this alliance, is expected to 
continue for the purposes of the poll. In Kerala the 
Chief Minister had himself asked for a poll in March 
and brisk preparations are afoot by the political com-
bines in the state to forxmilate their strategy. Ensur-
ing a fair poll calls for special efforts on the part 
of the Commission although a great deal also depends on 
the extent to which the contestants and the political 
parties are willing to observe the rules of the game. 
155. WHY THE delay. Hindustan Times, 63, 340; 1986, Dec. 30; 
9a-b. 
The paper highlights that while the central Govern-
ment has still not expressed its views on when election 
should be held in the five states of Wfest Bengal, Jaumrou & 
Kashmir, Haryana, Mizoram and Kerala, it now seems virtually 
certain that it will not accept the Eledtion commission's 
recommendation to hold elections in all the five states 
simultaneously in Feb. Instead elections are likely to 
be held in February and March in all the states except 
Haryana. Mr, Bansi Lai, has succeeded in persuading the 
centre to delay the election till June. He wants to 
consolidate his position in Haryana and particularly to 
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await the announcement of the Eradi Tribunal's award 
on the sharing of waters of the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej 
between Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan, there is also 
the vexed question of transfer of Chandigarh. Haryana*s 
delayed elections is last thing that the country needs 
for fear of losing Haryana to opposition is one of the 
reasons why the centre had tended to drag its feet in 
implementing the Punjab accord. 
-* -# -/ -# -# -# POLITIGAL PARTIES, PROSPECTS. 
156. BATTLE OP Lals. Onlooker. 49,9; 1987, May, 31; 10-5. 
States that the day for Haryana is June 17, 1987 
the day on which the state goes to poll to elect a new 
90 member assembly and fill the two vacancies in Lok-
Sabha from Bhiwani and Rohtak. The attention of nation 
is now focused on Haryana with the announcement of assem-
bly elections there. Though assentially it is battle 
between two Lals Devi Lai and Bansi Lai - the consequ-
ences will be far reaching which may change the whole 
cortplexion of Indian polity. The Congress (I) and 
Rajiv Gandhi personally, have high stakes in the 
Haryana assembly election. It will decide which way 
the wind will blow for the present rulers in Hindi 
belt, after they have lost the entire south. 
157. CAN TACTICS make perfect ? Economist. 303, 7502; 1987, 
Jun, 13; 39. 
The article focuses- on India's Operation Eagle 
turned out to be more of a spanrow, and it did Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi's international reputation no good at alltDelhi 
cynics recall operation Blue Star, the raid on the Sikh 
Golden Tenple in Amritsar, unleashed in 1984 by Mrs. 
Gandhi when bye electionswere going badly and communal 
riots were raging in UP. and Assam, Mr. Gandhi has some 
similar problemson his handa, and they are compounded 
by new revelations in the long running Bofors scandal 
which suggest that Indian officials recieved big cash 
hand outs from the Swedish arms company. The Sri Lankan 
swasbuckling drove that story from the front pages. But 
Mr. Gandhi's Congress party is still sensitive to the 
risks it runs when rural India has its chance to join 
the Rajiv~bashing on June 17th, 1987, the date of state 
assembly election in Haryana. Haryana assximed to ref-
lect opinion throughout Hindi-speaking northern India, 
is tough state for the Congress party to win. The opposi-
tion's Mr. Devi Lai is a seasoned conpaigner at the head 
of an odd coalition that brings together one faction of 
the profarraer Lok Dal party and Right wing B.J.P. Mr. 
Lais "'quite corruption" compaign capitalises on the 
smirching of Mr. Gandhi's once clean reputation with 
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The article focuses, on India's Operation Eagle 
turned out to be more of a spaitcow* and it did Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi's international reputation no good at all^Delhi 
cynics recall operation Blue Star, the raid on the Sikh 
Golden Tenple in Amritsar, unleashed in 1984 by Mrs. 
Gandhi when bye elections were going badly and conmiunal 
riots were raging in up. and Assam. Mr. Gandhi has some 
similar problemson his hands, and they are conpounded 
by new revelations in the long running Bofors scandal 
which suggest that Indian officials recieved big cash 
hand outs from the Swedish arms company. The Sri Lankan 
swasbuckling drove that story from the front pages. But 
Mr. Gandhi's Congress party is still sensitive to the 
risks it runs when rural India has its chance to join 
the Rajiv-bashing on June 17th, 1987, the date of state 
assembly election in Haryana. Haryana assximed to ref-
lect opinion throughout Hindi-speaking northern India, 
is tough state for the Congress party to win. The opposi-
tion's Mr, Devi Lai is a seasoned coir5»aigner at the head 
of an odd coalition that brings together one faction of 
the profarmer Lok Dal party and Right wing B.J.P. Mr. 
Lais'"quite corruption" conpaign capitalises on the 
smirching of Mr. Gandhi's once clean reputation with 
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the Jat Caste landowners and farmers who madeone fifth 
of local population making loud noises about cracking 
down on Sikh terrorism, Mr. Gandhi last month dismissed 
the state government and put Punjab under Delhite direct 
control. The sacked Chief Minister, Barnala, said that 
"Punjab's interests have been sacrificed on the altar 
of Haryana". 
158. MITRA (Nirmal). Battle for Haryana. Sunday. 14, 29; 
1987, Jun, 7-13; 25. 
Author says that for both the ruling Congress (I) 
and the opposition, the Haryana elections are crui-
cial. After the defeat in West Bengal and Kerala Assem-
bly polls, a defeat in Hindi heartland could prove dis-
astrous for the Congress (I). For the opposition, par-
ticularly the Lok Dal, it is an opportunity to bounce 
back. Devi Lai, leader of Lok Dal - BJP alliance, looks 
all set to win the crucial legislative Assembly election 
in Haryana. But Charan Singh's death will split the 
opposition votes and enable the Congress (I) to make a 
last minute come back. 
159. STAKES IN Haryana. Times of India. 150, 126; 1987, May, 
7; 6a-b. 
Editorially states that Haryana's iitqportance is 
to be guaged not from the number of Lok Sabha MP's it 
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elects but by the fact that it is the first Hindi 
speaking state to go to polls after March 1985 and the 
verdict here will reveal what the people of the North 
think of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress. At present, 
the Congress is on a weak wicket, not ojxd^  because of 
the series of scandals which have svir]6aced in recent 
weeks, but because the Punjab accord is perceived to 
be unfair to Haryana. In particular, the albatross 
of incomplete i^tlej•.Yamuna*!ink Canal hangs arround 
the Congress's neck,Mr, Devi Lai has emerged as a cham-
pion of Haryana's interests and his barnstorming across 
the state is likely to pay him rich electoral dividend. . 
But tf heawishes to win this election and to govern Har-
yana successfully then he must show some statemanship. 
In particular he must have an adjustment? with Mr, Ajit 
Singh, who is reportedly asking for 10 seats for his 
party and two for his Janata allies. Such an adjustment 
along with the alliance with the Bjp, and a possible un-
derstanding with Mr. Kanshi Ram's BSp, will help conso-
lidate the opposition vote, 
-» ' , -# -* -# JAMMU AND KASHMIR,POLITICAL PARTIES, 
PERFORMAMCE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE. 
160. FAROOQ's NEW team. Tribune, 107,87; 1987, Mar, 30; 4a-b. 
Editorially points out that in announcing a 19 mem-
bers council of Ministers conprising almost one-third of 
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the strength of the National Conference Congress (I) 
alliance. Dr. Farooq Abdullah has made a few inevitable 
compromises. For a House of 76 members, I9 Ministers 
seems too many and Kashmir calls for a judicious balanc-
ing of representation to the different regions and com-
munities. The Congress (i) with a strength of 24 MLA's 
has got seven cabinet berths with the National Conference 
getting seven Cabinet Ministers and five Ministers of 
state. Having sworn himself to fight corruption and 
fundamentalism, it is no surprise that Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah has kept with himself the portfolios of Home 
and General administration. Governor Jagmohan's Add-
ress to the State Legislature is noteworthy for two 
reasons. It contains a declaration by the new govern-
ment to give up the habit of "playing safe" and meet 
"head on" the sensitive issues. That means a no non-
sense policy in fighting conwiunal and antinational forces 
which were conspicuously belligerent during and prior to 
the Assembly poll. 
-/ -# -# -, -, -, RIGGim. 
161. COMPLAINTS OF rigging. TIgnes of India. 150, 93; 1987, 
Apr, 4; 6a-b. 
The paper editorially comments that complaints 
of rigging by electoral losers are common place in India. 
And no where is this more so than in Jammu and Kashmir 
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which, according to polls«ters, has seen only one free 
and fair election In 1977, when the prime Minister, Mr. 
Morarji Desai ensured it so it came as no surprise when 
leaders of vanquished parties in the state raised a 
chorus of complaints accusing the state government of 
widespread rigging in favour of the National Conference 
(F) - Congress alliance even "as the results started com-
ing in. The Muslim United Front (MUF) was the loudest 
to conpalin, followed by maverick state politicians, 
Mr. Bhim Singh and Mr. Abdul Ghani Lone. The MUF lea-
ders even tabled in assembly copies of false votes pol-
led by candidates of the NC (F). Even though the 1983 
poll which was badly affected by the Kashmir winter, 
the voting percentage this time has still turned out 
to be higher. The leaders of MUF have been demanding 
the appointment of a judicial commission to probe into 
their conplaints. There can be no doubt that the NC(P)-
Congress majority is genuine. Rigging, if all a factor 
could only have influenced the margin of the alliance 
victory. But it is necessary to set at rest all such 
complaints because faith in the electoral process is 
central to the objective of the Congress *NC(F) accord 
to strengthen the forces of nationalism and the isolate 
the secessionists and religious bigots. 
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_, _, _, -, -, KERALA, CONGRESS (I) COALITION, PROS-
PECTS. 
162. MENON (Venu), Delicate balance. Illustrated Weekly of 
India. 108, 11; 1987, Mar, 15; 20-3. 
The author points out that the Congress - I led 
coalition Government of Karunakaran in Kerala has wea-
thered many a crises during its tenure . Most of the 
crisgs having been caused by conflicting interests and 
shifting loyalties within the fragile alliance, predic-
tably even the selection of Congress - i candidates for 
the coming state legislature elections was marked by 
a period of sturro unddrang, as contending factions 
jostled to get their proteges nominated. Author re-
ports on the hactic behind - the-sceries exercise that 
went on before the roster of candidates was finalised. 
-, -, -, -, -, », POLITICAL PARTIES, PERFORMANCE, 
LEFT FRONT. 
163. HAMLYN (Michael), Gandhi sees poll support fizzle out. 
Times.62725; 1987, Mar, 25; lOa-e. 
Author highlights that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, lost 
control of a key southern state when a communist - led 
coalition won the legislative assembly election in Kera-
la. The Left Democratic Front gained an overall majo-
rity in the 140 member house. The cortffminists return to 
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the power after being out of office for five years, 
Mr. Gandhi was also unable to dent the communist hold 
on west Bengal, despite his exhibitions of personal 
charisma in a series of whirlwind election tours there. 
The ruling Left Front coalition won 18 out of 26 seats 
declared, and was leading as the count progressed in 
107 others. The congress (I) party won only eight, 
and was leading in only 14. The only good news came 
from the Jaromu & Kashmir, where Mr. Gandhi's coalit-
ion with National conference led by Parooq Abdullah, 
swept in the power»Mr. Gandhi made no iran^ diate state-
ment on the election results but had earlier shown 
some fortitude in the face of rocket setback when he 
said: "Failure was part of any mission of this magni-
tude". 
—, —, —, •", —, —, —, —, —, WXN. 
164. KERALA LEANS left again. Tribune. 107, 83; 1987, Mar, 
26; 4a-b. 
The paper editoricuLly states that it is too easy 
to read too many positive trends in the results of the 
Kerala Assembly elections. As a corollary, the state 
is believed to have disowned communal outfits espous-
ing regional causes. But the closer examination of the 
details available at present shows that this view can 
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at best be only partly true. The Congress (I) - led 
UDP has lost 20 seats - it had 83 in the dissolved 
House, including Independents, and it now has 63, in-
cluding a r^ ael and another supported by it. Out of this 
only 10 have been prised out of religion - based part-
ies. The Indian Union Muslim Leauge's repersentation 
has shrunk from 18 to 15 and that of the Christian -
dominated Kerala Congress, from-16 to nine. Even this 
gain has been more than neutralised by the powerful 
showing of Hindu Munnarai, a rank chauvinistic grouping. 
Also, the BJP has put up a credible fight in a large 
nxiffiber of constituenties, Inconplete results show it 
has polled between 5,000 to 12,000 votes in about 30 
seats. The BJP is a Johnny - come*J.ately in the sou-
thern State and has oft&i clashed with the CPM in the 
Central and Northern districts. Whatever may be the 
all India character of the party, it is a Hindu Front 
in Kerala, often crusading the cause of the backward 
castes. This fact alone has but paid to the fond claims 
of communalism being on its last legs in the State, 
165. UNDER STRESS. Times of India. 150, 44; 1987, Apr, 6; 
6a-b. 
The paper editorially comments that after the 
iastallation of yet another non-congress ministry, this 
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time in Kerala, it can be predicted that the centre-
state relations would come under added stress. Already 
Mr, N.T. Rama Rao has repeated his earlier view of the 
centre being a rayth; and, both Mr. Ram Krishna Hegde 
and Mr. Jyoti Basu have reiterated their stand that the 
centre ought to change its way of dealing with the states. 
In Assam, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh 
Karnataka and to some extent, Jammu & Kashmir, being rul-
ed by parties different from the one at the centre, the 
federal equation will, whether one likes it or not, 
demand redefinition and readjustment. Once the report 
of the Sarkaria commission - it corrpletes its term on 
April 30, unless it is given an extension - is out, 
the pressure of redefiniage centre - state relations 
will be irresistible. The congress party, in its pre-
sentation before the Commission, has forcefully conten-
ded that the centre ought to be strengthened further, 
whereas most other parties have predictably made just 
the opposite arguments. The central issue, of course, 
is the sharing of fiscal resources. To the extent the 
states capacity to raise resources is largly unelastic, 
they are dependent upon the centre's munificence. 
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MIZO NATIONAL FRONT, WIN. 
166, RENEWED SELF - Confidence. Hindustan Times. 64, 55; 1987, 
Feb, 24; 9a-b. 
The paper editorially highlights coining as tt does 
just after the sweeping victory of the Mizo National Lib-
eration Froht in the Mizoram elections, the prime Minis-
ter's forth-right defence of the various accords that he 
has signed with militant dissidents in Assam and Mizo-
ram, and Longowal in Punjab, is most welcome. It shows 
that the long period of self-doubt, which began when 
the congress party lost the elction in Assam and Punjab 
is now over. The criticism of Mr, Gandhi was mean, be-
cause it was based only too often on personal pique. Un-
like Mrs. Gandhi, Mr. Gandhi has not set aside much 
time for meeting Congress MPs and state leaders. Mr. Gandhi' 
aloofness threatened the power base of most congress 
MPS and, therefore, caused a great deal of resentment in 
the party. There can be no doubt that the main reason 
why the central government has been dragging its feet 
over the implementation of the Punjab Accord is its fear 
that this will trigger an anti-congress blacklash in Har-
yana. Mr, Gandhi's statement that he would not send the 
army to Punjab because "the battle for democracy cannot 
be fought by the army and the police", need to be seen 
in the context of his renewed self confidence. 
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167. AFTER THE March mini elections. Monthly Commentary on 
Indian Economic Conditions. 28, 8; 1987, Mar; 3. 
The journal highlights that the mini elections 
held on March 23rd, 1987, were important as they indi-
cated some new trends in many areas in the country al-
though not in majority states. The most dramatic result 
was that of West Bengal, where the Marxist Front routed 
the Congress. The Marxist won 187 out of 294 Assembly 
seats while the Congress won only 40 seats. Dr. Abdullah 
has made a sharp change in the traditional Kashmir policy 
of his father. He now advocates a "Consensus policy' 
which means agreement and alliance with the centre 
rather than a degree of isolation and some opposition 
to centre,this indeed, with the triumph of accord was 
of major importance in this election. Congress party 
has done well because it has won all the three seats 
in Maharashtra and third in U.p. The rise of BSp in 
U.P. and Mr. Kanshi Ram's rise is almost ujiique in 
recent Indian Political history. U.P. now indicating 
that the Congress party may see a major erosion of its 
base in U .P.* Haryana and Bihar, if the phenomena seen 
in Hardwar catch on as is likely. 
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168. HAMLYN (Michael) . Indian State elections will measiore 
decline in Gandhi's popularity. Times. 62, 722; 1987, 
Mar, 21; 7a-c. 
Author says that Mr, Gandhi faces an inportant 
test of public opinion at a time when most observers 
agree that his standing is at a record low point. 
The poll are to be held in three states - Kerala, jarremi 
6c Kashmir and Vfest Bengal. In Kerala and est Bengal 
for instance, Mr. Gandhi's Congress (I) Party is fac-
ing a communist - led coalition of left wing parties, 
but the curious thing about the conmunists is how 
middle - class they have become. In West Bengal the 
ODitrounist Party of India (Marxist) which dominates the 
L«ft Front Government, is led by Mr. Jyoti Basu, whose 
party first came to power in the state 10 years ago and 
has held on with increasing firmness ever since. The 
three state elections are focussing sharp attention en 
the communal and caste forces which divide Indian society. 
In Jammu & Kashmir Mr. Gandhi's party is in alliance 
with the National Conference, the Party founded by Sheikh 
Abdullah, the late lion of Kashmir, and presently led by 
his son. Dr. Farooq Abdullah. The alliance presented a 
force of secularism, and indeed represents the non-fun-
damentalist, non-chauvinist strands in the state. In 
the Muslim dominated Kashmir valley a coalition of 
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fundamentalist parties, the MUP, has put up candidates 
in all 40 seats. In JaimnU/ where Hindus form the majo-
rity community, the BJP generally supported by Hindu 
Chauvinists, is leading the opposition. 
_, _, -, -, _, _, -, COJGRESS (I), DEFEAT. 
169. ABRAHAM (AS) . Assembly Poll Olitcome: Some Jjuportant 
consequences. Tiroes of India. 154, 85; 1987, Mar, 27; 
6c-e, 
The ]^ a{>er focuses on the results of assembly 
elections in Kerala, West Bengal and Jamrou and Kashmir. 
The triunph of the C3PM-led left Democratic Front in 
Kerala, by however narrow a voting margin, has reduced 
the congress there to also ran status it already has in 
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. In West Bengal 
the CPM - led lieft Front's convincing victory makes it 
plain that CPM's grip on Wast Bengal is no nine day won-
der. In Jarorau and Kashmir, the National Conference (NC) 
is as popular as ever, the Congress has kept its own 
end up, although its replacement of BJP in Jammu the 
second time round makes its constituency in the state 
a mainly communal one, whereas the NC, by trouncing the 
rabid Muslim United Front (MUF), has convincingly estab-
lished its non-communal appeal. Dr. Farooq Abdullah's 
victory reflects the Kashmiri people's resentment of 
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the way the power he won legitimately in 1983 was un-
justly snatched from him at the instance of the ^p&ngress, 
which later shrewdly put itself on the side of angels, 
anCi expedient switch that has now paid it dividends. 
Nevertheless, it roust bask in the NC's reflected glory. 
170, LITTLE COMFCBT for Gandhi. Common-wealth Today. 29, 4; 
1987, May; 17. 
The article states that March election in West 
Bengal and Kerala brought no let - up in political pre-
ssure faced by the embattled prime Minister Gandhi. In 
West Bengal the communist - led local coalition exten-
ded its lead over Gandhi's Congress (I) party, and in 
Kerala Gandhi's party lost control of the coalition it 
had been running in the local assembly - meaning that 
Congress (I) no longer governs any of the country's 
southern most states. Further disappointment awaited 
in UP, where a bye election for a parliamentary seat 
was also lost. But at least Gandhi was able to main-
tain the status quo in the northern states of Jaramu & 
Kashmir. The same tactic has so far worked faitly well 
in the state assemblies in Punjab, Assam and Mizoram, 
but the cost to Gandhi has been a mounting tide to 
criticism from within his own party. With the approach 
of July, When j^resident Zail Singh is due to retire, 
Gandhi could have wished for a more stable situation. 
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171. RAJIV : Failure as vote - catcher. Democratic World. 
16, 13; 1987, Mar, 29; 3-4. 
Editorially points out that the ruling Congress 
has been virtually wiped out from South India and it 
has become a predominently a 'regional party' in the 
north. This trend ±s clearly visible in the outcome 
of Assembly elections just conclued. The def«at of 
UDF in Kerala has stunned the Central Congress leader-
ship. In West Bengal, the story is same. The Congress 
has miserably failed, despite all the propaganda gim-
micks. The CPM - led coalition has comfortably won 
the elections, in Jantnu and Kashmir, the volatile 
Dr. Farooq Abdullah is in a position to dictate terms 
to the Congress, in fact, he may keep his options open. 
The Congress has become a side kick only. The Congress-
men today feel that the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is 
not an effective "vote catcher". The fall out from 
the election results will tell heavily on the stability 
of the Rajiv Gandhi Government in New Delhi. Rumblings 
have already started within the congress party. Many 
ministers were threatening to resign. The President 
is now asserting his position having direct links with 
the "dissident" and disenchanted Ministers, MPs and 
also the opposition parties. The battle lines are being 
drawn and the capital is in the grip of a grave crisis. 
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In a sense the verdict has gone against the ruling 
party at the centre, there has been a steady erosion 
in the credibility of the Rajiv teadership^ The Cong-
ressmen are now reassessing the entire scenario. 
_, _, _, -, _, -, -, LEFT FRONT, WIN. 
172. KERALA AND Bengal. Hindustan Times. 64, 84; 1987, Mar, 
26; lOa-b. 
The paper editorially comments that the results 
of the elections in Kerala and West Bengal can hardly 
have come a surprise to those who understand how the 
sinple majority voting system can translate even wafer 
thin majority of votes into comfortable margins in 
terms of seats. This is most clearly visible in 
Kerala where the LDF has captured 75 out of 138 seats 
giving tt a comfortable majority in the 140 member 
House. In west Bengal, on the other hand, the tally 
of declared seats - 151 out of 178 to the left Front 
suggests a resounding victory for the ruling coalition. 
In political circles in Delhi the results are already 
being regarded as a setback for the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Gandhi, who had canpaigned long and hard in both 
West Bengal and Kerala. But the reasoning behind this 
conclusion is facile, for it is based on a blind exten-
sion of the series of reverses that the party has suf-
fered in Karnataka, Assam and Punjab to the two states. 
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and the baseless ascription of all these defeats, real 
or fancied to the Prime Minister hiraself. 
-, _, «, _, _, -, PROSPECTS. 
173. APPEARANCES ARE iitqportant. Times of India. 1986, Nov, 
21; 6a-b. 
The paper editorially states that the Congress 
leadership is reported to be inclined towards simul-
taneous elections next April to state legislature in 
West Bengal, Haryana, Kerala and Jararau and Kashmir. 
If the election in West Bengal be held in the third 
week of February, it would not be easy to beat the 
Left Front there and that a Congress failure in West 
Bengal in February would naturally demoralise ruling 
party in other election bound states just as it would 
hearten the scattered opposition ranks and that by club-
bing the election in four state assemblies, it may be 
possible to limit the extent of damage due to set back 
in West Bengal. Hence from the Congress leadership's 
point of view it makes sense to have the elections 
later than earlier. That is presumably why all oppo-
sition parties - baijring the AIADMK - have felt it 
necessary to urge the Election Commission to honour 
Mr. Jyoti Basu's request. The point is not the left 
Front will lose in April the battle it should otherwise 
win in February but at stake really is the convention 
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that a Chief Minister or a Prime Minister in posses-
sion of a clear majority in the House is entitled to 
have elections at a time of his choosing. The Election 
Commission anounced that not bye-elections were to be 
held in states in eaiMy 1987 but it made an exception 
in Tosham. Assembly in order to ensure that Mr. Bansi 
Lai could meet the requirement of becoming a Legislator 
within six months of becoming Chief Minister, 
174. KARLEKAR (Hiranmay) De-politicisation of India. Indian 
Express. 55, 124; 1987, Mar, 12; 6c-d. 
Author states that the Jamrau & Kashmir,Kerala 
and West Bengal will have Assembly elections on March 
23, 1987. The first is a strategically important 
border state; the other two are known for the political 
consciousness of their electorates. The out-come in all 
the three will have an inportant bearing on the country's 
politics. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's authority in Congress (i) 
will be further undermined if his party does poorly at 
the hustings. The dissidents, who now keep their eyes 
peeled on Prime Minister's relations with the President, . 
will then think of ways to assert their presence. The 
opposition, which feels greatly encouraged by the straws 
in the wind, will seek new opportunities. There is wide 
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spread feelings, not without basis , that litest Bengal 
will return the Left Front to f^ itower and ^ Slammu & Kashmir, 
Parooq Abdullah who heads a National Conference Congress 
(I) alliance. Mr. Gandhi's stock will rise if the Cong-
ress (I) succeeds in substantially cutting down the 
l»eft Front's margin in West Bengal and vice versa. The 
result in Kerala is by no means so certain and will have 
its fall out whichever side its favours, eiearly there 
is no certitude about the outcome in the three states 
which explains the indifference. It is loss of faith 
in politics. 
-, _, -, _, _, WEST BENGAL, POLITICAL PARTIES, CPI(M) , 
PROSPECTS. 
175. GANGULY (Tarun). Left is always right. Sunday. 13, 31; 
1986, Jun, 8; 12. 
Author states that while the CPI(M) - led Left 
Front has rvirtually become the 'natural rxilers' in West 
Bengal, it has had to support some non-Marxist tenets 
to stay in power. The Marxist came to power through the 
ballot box and not by way of bullets. There was no re-
volution and the CPI (M) Knows that in Bengal, its main 
base is the iower middle classes, the petite bourgeoisie 
in the towns and, of course, a section of the working 
class. This is evident from the fact that middle classes 
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and small landholders are in a dominant position in the 
party leadership in the state. 
—# —# —/ —/ —/ —/ ~/ / ~/ / "t WIN. 
176. TREMENDOUS VICTORY. Indian Express. 55, 137; 1987, Mar, 
27; 8a-b. 
Editorially states that the one of the main slog-
ans of the Coinraunist Party of India (Marxist) in the 
Assembly election in West Bengal was "Answer Rajiv's 
arrogance". To a significant act, the party's triunph 
is the result of its determined election effort. Its 
list of candidates was released as early as sep, 1986, 
and almost simultaneously it started gearing up its 
formidable election machinery. Perhaps almost as impor-
tant a factor in its victory as its organisational stren-
gth has been the leadership of Mr. Jyoti Basu who has 
emerged as one of the most respected political figures 
in the country. MuCb will depend on how younger men 
conduct themselves in government which is set to be in 
power in West Bengal till 1992. 
-, -, -, LOCAL BODIES, CORPORATION, 1985, BOMBAY, 
POLITICAL PARTIES, PERFORMANCE, SHIV SENA. 
177. SAEED (America) Rise of the Shiv Sena (in Bombay). Reg-
ional Studies. 3,4; 1985 Autumn ; 79-110. 
States that despite its social welfare services. 
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the Shiv Sena political activities over the year have 
given it the image of a rabid, extreme right-wing, vio-
lent Hindu communal organisation. And yet despite its 
terrorist image and its record of agitational politics 
it has had its influence felt politically and over the 
years made some atagjrfrising political gains, leading to 
its 1985 victory in the elctions to the Bombay Municipal 
Gorporation, Some Shiv Sena leaders may acquire indepen-
dence from their chief's thinking, as their fresh roles 
will enables them to deal politically with their coun-
terparts in other parties,, With the context of national 
polities, Bal Thackeray will have to match his political 
expertise in a highly corqpetitive field where well en-
trenched and well organised political organisations will 
pose bigger challenges. The real challenge for the fu-
ture will be decide between Shiv Sena as a vehicle for 
a personality cult or the basis of an organisation of 
institutional strength. 
-/ -• -/ -, 1986, TAMIL NADU, POLITICAL PARTIES, PER-
FORMANCE, AIADMK. 
178. WARNING SIGNALS for the AIADMK. Hindu. 109, 50; 1986, 
Feb, 28; 8b. 
Editorially states that the sifting the coiiplex 
factors at work in any given election and determining 
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what precisely influnced the voters is indeed a tricky 
business. On the top of it if one were to compare the 
voting pattern in polls held at different levels for 
Parliament, state assemblies and local bodies - and at 
different points of time and, on that basis, draw firm 
conclusions as to future trends, it may well be mislead-
ing. The most striking feature of the civic polls held 
in the state after an unduly long interval of over 15 
years is that the performance of the ruling AIADMK has 
been far below expectations in the exercise as a whole 
and very poor in one segment of it. The AIADMK - Cong-
ress (I) combine which routed the DMK - led front in 
Lok Sabha and Assembly elections just over a year ago 
has had a severe rebuff even in regions deemed to be 
strong holds of the two parties. Quite varied are the 
factors to which the AIADMK - Congress (I) partnership's 
poll setback could be attributed. The twin syn5)athy wave 
witnessed in the December 1984 poll was no longer in 
operation. The internecine quarrels indulged in by the 
AIADMK men proved costly for the party, and as for the 
Congress (I) its Tamil Nadu outfit has not been marked 
by unity and cohesion for several years now. 
-, -* -# -# 1987, KARNATAKA, POLITICAL PARTIES, PER-
FORMANCE . 
179. SMALL IS better. Economist. 303,7480; 1987,Jan, lO;22. 
States that there was a small revolution in India's 
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government of Hegde held elections for local councils, 
which will be given about half the state's budget to 
spend. The State's Civil servants and politicians are 
horrified at having to hand over so much power. But 
Mr, Hegde, who has become India's best known opposition 
politician* is an innovator with ambitions. He wants 
to move on tb the national stage as the only credible 
alternative to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. He Is well regarded by 
the many intelectuals who believe that Mr. Gandhi's 
Congress Party has abandoned its ideals. Members of 
State Assembly do not like the new system because they 
will loose local influence to the people who run Zilla 
Parishads. Mr. Hegde had a tough time getting his 
Janata Party to support the plan. Mr. Hegde was dis-
appointed by the results of the elections on January 
2nd, 1987 which were not the sweeping succeess that 
Janata party had enjoyed in the state election of 1985. 
The reason for his party's fall in popularity is put 
down to resentment against the top two castes, which 
claim arround 60 % of the seats in the state parlia-
ment even though they make xip only 30 % of the popula-
tion. 
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-, -, ft PARLIAMENTARY, 1984, KARNATAKA, POLITICAL 
PARTIES, PERFORMANCE, CONGRESS (I), WIN. 
180. SANGHVI (Vir), Selling of Rama Krishna Hegde. Illustra-
ted Weekly of India. 105, 49; 1985, Apr, 14; 20-1. 
Author highlights that both the Lok Sabha and 
Assembly election witnessed a profusion of advertising 
technique and marketing strategies in the fray. While 
the ruling party has played a pioneering role in this 
phenomenon,, the opposition has not lagged behind. In 
Karnataka the Janata Party summoned opinion pollesters, 
psephologists and admen to bolster its chances at the 
hustings. On Dec. 28, 1984 When the results of Lok 
Sabha election began streaming in, Hegde was bitterly 
disappointed. He had not seriously expected the Janata 
to win all of Karnataka* 28 seats but neither had he 
counted on losing 24 tf them to the Congress (I). Had 
the election been held on February 9, when the poll 
was conducted, the researchers reported, then the Cong-
ress (I) would have won 190 out of 224 seats in Karna-
taka Assembly. The Janata faced a defeat all over the 
states but worst in Karnataka. 
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-, -, -, -, -, POLITICAL PARTIES, CONGRESS (I) , 
CAMPAIGN. 
181. RAM (Mohan). Conspiracy issue. Far Eastern Economic 
Review.126, 51; 1984, Dec, 20? 14. 
The author says that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
fights an election can^aign very much in his mother's 
style. Rajiv Gandhi raises the spectre of foreign and 
domestic enemies in his bid to win votes in general 
election, scheduled for 24-27 December, 1984. Gandhi 
has launched his Congress party's canpaign on an aggre-
ssive and confrontationist note. He has tried to make 
perceived threats to India's unity and integrity at 
home and from abroad the sole issue of the campaign 
and has suggested the entire opposition has been aid-
ing anti-national forces. 
-» -# -# -# -# -# -/ EXPECTATIONS. 
182. ALI (S) and RAM (S). Waive of synpathy : Regionalism 
and Caste loyalties seem to overtaking Mrs. Gandhi's 
murder as key to Indian poll. Far Eastern Economic Re-
view.. 126, 52; 1984, Dec, 27; 13-4. 
The author states that the ruling Congress (I) 
party's earlier expectation that the murder of Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi may sweep aside most other 
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electoral issues and yet give it a massive five year 
mandate, seems to have been a major miscalculation. The 
situation was best described by Prime Minister Mr. Gandhi 
when asked if in his conpaigning he had noticed a synpa-
thy wave for Mrs. Gandhi, replied. "There was in the beg-
ining but now people seem to be looking ahead to future." 
His party is still attenpting to convert the poll into 
a plebiscite on the issues of threat of national inte-
grity from within and outside, and the need for a strong, 
politically stable and all powerful central government. 
Most of the opposition parties however are calling for 
greater demonstration of the power and condition of 
government in New Delhi representing various regional 
interests. Congress (i) supporters concede that widesp-
read social and economic disenchantn^nt has fuelled the 
demand for a change.Charan Singh, who was the prime 
Minister for two months in 1979 before Mrs, Gandhi's 
refurned to power in 1980^ makes his appeal to national 
pride at election rallies in rural areas of the Hindi 
heartland. 
-,, -, _, -, _, _, _, -^  PROSPECTS. 
183. SALAMAT ALL Riding a sympathy wave: Rajiv Gandhi odds 
on to sweep the ruling c4>ngress party back into power, 
calls a December general election. Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 126, 47; 1984, Nov, 22; 18-19. 
The author points out that just 13 days after the 
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death of Mrs. Gandhi, India's new Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi called a general election for 24th Dec. to select 
a government which will rule India until Janurary 1990. 
In calling note on schedule Mr. Gandhi was regarded as 
having made a future stability and continuity after the 
Mrs. Gandhi's aisassination touched off a major politi-
cal crisis and questions were immediately raised about 
whether and when election would be held. The commenta-
tor said that the election were held sooner rather than 
later. When feelings of nation unity and sympathy for 
Mr. Gandhi might have dissipated. Most of 2o states 
where voting will be held will conduct their election 
on 24th Dec. Many forces are tied up in Delhi where 
riots followed Mrs. Gandhi's assassination and in Pun-
jab where the police paramilitary forces and the array 
are trying to erase a Sikh tarsorists movement. Though 
no election will be held in Punjab which has a Sikh 
majority, or in Assam where there has been bloody agi-
tation over the make-up of electoral rolls. 
184. SURCX)R (Hasan). Battle of the giants. Sunday Statesman 
125, 3015; 1984, Dec, 16; 7a-h. 
The author states that the scene has changed drama-
tically since August 12, when a number of irrportant poli-
ticians discussed the eight Lok Sabha elections, A New 
youngprime Minister is now on trial, facing a fresh 
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realignment of forces. With just seven days left for 
polling, the canpalpi is in full swing. The issues are, 
the key contests, the highlights of major constituen%> 
ies. 
-, -, -, _, -, -, ELEC?riON MANIFESTOS. 
185. THAPAR (ROmesh) , Rajiv Party and the Hindus. Economic 
and Political weekly. 19, 50; 1984, Dec, 15; 2105. 
Author says that the aftermath of the assassinat-
ion of Mrs, Gandhi the terrible holo-caust which shat-
tered the life and peace of the Sikh communities, the 
cyclonic visitations of the South, the horrendous poison-
ing of thousands in Bhopal, the failure of the winter 
rains and the drought over vast areas is only the 
beginning of i ^ny uncertainties in India. The election 
manifestos are out at last. Interestingly, apart from 
the BJP, they read like tongue-in-cheek documents inten-
ded to keep the 380 million on the voting registers firmly 
hooked to local personalities, their castes and commu-
nities. Author wonders if the rtKDre intelligent who 
are active in political game tealise that the party of 
Gandhi and Nehru, aio more, that the Congress (i) or 
Congress (R) of today is essentially a hawkish Hindu 
formation moving rapidly to the espousal of some strange 
kind of corrupted capitalistic growth, backed possibly 
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by a siibservient civil administration and military es-
tablishment. The Hindu consolidation esqpresses itself 
more sharply in business and middle class circles, but 
these elements find convenient covers for their almost 
obsessive interest in the status-quo of privilege and 
profit. 
-, _, _, -, ~, -, PERPORMfiNCE, CONGRESS (I) . 
186. HARDGRAVE (Robert L). India on the eve of elections: 
Congress and opposition, pacific Affairs. 57, 3; 1984, 
Fall; 404-28. 
The author believes that one of the major sources 
of India's political stability has been the institutio-
nal strength of Indian National Congress. The strength 
is today seriously weakened and the larger party system 
is incoherent. Congress party dominance in the states 
and at the centre is no longer assured. While Congress 
is the only genuinely all India party and no single op-
position party offers a credible challenge to its power 
at the centre, it is highly vulnerabile. The political 
opposition to Congress is fragmented and regionally 
disparate. Although single opposition parties have 
emerged as a credible alternatives to Congress rule 
in a number of states, no single party poses such a 
challenge at the centre. Even if unable to displace 
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the Congress, however, the opposition can even in dis-
unity deny Congress its parliamentary majority. 
187. KHANNA (KC). Young man in hurry : Hopeful sign of 
dynamic change.Times of India. 148, 9; 1985, Jan, 9; 
6c-e, 
The author highlighting the situation today says 
that unity and integrity of the country is a central 
issue. Once again it has been proved that personal 
and national tragedies cannot blot the bright hopes 
for the future. The Prime Minister Gandhi has descri-
bed the recent Lok Sabha Elections as a great •^celebra-
tion of democracy". Mr. Gandhi's apprenticeship in 
politics is relatively short, his insticts are sound. 
He is signalling the end of kitchen cabinet corterie 
rule and the politics of manipulation. He is a young 
man in hxirry. Mr. Gandhi is thinking of parallel 
changes in the working of Congress party. The new 
thinking in Delhi is that keeping the Chief Minister 
and Pradesh Congress Chief at loggerheads does not 
pay; both remain off balance and are unable either to 
serve the purpose of the government or to buiid a co-
hesive arganization. Prime Minister is evidently 
sincere when he tells the opposition that it will 
be consulted on national issue, the Akali Dal participating 
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in the forthcoming election in Punjab if they win they 
will be free to form a Mii48istrj» Some of the opposit-
ion parties particularly the DMKP and BJP are loudly 
proclaiming that the resounding victory of the Congress 
in the recent election was interalia due to the"unlimi-
ted resources" at its disposal, 
188. MANDATE AND after. Mainstream.23, 19; 1985, Jan, 5; 
1-4. 
Editorially states that the 1985 has begun in this 
country with a new look government formed after a pheno-
menal victory of the Congress under the leadership of 
Rajiv Gandhi. No government since independence enjoyed 
the support from so many in the electorate. Congress 
score of 400 seats in Lok Sabha, To say that millions 
voted for Rajiv Gandhi's Congress out of compares ion for 
him just because his famous mother was creully done to 
death would be doing an injsutice to the voter's politi-
cal responses, that this vote was only the manifestation 
of sympathy. The fact of the matter is that Indira 
Gandhi for the last two years was repeatedly warning 
the nation about the threat to the country's security 
and the danger of destabilisation - warnings which were 
pooh - poohed by all the opposition parties as her 
scare stunt to dragoon the electorate to vote for her 
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party. .*hy was it that more Ttotes poured on the side 
of the congress and not of any other party ? After all 
no party in India has claimed to be a Quisling. Here 
lies the shrewd political sense of the Indian voters. 
Most of the opposition leaders even after the Mrs. Gandhi's 
assassination, did not care to unmask the ramifidations 
of Khalistani infiltration into the Indian situation 
nor did they bother to warn of the immediate danger 
th^t the removal of the leader of a one-pillar govern-
ment posed for the country's security with the massive 
parliraentary support behind him, Rajiv Gandhi forgied 
his cabinet on the*New Years'eve in the midet of the 
celebrations of his party's memorable triunphs. 
189. SALMAN ALL Rajiv 's first act - triumpb.Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 127, 1; 1985, Jan, lO; 25. 
Author traces that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
achieved a record win in India's eightiigeneral elec-
tion, but will face the problem after sweeping the 
opposition away with a brilliant juggling act. The 
prime Minister now promises unity and clean govern-
ment. Janata Party President S. Chandra Shekhar, who 
lost his seat, argued that the massive victory by Cong-
ress "could be only for two reasons the sympathy factor 
we could not assess or a total Hindu backlash". Former 
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Chief Minister Charan Singh, who heads the Dalit Mazdor 
Kisan Party who held his seat amid charges of electoral 
fraud blamed the opposition SrOut on "mass ^ ragging done 
with the help of government officials': JSnphasising the 
danger to national unity posed by separatist sentiments 
special Sikh militaney, the Congress i propaganda knoc-
ked the heart out of BJP's electoral platform. The Cong-
ress victory in Muslim and other minority areas asserts 
that Indians have risen, about the religion and caste 
considerations and that the present election mark an 
end to role of caste and religion in the politics. 
_, -, -,—, -, WEST BENGAL,POLITICAL PARTIES, PERFOR-
MANCE, CONGRESS (I), WEST BENGAL. 
190. ABDI (SNM)', Taking on the left Front. Illustrated 
Weekly of India. 105, 48; 1985, Apr, 7; 44-47. 
Author highlights that is the recent Lok Sabha 
elections Congress (I) joited the Marxist - led Left 
Front government in West Bengal out of its complacency 
by quadrupling its share of seats from 4 to 16. The 
Congress (i) proved that all is not going to well for 
the Marxists in their bastion. Recently, Marxist lea-
der Manorajan Hazra created a furore when he wrote in 
Bengali daily the reason for their dismal performance 
at the hastings, in which he pulled no panches and 
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laid bare instances where the party's ruling elite 
has strayed from the straight and narrow paths* predic-
tably Hazra was suspended for his exposes. Author wri-
tes on the latest controversy to have embroiled the Left 
Front Trials and tribunals make a communist perfect. 
The present breed of workers are living in the lap of 
luxury. Unless there is proper indoctrination, the 
ordinary man will not be able to distinguish between 
a ca?I (M) worker and Congress (i) worker. I know of 
GPI(M) MLAs who cannot cover even a furlong on foot: 
they require a vehicle each time they move. 
«, -, -, -, _, _, -, _, WIN. 
191. SO MUOi to do. Economist. 294, 7375; 1985, Jan, 5; 
9-10. 
States editorially that the dynastic anbitions 
of Mrs. Gandhi were fulfilled to the briRi when Rajiv 
won by a far bigger margin than either his mother or 
grand father. The party played the sympathy card 
for crowd pulling. Rajiv Gandhi used scare tactics to 
accuse opposition of conspiring with Sikh extremists 
and unnamed foreign powers. Now Rajiv will have to work 
hard to convert the gains into national concensus and 
nation building, specially in Punjab and Assam. The 
Other major problem field is the economy. As in other 
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democracies the root of political evil is the misuse 
of money. This nnist be curbed to end corruption. The 
time is also ripe for a really and truly national gov-
ernment in India and if Rajiv could achieve it, India 
could at last become a major world power. 
-, _, -, _, 1985, POLITICAL PARTIES, CONGRESS (I), 
CANDID.nTES, RAJASTHAN, CHURU. 
192. CONGRESS (I) FIELDS now face for Churu seat. Stateman. 
126; 3593; 1985, Nov, 23; 2a. 
States that the Congress (I) has sprung a surprise 
by selecting Mr. Narendra Singh Bhudania as the party 
candidate for the Churu Lok Sabha by election on Decem-
ber 16, 1985. The 31 year old virtually unknown candi-
date will face a tough fight against Mr, Doulat Ram 
Saran of the Lok Dal, In fact as the things stand 
today Mr. Saran Singh has more to fear from opposition 
cartp than the rulling party. Within Lok Dal Mr. Saran 
Singh is at loggerheads with the State president. The 
BJP, especially the faction led by Mr. B.S, Shekhawat 
leader of opposition in Assembly, is also opposed to 
Mr. Saran.Mr, Shekhawat is said to be trying to get 
one of his nomenees selected as the official BJP candi-
date for the CJiuru by election. 
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-, -, -, PRESIDENTIAL, 1987 
193. GIANIJI's DECISION. Patriot. 25, 88; 1987, Jun, 25; 
4a-b. 
Editorially states that there is widespread re-
lief over the role played by President Zail Singh and 
the Leftist parties to save the dignity of the Presi-
dential office by refusing to adopt a vengeful and nega-
tive approach. The President has risen to the Occasion 
in a manner worthy of his political bequest and the 
popular trust reposed in him. He has declined to be 
drawn into a political controversy that would have set-
tled no issue but only enhanced the dangers of a grave 
crisis. Those who wanted him to contest for a second 
term merely wanted to use him to split the Congress. 
The left has strengthened the republic by refusing to 
partake of this negative approach. The Right Wing 
parties tried their best to exploit the Giani. 
-/ -/ -0 -/ -# CANDIDATES, KRISHNA lYElR (VR> . 
194. FRAGILE CONSENSUS. Tribune, 107, 172; 1987, Jun, 23; 
4a-b. 
The paper editorially states that the Left demo-
cratic opposition can draw little comfort from the 
fact that it has, at long last, selected a consensus 
candidate to be pitted against Vice-President R. Venkata-
raman in the ensuing Presidential election because the 
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whole exercise was not only incorrplete but also clumsy. 
The consensus looks fragile because it does not take into 
account the views of the BJP which, though by no means 
a Leftist outfit has uninpeachable democratic credentials-
all the more so after the flattering account it has given 
of itself in the recent Haryana elections. And a three 
member committee to select the nominee did not seem to 
know its own mind until it was forced to make it up. One 
does not have to be an admirer of the Congress (I) to 
say that its leaders and nominee alike have acquitted 
themselves creditably in Sharp contrast to the perfor-
mance of various opposition leaders. What is disgusting 
about the antics of the opposition leaders is that they 
prove that the path from anti-Congressism to unity among 
non-congress parties continues to be indistinct even 
after the thumping electoral success achieved in Har-
yana by a non-Congress party. That they had managed to 
persuade so widely respected a person as Mr. Krishna 
Iyer to be their candidate did not seem to have made 
the slightest difference to their thinking. 
-# -# -# -/ -/ -# VENKATARAMAN (R) . 
195. CHOICE, WISE and proper. Tribune. 107, 165; 1987, Jun, 
16; 4a-b. 
Editorially states that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and 
Congress (I) nigh Command have to be commended for the 
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party's choice of the nominee for the next occupant 
of Rashtrapati Bbawan. Mr. R, Venkataraman eminently 
deserves the honour/ not only as veteran of Congress-
man and freedom fighter, a very able administrator and 
above all, a man of pleasant manner, high integrity and 
intellect, but also as the incumbent Vice-President. A 
graceful way of clinching the issue would have been to 
call the opposition leaders, inform them of this pre-
ference and appeal to them to make it a unanimous 
national choice. Barring a miracle and the intervent-
ion of nature, the election of Venkataraman next month 
as the eighth?resident of the Indian Republic is a 
foregone conclusion. Despite being in politics for 
over five decades, Mr. Venkataraman has been free from 
the taint of corruption. He knows the Indian constitu-
tion as well as anyone and if the Prime Minister cares 
for good advice, he will be assured of getting it ap-
lenty, from Rashtrapati Bhawan, After all the controversy 
about the President-Prime Minister relations, the nation 
is entitled to expect a relationship based on mutual 
respect between the two. It is good that Mr. Gandhi 
had announced his party's preference in good time ins-
tead of keeping everyone in suspense. His trend that 
consensus should be built around the Congress party's 
choice rather than on personalities suggested by the 
opposition parties is also unexceptionable. 
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196. EXCELLENT CHOICE. Hindustan Tiroes. 64, 166; 1987, Jun, 
17; lla-b. 
Editorially points out that in naming, Vice-Presi-
dent R. Venkataraman as the presidential candidate, the 
Congress (I) has made excellent choice, fulfilling the 
criterion suggested by the founding fathers of the cons-
titution that the president should 'represent the dignity 
of State'. Mr. Venkataraman is one of the few leader 
whose image remains untarnished even after having been 
in the thick of politics for decades. An able adminis-
trator, good parliamentarian successful Chairman of 
Rajya Sabha and, above all gentle to the core, he 
has requisite qualities to become Head of State. As 
Union Minister, whatever his portfolios, he left a mark 
on the administration. His role as Vice-President has 
been equally commendable. The search for the consensus 
began when the prime Minister himself announced that he 
was in favour of one. The opposition also indicated that 
it too was keen on consensus. The Congress - i should 
have made known its preference for Mr. Venkataraman a 
few days earlier. It is difficult to discover even 
one valid reason why the opposition should not support 
him. Even now it is too late for the opposition to wel-
come Mr. Venkataraman's choice and pave the way for his 
unanimous election such a gesture will not only ensure that 
the next President assumes office on the support of all 
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parties but also iitprove the political climate which 
has been vitiated in recent months. 
197. •R,V. ' The nost suitable choice. Democratic World. 
16, 25; 1987, Jun,21; 3. 
Editorially states that the 77 year old Venkata-
raman is all set to enter the Rashtrapati Bhawan. He is 
the best suited man to occupy the highest office as 
President of the Indian Republic, The Congress Parlia-
mentary Board, which met in New Delhi on Sunday under 
the Chairmanship of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, did not take 
much time to finalise the Congress nominee. Rajiv ketp 
it secret and he only averred that the man would be 
from the South, acceptable to all, and a man of natio-
nal stature. After the formalities were over, the 
Prime Minister acconpained by Kamalapathi Tripathi and 
others went to the Maulana Azad Road Complex and infor-
med Vice-President Venkataraman. Venkataraman is an 
able lawyer and also a trade Union leader. As the 
Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, Venkataraman has shown 
his skills. Due to recent controversy triggered off 
by differing interpretations of Article 78 and some 
other provisions of the constitution and the stand taken 
by President Zail Singh, the role of future Presidents 
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has assumed great importance. The president has to 
preserve and protect the constitution^. He may have to 
face fresh challenges in view of the fast changing nat-
ional scenario. 
_, _, -, -, -, WINNER, VENKATARAMAN (R). 
i98» PRESIDSm! ELECT. Times of India, 150, 197; 1987, Jul, 
17; 6a-b. 
Editorially states that there are many reasons 
to rejoice over Mr. R. Venkataraman's election as the 
country's eighth president but none is more conpelling 
than the promise it holds for the speedy restoration 
of dignity in the highest office in the land. Given 
his record in public life and his temprament, the new 
president can be trusted to put an end to the unseemly 
controversies which have surrounded Rashtrapati Bhawan 
in recent months. The atmosphere in the capital is so 
heavily charged with suspicion that even today, with 
the presidential election behind us, no one is quite 
prepared to discount the possibility that the out-going 
President will not spring an unpleasant surprise on the 
nation before he formally lays down office on July 25. 
Mr. Venkataraman's presence in Rashtrapati Bhawan is 
bound to bring about stability where it is desperately 
needed at the moment - in the President's relations with 
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the Prime Minister. On the issue that sparked off the 
row between Giani Zail Singh and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi - the 
interpretation of Article 78 related to the President's 
right to information and the Prime Minister's duty to 
furnish it - the President - elect has taken an eminen-
tly sensible stand, on the larger issue of the president's 
role and prerogatives Mr. Venkataraman has been equally 
forthnight. He has forcefully reiterated the cardinal 
principle of our parliamentary democracy, viz., that 
the Prime Minister is not responsible and answerable 
to President but to the Lok Sabha. All this is not to 
the argue that the many issues raised by the "interven-
tionist" Gianl will disappear over -night. 
199. WELCOME, MR. VENKATARAMAN. Hindustan Times. 64, 197; 
1987, Jul, 17; 9a-b. 
Editorially states that Mr. R. Venkataraman's 
election as the eighth President of the republic will 
be widely welcomed. It is sign of the maturity of our 
democracy that the presidential contest was along heal-
thy lines and the victor as well as the loser played 
their part admirably. An elder statesman, seasoned 
politician, able administrat<!)r and, above all, highly 
respected person, he richly deserved the victory. By 
no reckoning could the Congress i have put up a better 
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candidate than Mr. Venkataraman for Presidency^ 
Mr, Venkataraman assximes office at a critical juncture 
in the history of the nation. The issues raised during 
the Presidency of Mr.-Zail Singh are likely to be rai-
sed at some stage or the other during the next five 
years. No president has ever tried to establish that 
in the power ladder he is far above the Prime Minister. 
Nor has any prime Minister ever atten5>ted to prove that 
the Presidency is only an ornamental post. Mr. Venkata-
raman may face situation in which he will be called 
upon to take major decisions. The main guide for 
the President is undoubtedly the constitution and 
Mr. Venkataraman as President will be judged by how 
scrupulously he follows it, 
-, -, FOREIGN POLICY, FAILURE. 
200. ABRAHAM (AS), India's regional role : Steady erosion 
of leadership. Times of India. 150, 113; 1987, Apr, 24; 
6c-e. 
Author points out that for a country that aspires 
to regional leadership, India presents a sorry spectacle 
right now. Since before the current series of contro-
versies brokout, it has been beset with myriad problems:; 
a secessionist movement in Punjab* a widening communal 
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divide, with disputes such as that over the Ram Janam-
Bhooini~Babri Masj id holy site becoming focal points of 
religious strife; continuing insurgency in the north-
east, with a fresh ingredient in this bubbling pot in 
the form of Gorkhaland agitation; other kinds of paro-
chial conflict like the dispute over what Goa's official 
language should be, the as yet unresolved Maharashtra -
Karnataka boundary quarrel, and the intercaste warfare 
in Gujrat and elsewhere. Coming on top of all these, 
the present controversies can only reinforce the image 
of a floundering giant so weakened by domestic difficul-
ties as to be unable to act coherently. These troubles 
are occuring even as relations with our neighbours are 
deteriorating. If there is a perception that the coun-
try is steadily losing its will and its capacity to fash-
ion a regional environment conductive to its leadership, 
then that perception can only be buttressed by the con-
currence, albeit accidental , between domestic crisis 
and regional congeniality 
-/ -» -/ -# SRI LANKA, RELIEF SUPPLIES, AIR DROPPING. 
201. SRI LANKA: The fire next door.Onlooker. 49, 11; 1987, 
Jun, 30; 14-21. 
The article highlights that the Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi committed a diplomatic blunder when he sent 
an arrogant one sentence message to the Sri Lanka 
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president, "military operation will not work. The Indian 
government, by its undiplomatic act of violating Sri Lan-
ka air space in dropping relief supplies over Jaffna, has 
lost any leverage it might have had in bringing about a 
settlement of the ethnic problem in the island state. 
At the same time it has given the hawks in the Sri Lanka 
government with an excuse of cry foul with India and 
scream for help from others in saving a helpless country 
from the neighbouring 'bigi bully'.. 
., ., ., ., _, ., SBA LANDING, SRI LANKAN. 
202. FOLLOW IT through. Indian Express. 55, 205; 1987, Jun, 
3; 6a-b. 
Editorially highlights that the Sri Lanka govern-
ment's decision that it will not accept an Indian convoy 
of relief supplies for the people of Jaffna is not sur-
prising. What has been happening there since February 
this year, but most brazenly in the last week or so is 
nothing short of genocide. Indiscriminate bombing and 
shelling of entire habitations, towns and villages, even 
hospitals and other areas officially notified as "civili-
an shelters" can by no definition be defended as legiti-
mate security measures against Tamil terrorists. Thus 
to send food and medicines is the least that the Indian 
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Government is obliged to do in the circvunstances. 
Under the auspices of the Indian Red Cross, 20 unarmed* 
to 
unescorted boats are^carry food and medicines for dis-
tribution among the starving and the ailing Jaffna.India 
has invited the Sri Lanka Red Cross and its High Commis-
sioner in New Delhi to inspect the loading operation. 
New Delhi should be fully geared to meet all possible 
consequences, including the probablity of having to 
escort the relief boats. The Government has committed 
itself and the country to take whatever other steps may 
become necessary to save the Tamils from the 6ri Lankan 
army. 
-, -, INTER-STATE DISPUTES, MAH^RASHTRA-KARNATAKA, 
BOUNDARIES. 
203. PATIL (RLM), Maharashtra - Karnataka border row. 
Mainstream. 24, 3; 1985, Sep, 21; 14-8. 
Author points out the dispute over a boundary 
between Maharashtra and Karnataka has been lingering 
on as a festering wound for the past three decades ap-
parently due to the prevalent conflict - building ten-
dency in India today. The very nature of the conflict 
right from the incipient stage has been misread or 
misrepresented. The quantitive dimeni-ions of the dis-
puted issue are so large as to warrant a different des-
cription from the presently loosely labelled "border 
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dispute". For the claims made by both Karnataka and 
Maharashtra over each other's territory constitute a 
whopping 1,000 sq kms of area covering more than 1,000 
villages and a population of more than a million. The 
excessively big demand made by Maharashtra has pronpted 
Karnataka to twit that such a large scale reallocation 
cannot be called either in law or infact a minor boun-
dary adjustment. Second demand of the leaders and 
government of Maharashtra, they seem to be asking for 
the settlement of a disputed border area, and when an 
independent commission appointed for the purpose speci-
fically at their own behest does make an award, they do 
not accept it. Thirdly it is not sufficiently well re-
alised that there would be always be linguistic mino-
rities in any scheme of organisation of States in 
India. 
-# - # -* -i -* BELGAUM. 
204. RAJGHATTA (Chidanand). Battle for Belgaum. Sunday. 
13, 32; 1986, Jun, 15-21; 25. 
The author says that the border war between 
Maharashtra and Karnataka is very much like that bet-
ween Romans and the Gauls in Asterix, with Sharad powar 
as obelix, S.M. Joshi as Asterix and Bal Thackeray as 
Getafix in -onfrontation with the unbending Caesar: the 
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Cheif Minister of Karnataka, Ramkrishna Hegde. The to-
tal number of villages and towns claimed by Maharashtra 
is 865 out of which 264 have been recommended for tran-
sfer to Maharashtra by the Mahajan Commission of the 
865 villages that Maharashtra has claimed, it was pre-
pared to offer 213 Kannada majority villages to Karna-
taka. The immediate provocation for the 1 June, 1986 
satyagraha organised by the Samyukta Maharashtra Seema 
Samiti was imposition of Kannada as the first language 
in Marathi medium schools in the disputed border areas 
from 2 June 1986. The iuposition of Kannada as the 
official language in the Marathi - dominated areas of 
Karnataka had led to a spate of protests by Shiv Sena 
activists and Samyukta Maharashtra Seema Samiti led by 
Sharad pawar. 
-, -, -, PUNJAB-HARYANA, BOUNDRIES. 
205. BEHL (Vinod) and ONKAR SINGH. Winter of discontent. 
Illustrated Weekly of. India. 107, 4; 1986, Jan., 26; 
20-3. 
The authors comment that even after the momentous 
Punjab accord, controversy and tension continue to mount 
in the troxibled states of Punjab and Haryana as Jan. 26 
approaches. For that is the date scheduled for the 
simultaneous transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and the 
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latter state districts of Fazilka and Abohar to Haryana 
However, since both the states insist on diametrically 
different interpretations of the accord, discontent, dis-
sent and even bursts of violence break out afresh in two 
ill-fated areas of disturbance. 
_, », -, _, -, CHANDIGARH TRANSFER. 
206. CAPITAL GAINS. Economist, 298, 7429; 1986, Jan, 18; 41. 
Points out that Chandigarh is due to become Punjab's 
alone on Jan 26th, 1986 but Haryana was never consulted 
about this. Mr. Bhajan.Lal the Haryana Chief Minister is 
demanding his state's due including conpletion of the 
SYL canal and funds to build a new capital city for 
Haryana. Mr. S.s. Barnala the Punjab Chief Minister 
needs all the help in his fight against the terrorists, 
extremists in his own party and All India Sikhs Students 
Federation. The last named have threatened to demolish 
and rebuilt the Akal Takht ,from jan 26th. The commission 
which is studying which villages should go to Haryana in 
lieu of Chandigarh is expected to submit its report by 
Jan. 26th. 
207. PUNJAB KEENLY awaits transfer of Chandigarh. Link.28, 
23; 1986, Jan, 12; 15-6. 
The article states that the Punjab is keenly await-
ing while Haryana is eagerly opposing the transfer of 
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territorial and administrative control of Chandigarh 
to Punjab on January 26, 1986, the date set for the pur-
pose in the July 24, 85 accord signed by the late Longo-
wal and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Haryana Chief Minis-
ter Bhajan Lai, his Government, the ruling party in the 
State and a combined Lok Dal - BJP led opposition are 
all in jitters on this score. The accord had envisaged 
that the SYL, in the Punjab territory, would be const-
ructed and completed by August 15, 1986. Hurdle in 
the transfer of the city is that the two contesting 
states have not been able to come to a mutually negotia-
ted settlement about the Hindi speaking areas that are 
to be transferred to Haryana in lieu of the capital city. 
Rumour and speculation apart, the capital city, euphemis-
tically described as "city beautiful", is all set to go 
to Punjab, if the provisions of the July 24, accord, 
ratified by Parliament and the Punjab Vidhan sabha, are 
not to be flouted, leading to another spell of uncertaini-
ty in and around Punjab. Since the Rajiv-Iiongowal accord 
was signed in the national interest, its inplamentation 
has to be ensured over—looking the narrow and short time 
politico-administrative interest of few people, whether 
they are in or outside Punjab. 
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_, -, _, -, _, _, DESAI COMMISSION, REPORT. 
208. NAYAR (Kuldip), Sikhs reject Delhi land transfer plan 
and bring accord near to collapse. Times. 62490; 1986, 
Jun, 2 3; lla-c. 
The author states that the Akali Dal, which rules 
Punjab, has rejected the new plan on transfer of Chandi-
garh, which it has been sharing as capital with Haryana 
since 1966 when the bigger state of Punjab was divided 
into two states: Punjabi-speaking Punjab and Hindi 
speaking Haryana. The cruicial part of accord signed 
in July, 85 was Chandigarh's transfer to Punjab in ex-
change for "some Hindi speaking villages" from the state 
to Haryana, A Commission, headed by Justice D.^. Desai, 
the Law Commission's Chairman and a former judge in the 
Supreme Court of India, will identify the 70,000 acres 
of land which the earlier commission under Justice E.S. 
Venkataramiah awarded to Haryana in exchange for Chandi-
garh without identifying the area. The Punjab cabinet, 
which rejected the proposal on Saturday, has said that 
terms of reference given to the Desai commission do not 
differentiate between the Punjabi and Hindi speaking 
areas of the state while under the accord "some Hindi 
speaking" villages are to be transferred. 
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-i -# -/ -,-/-# MATHEW COMMISSION. 
209. CONFLICTING CLAIMS: Mathew ConHnission. India today. 
lO, 21; 1985, Nov, 1-15; 30-31. 
Article examines that in what promises to degene-
rate into a bitter legal brawl between two old antagon-
ists, Haryana and Punjab, the Mathew Commission last 
fortnight began hearing on Haryana's claim on 408 Pun-
jab villages in lieu of planned transfer of Chandigarh 
to Punjab next republic day. The Rajiv - Longowal ac-
cord of July 24, 1985 specified that "the principles of 
contiguity, linguistic affinity With village is the 
unity, will be the basis ... to determine the specific 
Hindi speaking areas of Punjab which should go to Har-
yana in lieu of Chandigarh". Haryana sees the Mathew 
Commission as some sort of compensating agency to 
make up for a loss which it puts at a staggering 
rs. 8,000 crore. The Punjab authorities argue that 
because Chandigarh was built for and belongs to Punjab 
the concept of compensation is wholly extraneous. 
., _, _, -, -,-,-, REPORT. 
210. JSlOING THE deadlock over Chandigarh. Hindu. 109, 36; 
1986, Feb, 12; 8a-b. 
Editorially points out that the failure of the 
Mathew commission to give a binding verdict on the ques-
tion of which Hindi - speaking areas in Punjab were to 
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be transferred to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh is only 
now beginning to sink into the minds of those who would 
liJce to settle the future of Union Territory. It would 
appear that, according to the commission, the Hindi speak-
ing areas which were to be considered by it for transfer 
to Haryana were practically restricted to 105 villages 
and two towns identified in pursuance of the former 
prime Minister Mrs.Gandhi's decision in 1970. Mr, Bar-
nala was quite pleased with the Mathew Commission's pro-
nouncement; his contention there could be no transfer of 
Fazilka. and Abohar in the absence of contiguity was vin-
dicated. Mr, Bhajanlal has said the commission having 
declared the disputed areas as Hindi speaking, there 
could be no transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab without a 
simultaneous transfer of those areas to Haryana. This 
is how he has interpreted the terms of the accord rea-
ched between the Akali leaders and the Prime Minister 
Gandhi, Mr. Barnala, to whom the resurgence of extre-
mism in Punjab on a menacing scale is posing a big 
challenge has chosen to keep a low profile on Chandigarh 
issue although he knows fully well that the political 
future of his party is entirely dependent on the trans-
fer of the Union Territory to Punjab. 
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-# -/ -/ -/ -# -i VENKATARAMIAH COMMISSION. 
211. iNiAYAR (Kuldip) . India revives attenpt to mollify Sikhs. 
Times. 62422; 1986, Apr, 4; 9d. 
Author says that the Indian Government, trying to 
mollify Sikh resentment, has picked a new commission to 
identify Hindi speaking areas in Punjab to give to neig-
bouring Haryana state in exchange for the town of Chandi-
garh. The commission, headed by Indian Supreme Court 
Justice E.S. Venkataramaiah, has been given a month 
for task. 
-, -, -, RIVER WATERS, RAVI- BEAS, ERADI COMMISSION, 
REPORT. 
212. ERADI DISCOVERY. Times of India. 150, 141; 1987, May, 
22; 6a-b. 
The paper editorially points out the Eradi panel's 
report on the allocation of Ravi - Beas water to Punjab 
and Haryana appears tailor - made to satisfy both states, 
is 
However the catch/with regard to the additional water 
which the commission has discovered. The report claims 
to have located an additional 4.613 million acre feet of 
water in the two river systems, although it estimates 
that only 40 per cent of this amount is utilisable-Only 
60 per cent of this utilisable amount should be alloca-
ted to Punj ab and Haryana now, leaving the remaining to 
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be distributed later. Both the Akali Dal and BJP have 
expressed surprise at the commission's discovery/ poin-
ting out that additional water being available at the 
rim stations between Madhopur and the Ravi siphon or 
between the Mandi plain and Perozepur. Of course, the 
Eradi panel was concerned with the allocated amounts, 
apart from actual use. It was pointed out that by choos-
ing July 1/ 1985 as the date for measuring actual use, 
the centre had written in a pro-Punjab bias in the 
Eradi panel's terms of reference. That Haryana's shaias 
has been increased despite this limitation may help the 
ruling party in the forthcoming poll. Taking a longer 
term view, however, what should concern all the parties 
is the sharp decline in the ground water level both in 
Punjab and Haryana. 
213. ERADI TRIBUNAL : NO help ? Frontline. 4,11; 1987, May 
30 - June 12; 22-3. 
States that the long awaited report of the tribu-
nal headed by justice V. Balakrishna Eradi of the Sup-
reme Court, on the sharing of the water of the Ravi and 
the Beas has been released. But contrary to expectations, 
it has not helped to set at rest the fears of Punjab 
which led to its appointment in April 1986, under the 
Punjab accord of July 1985, between the Prime Minister 
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Rajiv Gandhi and Longowal. Though tne centre subse-
quently darifiSdr this pointj^the opinion in Punjab conti-
nues to be against the tribunal award. This was not 
clarified properly when the Central Government released 
the conclusions of the tribunal and as a result an im-
pression was created that the shaire allocated by the 
tribunal was lower than the quantum verified as in 
actual use by Punjab as on July 1, 1985. The reaction 
in Haryana and Rajasthan has been by and large favour-
able to the report. As such these two governments can 
be expected to insist that the award should be made 
binding as agpred to in the settlement between Rajiv 
Gandhi and Sant Longowal. 
214. MUDDING THE Waters. India Today. 12, 11; 1987, Jun, 
15; 49-50. 
States that the Mathew, Venkatramaiah and Desai 
commissions conplicated issues that were conplex to 
begin with. Last fortnight the report of Eradi Tribu-
nal, set up to decide Punjab's and Haryana's share of 
Ravi-Beas Waters as part of accord, nvuddied the waters 
further. By reducing Punjab's share of Ravi-Beas waters 
and doubling Haryana's the Eradi report has only inflamed 
passions in Punjab. Aajmost every political party in Pun-
jab rejected its findings. An though Haryana welcomed 
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thm Siradi rasdidU th«s« w«« »mm doubt whether this 
gift o£ additloiial w«t«r would boost tho flagging psoo* 
poets of tbm oabottlod Oongxooo (I) in tho Juno* 17« 
1987 oloetlon to t ^ ststo loglsloturo. 
-« •»« KHALiaTMi, uismm, 
215. DZSmZGH (Angolo) * Obojcoai Yttdht VandUuMatoUst ITMII* 
fleotloiis of Sikh outoaooor donuuado in Punjab* lntoCT«t» 
ioasl ios Aoioafoacuai* 1S« 3«4| 1984# aavf 195«2I7. 
Sosoy Mqprooonta « eontribation toifMrdo tho TOZI-
fiootion of tho hypothooio that j»ligious fundonoatollMi 
OJCiooo la dovolopiag soeiotioo postioulajrly whoa tho 
InfrootruetujEO booonoo OMMCO highly ovolvod la coopoaoo 
to aeoda of • sv^jriiilpoood atoto apparatua* aatagcmia-
t i c to tho iatoroata and idontity of a paxtieular rag-
ional eulturo* la this rogaxd« i t aaoka to oxploxo tho 
quoatioa aa to whothor SiMh fvndaa»ntalia«i l a tho long 
rua naxoly rapxoaoata a foreo of oqualisation. via*a» 
via xeaultiag ooonouLo and othor d i ^ a r l t i o s or addit-
ionally and priMUEl^ooaatitutoa aa authantio osqpxoaaion 
of a populariat aovaiMat goaxod towards tho roatorofe-r*^  
ioa of aa antoc^thoneua social ai^ cultural tJtaditioa* 
To halp i a tho olarificatioa of thoao poiata tho hia-
torieal background to roligioua rovivaliaa waa diaeuwMd 
along w i ^ a aurv^ of oonto^porary ocenoad.e and polit ioal 
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contradictions, conducive to its most recent manifes-
tation in the form of "fundamentalism". This phenomenon 
in the Punjab among Sikhs is viewed as denoting a resur-
gence of the militant symbols and traditions comprising 
one aspect of the ideology and polity espqused by Sikh-
ism, reawakened to serve, immediate' economic and politi-
cal goals, i.e., redressal of grievances of the Sikh 
minbrity in India. 
-, -, LANGUAGE CHAUVENISM, KARUATAKA. 
216. KARNATAKA: Politics of language. India Today. 11, 1; 
1986, Jan, 1; 55-6. 
The article points out that the Karnataka has dec-
lared war on English, and the <2ensure of a senior IAS 
officer in the state government has come as a clear warn-
ing to the bureaucracy that Chief Minister Hegde's govern-
ment will brook no delay in the use of Kannada in all 
official transactions. T.R. Satishchandran's circular 
minced no words: "Kannada is the state's official lan-
guage. It is the government's policy that Kannada should 
be used in secretariat onwards to a village level office. 
Whoever doesn't heed this last waning will face merci-
less action", KWC's Chairman puttappa said that "If the 
officials don't use Kannada their increments may be stop-
ped". The Janata Government's growing association with 
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the cause of Kannada was also evident last fortnight 
with it hosted the "World" Kannada conference at Mysore 
"to promote Kannada". By holding the conference, which 
served no perceptile purpose, the Janata Government also 
made yet another policy votte face. If the government 
is not already being accused of being fanatical it is 
sure to if Kannada watch dog Committee (KWC) proposal 
comes into force to stop the exenption from Kannada given 
to linguistic minorities in areas where they number more 
than 15 per cent of the population. As of now, such mi-
norities can use their own language. The stoppage of 
this concession can creat serious problems in the areas 
bordering Maharashtra where relations between Marathi 
and Kannadi-gas are already strained as a result of 
the border dispute between the two states. 
-, -, -, RIOTS, ASSAMESE - BENGALI SPREAKING ASSAM, 
KARIMUNJI. 
217. NAYAR (Kuldip) . Language riots lead to curfew in Assar^^ 
Times. 62520; 1986, Jul, 23; l4f. 
Author points out that curfew has been inposed 
on the town of Karmunji in southern Assam, after six 
people were killed in the language riot on Monday. The 
cause of trouble was a government circular making Assa-
mese a conpulsory language. Kariraunji is a Bengali speak-
ing town which has been the scene of many protests against 
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the imposition of Assamese on Bengali - speaking 
population. 
-,-, PARLIAMENT MEMBERS, SCHEDULED CASTES AND TRIBES. 
218. MENDELSOHN (Oliver). "Harijan elite" ? The lives of 
some untouchedole politicians. Economic and Political 
Weekly.21. 12; 1986, Mar. 22; 501-9. 
The author states that the current furore over 
reservation for the "other backwards" contrasts with 
the generally uncontroversial system of reservation 
for the scheduled castes and tribes which has been in 
place throughout the post-Independence period in India. 
Why has such a vast system of reverse discrimination 
been so relatively uncontroversial 7 The overwhelming 
reason is the ineffectiveness of the reservation for 
untouchables and tribals over almost 40 years of prac-
tice. Reservation has failed to alter the relative 
prosperity between high or middle castes and untouch-
ables or tribals therefore, not engendered the resent-
ment that a more successful scheme would have, it is 
nevertheless still possible to percieve the system as 
having useful marginal effects on mass poverty and also 
as having created a group within the scheduled castes 
and tribes which is either actually or potentially 
useful in leadership roles in these communities, it is 
latter question - that of the emergence of a so called 
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"Harijan elite" - which is concern of this paper. The 
material for the discussion has been collected through 
interviews with representatives of one branch of presump-
tive elite occupants of reserved seats in parliament and 
state legistatures. 
-,-, POLITICAL BARTIES, AKALI DAL. 
219. BOMBWALL ii^y.) . Sikh identity, Akali Dal and federal 
policy.Economic and Political Weekly. 21, 20; 1986, May, 
17; 888-90. 
The "Punjab problem" is rooted in the failure of 
Punjab - in particular post - 1966 Punjab to evolve a 
regional-cum-linguistic personality as most other states 
of India have succeeded in doing. Hindu chauvinism and 
the theo-political orientation of Akali^ have unwittingly 
but inexorably acted in tandem to thwart the emergence 
of a conposite Punjabi identity. Had the Punjabi genius 
been able to fashion a viable synthesis across the com -
munal divide, the state would have been spared its most 
recent trauma, the country's flederal system would have 
had one hurdle less to cross in propelling the none-too-
easy enterprise of nation building the Akalis would not 
have had to make do with a pyrchic victory in the creat-
ion of truncated Punjabi Suba and the national leadership 
of the ruling party would not have been able to draw the 
276 
boundaries of the new state in communal rather than 
linguistic lines. 
220. WALLACE (paul). Sikh as a "minority" in a Sikh majority 
State in India. Asian Survey. 26, 3; 1986, Mar, 363-77. 
Demographic economic and political dimensions 
are examined by the author seperately and in combinat-
ion so as to explain Sikh militancy and terrorism in the 
1980s, Sikh perceive themselves in minority rather 
than majority terms in Punjab state. Sikhs historically 
have been in a minority and fear that their 60% majority 
since 1966 will erode as the green revolution leads to 
an outflow of Sikhs and an inflow of Hindus. Sikhs 
constitute the most economically successful agricul-
tural sector of any state in India. Low level of indus-
trial development coupled to difficulties in extending 
the green revolution qualifing their affluent image. 
Politically, the Akali Dal became the majority party 
in September 1985. Other parties normally appeal to 
the Akali's Sikh support base, and factions within the 
Akali's enahance Sikh political insecurities. Demogra-
phic economic and political data support the minority 
theme. 
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-/ -# -/ -, BIFURCATION. 
221. DANG (Satyapal). Punjab (risis : Negative and positive 
aspects. Mainstream. 25, 21; 1987, Feb, 7; 3. 
Author says that the extremely serious note needs 
to be taken of all that happened in Golden Temple on 
January 26, 1987 by all those who cherish the unity and 
integrity of the country. A socalled "Sarbat-Khalsa" 
had been called by Gurubachan Singh Manochal, a mem-
ber of the "Panthic Comnittee", an extremist outfit. 
More than one national flag were burnt and more than 
one "Khalistan" flags were hoisted. By another reso-
lution, "the declaration of Khalistan" made from within 
the Golden Temple on April 29, 1986 by the extremists 
was fully endorsed. Its implications, however, are 
much more dangerous than of the 1986 resolution. This 
for the simple reason that this resolution had the 
support and backing of all the five Head priests ap-
pointed by the SGPC after sacking the earlier ones, 
after Gurucharan ^ingh Tohra had been elected its 
presidentdefeating the nominees of Akali Dal (Longowal) 
and after the leadership of the SGPC had been captured 
by Tohra-Badal faction of the Akali Party. 
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222. SALAMAT ALI. Going seperate ways. Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 135, lO; 1987, Mar, 5; 41-5. 
Author says that although the turmoil in India's 
terrorist - infested strategic state of Punjab is un-
likely to subside in the immediate future, the religi-
ous politics at the root of the problem reached a new 
water shed with tjie event following the unprecedented 
ex-communication of Chief Minister Surjit Singh Barnala 
by Sikh head priests on 11 Feb, 1987. The community is 
now split with a significant faction for the first time 
questioning the validity of an edict issued by the 
highest Sikh teitporal forum, the Akal Takht. The other 
faction continues to believe in the inseparability of 
Sikh religion and politics and is pitted openly against 
New Delhi. On the eve of the convention, Darshan Singh 
released a list of 19 Barnalite legislators including 
lO members of the Barnala cabinet who pledged loyalty 
to Akal Takht. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met national 
opposition leaders on 16 February and recieved their sup-
port for evolving a programme to sustain Barnala and 
counter Sikh militancy. Barnala will have difficulty 
rallying the support of half of the community. Last 
year, his faction lost the indirect electoral battle it 
waged for control of the statutory body that manages 
the Sikh tetrple in Punjab, clearing the way for replace-
ment of the former head priests of the Golden Tenple 
279 
with those now in confrontation with Barnala and New 
Delhi. For the moment, the Sikh militants are nowhere 
near their secessionist goal, while New Delhi remains 
equally far from its objective of restoring peace and 
normalcy to a Punjab suffering from a daily toll of 
political murders, bank hold-ups and other acts of 
terrorism. 
_, _, _, -, PERFORMANCE. 
223. MALIK (Yogendra K ) Akali Earty and Sikh militancy 
move for greater autonomy or secessionism in Punjab ? 
Asian Survey. 26; 1986, Mar; 345-62. 
States that Rajiv Gandhi's return to politics 
of flexibility and accommodation has been successful 
in bringing the Akali Dal party of Punjab back into 
the mainstream of Indian politics. In the recent poli-
cy statement presented by the Akali Government before 
the Punjab state legislature, it declared the "state 
government would give no quarter to any separatist 
ideologies or activities". The Akali demand for greater 
state autonomy still needs to be met. Such a demand 
however is voiced by the regional parties. The future 
course of Akali politics is dependent upon the extent 
of the autonomy granted to the states, the attitude of 
the national political elite toward the regional parties 
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and above all the Akali party's ability to become a 
regional party without losing its distinctive clien-
tele, 
-# -/ -# -/ ASOM GANA PARISHAD, DJCSSINDENTS. 
224. ACCOUD AND after. Sunday. 14, 16/ 1987, Mar, 4;12. 
The article states that the thirteen months 
after a euphoric victory in the elections, the Assam 
Gona parishad government has run into trouble. The 
AGP government in Assam is under pressure. While it is 
no longer a secret that Chief Minister Prafulla Mohanta 
and Home Minister Bhrigu Phukan do not see eye to eye 
on many iitportant issues, the AASU has charged the 
government with non-inplementation of Assam accord, 
-, -, -, EAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY*PERFORMANCE. 
225. AJAY KUMAR, Some questions on Bahujan Samaj. Times of 
India. 150, 91; 1987, Apr, 2; 6g-h. 
Author says that the three-years-old BSP is already 
a political force to be reckoned with in North India. 
With every successive electoral battle it has fought 
since its debute in the 1984 general elections - the 
assembly elections in 1985, the Punjab poll, the Bijnore 
byelection and the latest byelections in U.P. - it has 
got the scheduled caste votes. The Congress had been 
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most adversely affected so far. But the latest vote 
in U.P. must cause concern to other major parties in the 
north^the Lok Dal, the BJP and Janata party.A few figures 
should suffice ; The BSP got 26.3 per cent of valid votes 
polled in the four byelections against four per cent in 
1985 assembly election while the Lok Dal got 0.70 per-
cent votes this time and the BJP 0.20 per cent. The 
Janata party's Ram Bilas paswan, a national political 
figure, lost his deposite in Hardwar. The BSP has defi-
nitely made in-roads into the other backward caste vote 
in the north, but its iitpact is also exaggerated by the 
fact that both Bijnore and Hardwar are reserved consti-
tuencies with substantial Harijan votes. Besides the 
Lok Dal - for all its present disarray is no mean cita-
del of the intermediate caste. The SC and the Muslims 
may vote against the Congress in byelections, but in 
elections that elect governments they have tended to 
waste their votes. The Congress has given the protect-
ion in exchange for their vote and it will need^an amaz-
ing act of faith in the BSP^ ability to win power to 
shake this pact. 
226. LAKSHMAN (wikhil). Sudden impact. Illustrated Weekly 
of India. 108, 10; 1987, Mar, 8; 8-17. 
Author reports on the dramatic emergence of Bahu-
jan Samaj party and how it has sent the Congress leadership 
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into a cold sweat. A group that represents the interests 
of the most downtrodden sectors of our society : the sche-
duled castes and backward communities, sectors that are 
numerically very large and have the potential to become 
the most powerful force in Indian politics. The organi-
sation K^nshi Rem heads is called the BSP and its best-
known, yet most mysterious arm, is the D-S^. Since its 
electoral debut in Dec. 1984, the BSP has made awesome 
incursions into the Congress vote banks in the Hindi 
heartland. Though it did not win a single seat, its 
presence was enough to ensure the victory of at,least 
80 opposition candidates in UP and Punjab assembly elec-
tions. Little wonder then that the Congress High Command 
is very seriously concerned about Kanshi Ram and his emer-
ging power base. 
-, -, -, CONGRESS (I). 
227. GUJRAL (IK) Marmurings in the heart lands. Seminar. 
315; 1985, Nov; 20-3. 
Author says that the national media and the poli-
tical elite have been for some time now, too occupied 
with the lingering crises in the Punjab and Assam to 
even notice, much less pay attention to, the ferment 
brewing in the Hindi speaking states particularly in 
U.P. and Bihar. The national scenarios, the Congress(I) 
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base has already shrunk to the Hindi belt. The Akali 
victory in Punjab has nearly conpleted the process of 
regionalisation of national politics. People in some 
states like Andhra, have enthroned regional parties, 
even though the centre has attenpted to tame them via 
the governors and the financial institutions. The emer-
ging end result is that the Indian political culture 
has been split. While the Hindi belt politicians, by 
and large, stand for a constralised, authoritarian 
State, the others are pressing for healthy decentrali-
zation inherent in a federal outlook. Rajiv Gandhi has 
changed the style of leadership from Mrs. Gandhi's im-
perial manner. He prefers the path of conciliation. 
The recent reshuffle has shown, he has created only 
three centres of power besides himself. While Arun 
Nehru has been assigned all instruments of State power, 
he has also been accorded personal Supermacy in U.P. 
where his nomihee has replaced a conparatively senior 
Chief Minister. Ahother insider, Arun Singh, is how the 
virtual defence Minister , while V.P. Singh lords over 
tne financial realms, 
228. KOTHARI (Rajni) . Centre and the challenge. Far ^^ astern 
Economic Review. 127, 4; 1985, Jan, 31; 34-5. 
Author comments that the whole of the south, 
large part of the east (West Bengal, Tripura and Sikkim) 
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and Kashmir provide evidence of a different kind of 
alignment than is suggested by the "Wave" for Congress 
and against the national opposition. Add to this the 
problem states of Punjab and Assam, and the picture 
become quite different. The basic challenge is to 
resolve the raging disputes between the centre and 
states which are likely to increase in tne coming months, 
together build a viable decentralised polity and through 
that, contain the communal and chauvenistic drives that 
gained momentum under Mrs. Gandhi which she left he-r 
hind as a fatal legacy. 
229. MANOR (James), Rajiv Gandhi and post-election Indiaj 
Opportunities and risks. World today. 41, 3; 1985, Mar; 
51-4. 
Author states that if Rajiv Gandhi is to succeed 
as a rebuilder of institutions and to survive politi-
is 
cally, he must revive what was for long time^india's 
central political institution, the Congress party. The 
party must be regenerated so that he can function in a 
rational manner at state and constituency levels. A 
second major concern is the near - certainity of a 
severe fiscal crisis which will be the resutt of re-
cent ruinous spending sprees to inpress the voters. 
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230, SETHI (Lalit). Need for cohesion in Cong (I) in view 
of party election.otatesman. 127, 3564; 1986, Feb, 12; 
6. 
The author says that Mr, Rajiv Gandhi 's poli-
tical strategy appears to be to strengthen the hands 
of the Congress (I) CMS who are reasonably well en-
trenched and not facing any challenye from within the 
party because of their failure to deliver the goods. 
The existence of groups within the party Is well re-
organized but it is felt that there is a great need 
for cohesion in the party ranks and leadership as it 
is preparing for organizational elections in the mid-
dle of the year. In pursuit of the aim two presidents 
of Pradesh Congress Committees have been replaced in 
the past few months Rajasthan and Gujrat. The third 
change perhaps imminent, may be in Madhya Pradesh. 
-/ -/ -/ -# CENTENARY. 
231. CHAKR^VVURTHY (Nikhil) . From platform to party: Trans-
formation of the Congress. Frontline. 2, 26; 1986, Jan, 
10; 15-6. 
Author states that the Congress has travelled and 
major changes it has undergone since it was formed a 
100 year ago. It was at Bombay that Congress was first 
set up on Dec. 23 in the year 1885, holding its first 
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session under the presidency of a well known barri-
est , W.C. Banerjee^ it can be argued that the Congress 
in the course of the hundred years of its existence has 
gene through many a metamorphoses but all this need not 
challenge its claim to that title. Once the Congress 
ceased to be a platform and turned itself into the poli-
tical party of a new establishment v/ith its bias for the 
rich, the socialists and the communists had no place in 
it. This by itself did not lead to cohesion and with 
every twist and turn, v/itn every setback and convul-
sion, defections and split came, sometimes in trickle 
and sometimes in casecade: Entered Rajiv and his team 
the new elite unencumberecl by any memory of the Congress 
past,' a new style a new outlook. Some have tried to 
berate them as the "computer boy" but destiny smiled 
on them as in the tension charged aftermath of Indira 
Gandhi's cruel assassination, the electorate gavte Rajiv 
a massive mandate. For one thing as the ruling party at 
the centre and in many of thd States the Congress still 
wields power and through its influence over a large 
part of the country, larger than any other party could 
claim. Today's Congress bears little resemblance to 
the original^ 
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232. HAMLYN (Michael). Gandhi rocks his party hierarchy 
with strong attack on corrupt ways. Times. 62332; 1985, 
Dec, 30; 5s-c. 
Author states that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian 
prime Minister, rocked the self confident complacency 
of his own po2<itical party with a speech laying out 
its sins and sicknesses far more pointedly and vehemenly 
than any of its political opponents would dare to speak-
ing at the centerary celebrations of the Indian National 
Congress, of which his party the Congress (I), claims to 
be the direct descendant, Mr. Gandhi first attacked a 
number of ills in Indian society. Mr. Gandhi made it 
plain, however that there was no party capable of tak-
ing over Congress's role. "All other parties are shot 
through with internal contradictions", he said "The 
sorry unedifying spectacle of their total incapacity, 
corr^tion, nepotism, hypocrisy, has disfigured our poli-
tical landscape". The other parties had colluded with 
anti-national elements and had shallow ideological roots 
"Wherever they have come to power, they have retarded 
social and economic progress." He declared, promising 
to break the nexus between political parties and vested 
interests. "We will change the electoral laws to ensure 
Cleaner elections", he said, "we will make political 
parties accountable for the funds they receive. We will 
wage ideological war against those who exploit the poor 
in the name of caste or religion". 
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233. HAMEyN (Michael). Gandhi to lead the candle light tri-
bute: Indian party's centenary.times. 62129; 1985, May, 
4; 7a-b. 
Author highlights that the Indian National Congress, 
of which the faction launched by the late Prime Minister, 
Mrs. Gandhi, Congress (I) claims to be the only legitimate 
descendent, celebrates its lOOth birthday this year. Twen-
ty five thousands district officials from Congress Commi-
ttees will be present to hear Mr. Gandhi who is the 
current Congress president speake and watch him light 
the 100th flame after a procession of torches carried 
by 99 children. Congress (I) became not only a political 
party but a mass movement, and the principal tool of the 
freedom struggle led by Mahatraa Gandhi. "We would have 
been nowhere." said the Mahatama in a sentence which 
is being remembered as a part of the celebration, "if 
there had been no Congress", 
234. HAMLYN (Michael). Rebels spurn offer to join celebra-
tion . Titles 62131; 1985, Mary, 1, 8g-h. 
Author comments that the former members of the 
Indian National Congress declined a hurried invitation 
issued to thera to attend the opening celebration of 
the Congress centenary in Delhi. They are those who 
opposed Indira Gandhi when the Congress split, in 1969 
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or 1978. They now run splinter parties of their own 
and, to judge from a history of the party issued to 
those presents, they were right not to have come. Had 
they attended, they would have found themselves des-
cribed officially as "the reactionary elements in the 
Congress" and people opposing the "progressive policies 
of the Congress". 
-, ~, -, -, DISSIDENTS. 
235. CHAWLA (prabhu). Congress (I) : The battle within. India 
today. 11, 15; 1986, Aug, 1-15; 25. 
Huthor focuses on ruling party's ferment.By July 
1986, half of the Congress (I) chie£ Ministeiswere fac-
ing revolt from dissidents, in Delhi senior party func-
tionaries were busy undermining each other and party 
President Rajiv Gandhi seemed unable to stem the rot. 
The AICC (I) office bearers installed by Rajiv Gandhi 
failed to maintain someserablence of party discipline. 
The party has been confronted with total confusion 
over the role and authority of Arjun Singh and Arun 
Nehru the Prime Minister's most trusted aids, 
236. DEALING WITH Dissent. Tribune. 1986, Apr, 29; 4. 
The paper editorially says that the striking at 
dissidence where it is likely to hurt the party, the 
Congress (I) High Command has expelled Mr. Pranab 
230 
Mukherjee and suspended three others for alleged anti-
party activities. Mr. Mukherjee is no great asset to the 
Congress (I) either in terms of image of popular follow-
ing much the same can be said of Mr. Sripati Misra, Mr. A. 
P. Sharma and Mr. Prakash Mehrotra, who have been placed 
under suspension simultaneously, the Prime Minister has 
sought to assuage the hurt feelings of the party's 
working President, Mr. Kamlapathi. The latter, who 
has been nursing a justified grievance of having been 
ignored by the party's President and kept out of the 
decision - making process, may become the fulcrum of 
revolt in the Congress (i) ranks againgt the style of 
functioning of leadership. Mr. Mukharjee has been the 
most vocal critic of the Government's policies and pos-
tures. Together, the dissidents who call themselves 
"Indira Loyalists" do not amount to a major threat to 
either the Government or the party leadership. In a 
sense, they are out of the present Congress (I) mains-
team precisely because of their image - tarnishing proxi-
mity to the former Prime Minister, 
-t -0 -, -/ -/ KERALA. 
237. MENON (Venu). Growing Chasmi . Illustrated Weekly of 
India. 106, 16; 1985, Aug, 25; 29. 
The author states that the gloss has faded from 
the much-vaunted merger of Congress i in Kerala. Two 
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weeks ago, the cracks grew into a yawning chasm as 
Home Minister Vayalar Ravi and Chief Minister K. Karu-
nakaran drifted beyond handshaking distance. The Cong-
ress (D) abruptly divided into distinct camps. Behind the 
Home Minister stood an array of disgruntled members of 
the Congress faction owing allegiance to A.K. Antony. 
There is an anxiety among Karunakaran's followers that 
the Antony faction will gain head way in times to come. 
Karunakaran, supporters lack a second line of leader-
ship. Recently the Chief Minister attempted to evict 
the Home Minister in an abortive cabinet reshuffle. 
Vayalar Ravi escaped unhurt^ but the rancour among the 
Antony faction set in deeper. 
., -, _, _, _, RETURN, RAy(Siddartha Shankar) . 
238. ABDI (SNM). Back from the cold. Illustrated Weekly 
of India. 106, 9; 1985, Jul, 7; 32-3. 
Author says that another prodigal has returned 
to the fold. Despite,the vehement opposition to his 
rehabilitation, Siddhartha Shankar Ray has come back to 
the whirl pool of Congress-I politics. With the centre's 
benign sanction, the former chief minister has begun 
canpaigning for party candidates in the Calcutta civic 
elections. It is believed that Ray will soon be offi-
cially readmitted into the Congress - l and lead the 
party in the Assembly elections in 1987^ 
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_, _, -, ~, effects of DEFEAT, ELECTIONS, ASSEMBLIES, 
1987, HARYANA. 
239. DUA (H K ) Congress - I after Haryana. Hindustan Times. 
64, 175; 1987, Jun, 25; 9c-f. 
Author says that although Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and 
other Congress I leaders have succeeded in averting 
a threatened split in the party over Presidential elec-
tion, they have no reason to remain conplacent. Atteitpts 
at splitting the ruling party were not unexpected after 
Mr. Devi Lai swept the polls in Haryana throwing the 
Congress - I rank and file into state of shock and 
confusion. A section of opposition saw in the situat-
ion an opportunity to bring about a change in the party 
by rallying the support of Congress - I dissidents for 
a second term for Mr. Zail Singh. The opposition attenpt 
did not succeeded because it could not line up enough 
people for reelecting Zsil Singh who also saw through 
the inpartial nature of the proposition and made it 
clear to the Prime Minister as also his friends that 
he was not in the race, in the power game that was 
being played in the capital last week-end the Communist 
parties chose to help Mr. Rajiv Gandhi by refusing to 
back the proposal to sponsor Mr. Zail Singh for Presi-
dent and in the process left the prime Minister under 
obligation for the good turn they did to him and left 
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the opposition parties bitter. To believe that the 
people in Haryana and other states are not reading and 
talking about the Bofor and the Submarine deals and 
scandals, imagined or other wise, will be living in a 
make believe world and will do anyone no good. Mr, Rajiv 
Gandhi and Government will have to take steps to clear 
the air, for on his image will depend to a large extent 
the image of the party and the country he is leading. 
240. HARYANA VERDICT. Democratic World, 16, 25; 1987, June, 
21; 4. 
The article editorially states that the rout of 
Congress in Haryana and emergence of Devilal may lead 
to far reaching political turbulence in Indian politics 
or at least in the Hindi speaking areas. The election 
defeat of the ruling party in the Centre will naturally 
affect the pulling power of Rajiv Gandhi, who is facing 
a multi-facet challenge in his career. The election 
story in Haryana is a personal victory for Devilal, al-
though some opposition parties, including NTR's TeJugu 
Desam, had backed him^the Jat leader led the canpaign 
with relentless Vigour. The Prime Minister may have 
to take the Haryana election results seriously and reshape 
his political strategy. Otherwise the backlash from 
Hairyana may create problems for him. The c<i)ngress is 
facing today a serious challenge, perhaps a challenge 
for its survival. 
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241. INDERJIT. Rajiv, Haryana poll and new cirsis. Economic 
Times, 14, 84; 1987, Jun, 23; 5g-h. 
Feels that Mr. Gandhi is facing the biggest crisis 
of his prime ministership and political life. With the 
defeat of Congress-I in Haryana, the opposition leaders 
have demanded his resignation and ther^ have been moves 
for his prosecution in a coiirt law for alleged Bofors 
bribes. He has, till now, been bailed out by the refusal 
of zail Singh for the last named, as required the Act. 
The President, however, is under great pressure to "dis-
miss" him. In case of Haryana poll, no one could have 
forecast the massive rout of Congress-I, even though 
Mr. Bansi Lai was unpopular in the state. All the 17 
cabinet ministers, except one, lost at the hustings. 
The Punjab accord and the general feeling among Haryanivs 
that they were not getting a fair deal from the centre 
and the in-fighting in Congress»l contributed to its 
defeat. Mr. Devi lal made full use of all the anti-
Gandhi in^formation available and accused the Prime 
Minister of corruption. The Union Government has it-
self to blame for the mess it finds itself in because 
of inaction against corrupt people, coraraunalists and 
disloyal elements, its handling of Fairfax affair, 
submarine deal and Bofors issue has been clumsy and inept. 
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242. THARYAN (P). Meaning of the Verdict; Haryana. Hindus-
tan Times. 64, 170; 1987, Jun, 20; llc-f. 
The author comments that it is seldom that a 
party gets almost wiped out in the state Assembly elec-
tion and when such an event takes place, not only the 
State where the Polls have been held but the rest of 
country also feels the iiipact. The outcome of the 
Haryana elections may or may not be an indicator of 
the shape of things to come at the national level but 
it is certainly a-stemn warning to the Congress-i from 
tne Hindi belt where alone the party still rules,, The 
defeat most painful to the party is that this is third 
in row - in 1977, 1982 and now. The poll outcome in 
Haryana is a verdict against the Congress—I. A faction 
ridden party, a party where organisational elections 
have not been held for a couple of decades, a party 
where initiative at the grass - roots level is discoura-
ged, and a party where inner democracy is stifled -
that is plight to Congress - i today. By losing all 
the Assembly elections in recent years, it almost gives 
the in^jression that it is not acceptable to the people 
unless it mends its ways and regains its traditional 
values. This the meaning of verdict in Haryana, 
243. WARNING FOR Congress (I), Hindustan Times. 64, 169; 
1987, Jun, 19; 9a-b. 
Editorially comments that a political hurricane 
29G 
has lashed Haryana. How else can the sweeping victory 
of the Lok Dal (B) - BJP Alliance and the debacle of 
Congress (I) in the state Assembly elections be descri-
bed ? The credit for this remarkable feat must go to 
Mr. Devi lal whose poll strategy and campaign were 
down to earth and effective. The poll results clearly 
indicate that Mr. Ajit Singh's Lok Dal is not a force 
to be recknoned with in Haryana and its alliance with 
Janata was hardly fruitful. The rout of Congress - I 
is certainly a stern warning to the party. The thought 
that it has lost almost all the state Assembly elections 
in recent years can hardly be comforting the party. The 
message was identical from Kerala, West Bengal, Mizoram 
and the rest of the Stgites which had gone to the polls. 
Haryana was considered a test case so far as Hindi -
heartland was concerned and the party's electoral set-
back in the state undoubtedly indicates a distressing 
trfend for it. It is time that Congress - I did some 
introspection and examined why state after state is 
slipping out of its hands. The leadership should know 
that if the people of Haryana can get disenchanted with 
the party, people in other states can also be so. It 
will be futile for the central leaders to believe that 
unending controversies surrounding the Bofors'and sub-
marine deals have had no impact on voters in the villages 
and towns of Haryana, 
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-/ -# -# -# EXPULSION, MUKHERJEE (pranab) . 
244. SAREEN (Rajendra). Cong revolt nipped. Tribune. 1986, 
Apr, 29. 
The author highlights that going by extremely sub-
dued reaction among congress M.P.s to the expulsion yes-
terday of Mr, pranab Mukherjee and the suspension of 
three others for anti-party activities it appears the 
incipient revolt has been nipped in the bud. Mr, Arjun 
Singh today refused to answer questions on this aspect. 
Mr. Singh said that the Congress (i) president was 
fully enpowered to take action and had all the power 
of ^ jforking committee when the latter was not in session. 
Mr. Gandhi consulted senior colleagues in this regard. 
-# -#-# -/-# SINGH (V.P) . 
245. V.P. SINGH'S expulsion.Hindustan Times. 64, 200; 1987, 
Jul, 20; 9a-b. 
Editorially points out that the Prime Minister 
of the country is under attack from some of his erst-«-
while colleagues and friends and is fighting back to 
retain his position as well as image. Now Mr, v.p. Singh, 
who has emerged Mr, Gandhi's main political adversary, 
though 
has been thrown out of the Congress (I), No one had really/ 
that after all that has happened Mr, V,P. Singh would be 
able to stay in the party led by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. 
29g 
Mr. Singh's o£c ar to resign was not accepted two days 
ago on the ground that it was conditional. The real rea-
son was that the Congress (1) leadership did not want 
him to get away with a martyred feeling. The Congress 
(I) leadership perhaps felt that Mr. Singh would not 
go out of the party on his own, the Prime Minister must 
have concluded that any action by him at this time against 
have 
Mr. Singh woulc^support of the majority of Congress (i) 
parliamentary party. The prime Minister may succeed in 
keeping the party behind him and this is acial at 
the moment. His instituting the inquiry into Mr. Ajitabh 
Bachchan's swiss property may be attempt to distance 
himself from people who have become a political liabi-
lity for him. What exactly he does remains to be seen. 
It is quite likely that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi will backtrack 
on some of his economic policies and go in for populists 
measures during the forthcoming parliament session. 
-/ -/ -# -/ -, -/ -/ DEMAND, ALLAHABAD CITY CONGRESS 
COMMITTEE. 
246. RELUCTANT CHALLENGER. Statesman. 127, 8489; 1987, May, 
25; 6b-c. 
The paper editorially comments on the rejection 
by AICCI of the recommendation of Allahabad Congress -I 
Committee to Bxpel Mr. V.p. Singh and an M.L.A. for 
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"anti-party activities". The reason for this is that 
neither side is willing to come out openly against the 
other. Mr. Singh has acquired a reputation of being 
"Mr. Clean" in his relatively short political career 
and it seems that he is reacting to the situation as 
they arise rather than masterminding the events. The 
Congress High Cororaand too is not very sure how to tackie 
him since all he apparently pleads for is the retvffn of 
accountability and decency in p\iblic life. To conpound 
the conplications further, there are utterances and 
statements by men like Mr. Kalpanath Rai, who symbolize 
the Congress—I "Culture" at its worst. 
-^  _, -, -, MEMBERS, CODE OP CONDUCT. 
247. CONGRESS (I) CODE. Tribune. 1986, Jan, 23; 4. 
The paper editorially points out that the going 
by the brief account published so far of the draft code 
being prepared by the Parliamentary Board of Congress 
(I) for the guidance of party members, it is clear 
that the immediate errphasis will be on relations 
between members of the legislatures, both in Delhi 
and in the States, and the organisational set up out-
side the legislatures. Mr. Arjun Singh, who was ap-
pointed Vice-president of the party has lost no time 
in getting down to the task assigned to him by his 
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Chief. The proposed line of action includes more fre-
quent meetings of the Parliamentary Board to discuss the 
prevailing political situation and other issues and a 
closer liasion between the Chief Minister and the men 
at the P.C.C.(I) office*. Mr. Arjun -^in^could not 
have put forward his proposals without the sanction 
of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, which again shows that the relat-
ion between the President and Vice-Fresident of the Party 
are going to be based on a great deal of mutual trust and 
the Chief's confidence in his Deputy's capacity to make 
the right judgement and produce results. Mr, Singh's 
style of functioning as Governor of Punjab proved re-
warding under the circumstances. 
_, -, _, -, MUSLIM DISILLUSIONMENT. 
248. JAIN (Meenakshi). Muslims and Harijans : Drift away 
from Congress. Times of India, 150, 110# Apr, 21; 
6c-e. 
The author says that the recent demonstration of 
strength by the country's principal minority and weaker 
sections should have created a stir in political cir-
cles in northen India. The Muslim protest on the Babri 
Masj id/Ramj anara-tohoomi issue and the iirpressive per-
formance of fledgling Bahujan Samaj' Party in the just 
concluded assembly and parliamentary by-elections have, 
objectively speaking raised the spectre of the onward 
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march of minorities and depressed classes sweeping 
everything before them. The Muslims turned enthusias-
tically to the Janata party particularly, it is belie-
ved to its Lok Dal Constituent in 1977. On the eve of 
1980 elections, all the political parties tried to woo 
the Muslim vote, this resulted in improvement in Cong-
ress vote to some extent. Janata and Lok Dal also 
made some inroads into Muslim strongholds. The Hari-
jan vote showed the same trend in 1971, but in 1977, 
the Harijan vote deserted the Congress because of Bel-
chi carnage etc. I^ 1980, the Congress staged a comeback, 
specially in South India. The assassination of Mrs. Gaidhi 
resulted in a nationalistic upsurge and apparently the 
Muslims and scheduled castes too joined in that. However, 
in the present times, the Hariians have overwhelmingly 
voted for Bahujan Samaj Party and the Muslims too have 
moved away from the Congress. 
-, -/ -/ -/ PROBLEMS, BOGUS MEMBERSHIP. 
249. GUJRAL ( I K ) Reviewing the Congress position. Gentle-
man, 1987, May; 19. 
The author says that once again one hears talk of 
making the Congress (I) Cadre-based party. Such ideas 
usually surface when the party gets a drubbing at the 
polls or when its bogus membership gets out of hand. 
302 
Uma Shankar Dixit has served the party long and in 
difficult situations but he must be finding his present 
assignement rather bewildering. It would indeed be 
Herculean task to revive the Congress's pristine conjmit-* 
ments and turn it into an instrument of social change* 
The Congress of Gandhian era played a heroic role in 
restoring India's self esteem and in building a new 
culture. Nehru was at the helm of affair But,even 
during his own lifetime the bosses had established 
their strangehold over the party. The Congress (I) 
still has many eminent persons whose worth has been 
proved in past years and it has now recruited some 
brilliant and fresh intellects. The Congress does not 
have the capacity to reach out to the masses, to red-
ress their grievances. Any talk of cadre-basing the 
party, must begin with a clear definition of ideology 
and objectives. The Congress (I) must face the fact 
that a codre-based party is not conpatible with a plura-
listic democracy. This cadre can neither replace the 
lower levels of bureaucracy nor can it be entrusted 
with the development activity that uses public funds 
and governmentai authority. The Congress (I) chief 
minister generally preferred to supersede the pancha-
yats and municipalities. Dixit would do well to re-
cognise that the two functions - electioneering and 
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constructive work are interrelated in Indian context. 
It is worth remembering that the party and its tradit-
ions have been destroyed over the years and its social 
relevance can be established only by prolonged labour. 
-/ -/ -/ -# R^IV - PRAJSAB CONTROVERSY. 
250. NANDY (Pritish). Man who knew too much. Illustrated 
Weekly of India. 107, 18; 1986, Apr, 27; 6-18. 
The author coraroents that the strange things are 
happening to Pranab Mukherjee. The ex-finance Minis-
ter in Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet and her closet adviser 
in many matters, suddenly found himself out in the 
cold when the new government took over. But that was 
not enough. A systematic vilification canpaign was 
launched to humiliate him and cut him down to size in 
such a way that he would have no option but to quietly 
quit the party and go away. Add to that a series of 
bizarre incidents that have recently taken place. 
Frightening phone calls; plastic bomb exploding in 
his house; his car set on fire; persistent hate mail 
making Mtidnoxxs threats. Strange sinister warning that 
he should keep his mouth shut or face the consequences. 
After a long period of silence, during which r\imours have 
snowballed that pranab Mukharjee is planning to stake 
out on his own and lead the dissidents within the 
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Congress (I) to form a separate party, the loyalist 
has finally chosen to speak out. To explain what is hap-
pening and why. To concede why Rajiv Gandhi considers 
his mother's closest adviser to be a political pariah 
today. 
-, -, '-, -, RESTRUCTURING. 
251. CHANGE IN Congress (I), Amrita Bazar Patrika. 1986, 
Jan, 28. 
The paper editorially comnents that pronpt steps 
have been taken by the Congress (I) president, Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi to revitalise the party in pursuance of the pro-
mise he made at the Congress centenary celebration in 
Bombay last month and his dramatic changes in the 
Union cabinet by appointing Mr. Arjun Singh as Vice-
President and restructuring the party secretariat have 
enthused Congress (I) men and many others. Simultane-
ously, two. Ministers of State, Mr. T. Anjaiah and 
Mr. Naval Kishore Sharma, and the Vice-Chairman of 
Rajya Sabha, Mrs. Najma Heptullah, have been made gene-
ral secretaries of the party. All the vacancies in the 
Union Cabinet were filled up on Monday. The changes 
have understandable percolated to the party's central 
Parliamentary Board and Working Committee. 
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-# -* -# -/ -# WEST BENGAL. 
252. CHOICE FOR Bengal. Statesman. 126, 3361; 1985, i^r, 
5; 6a«>b. 
Editorially states that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has 
sprung a major surprise by appointing Mr. Pranab Mukher-
jee president of the West Bengal, PCC(I) soon after 
Mr. Gandhi took office it appeared that Mr. Mukherjee 
had lost the icnportance he enjoyed during the last year 
of Indira Gandhi's reign. The impression was not quite 
dispelled even when he became the most energetic Cong-
ress (I) canpaigner is West Bengal for the Lok Sabha 
election. His unceremonious exclusion from the recons-
tituted Union Cabinet was regarded as final confirmat-
ion that he had fallen from grace. Though he worked 
hard for the State Assembly by elections as well, there 
was little evidence of his rehabilitation in the party's 
inner councils. He will now need to display qualities 
of larger political leadership. But his success will 
also be determined by the kind of svtpport he recieves 
from the party High Command. 
-/ -# -# -# REVOLT. 
253. LAKSHMAN (Nikhil). Cracking up. Illustrated Weekly of 
India. 107, 14; 1986, Apr, 6; 6-19. 
The author examines the state of the ruling 
party in the wake of the proposed revolt by some 
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powerful members and asks whether the Congress - i 
was cracking up. The war within the Congress - i has 
intensified - during the past few weeks, with the old 
'Indira loyalists'coming closer together to face the 
on-^laught of the new power elite. Rumours are rife that 
they are preparing a get together and form a new politi-
cal party tnat would involve veteran Congressmen like 
Pranab Mukherjee, Jagannath Mishra, Madhav Singh Solanki, 
Hiteshwar Saikia and Gundu Rao among others, Rao has, 
in fact, even admitted this in a recent interview he 
gave to the author, 
., _, _, _, WEST BENGAL. 
254. NEW TEAM in Bengal, Indian Express, 53, 345; 1985, 
Oct, 17; 5a-b, 
Editorially points out that the composition of 
recently announced West Bengal Pradesh Congress Commit-
tee - I executive clearly reflects the party High Com-
mand's resolve to enable Mr, Priya Rajan Das Munshi to 
consolidate his position. Not only have Mess©rs pranab 
and Subrata Mxikherjee, who have not taken kindly to 
Mr, Das Munshi's appointment as WB PCC-I president, 
been excluded from the 43 members body, but also their 
supporters, on the other hand supporters of Mr. Ashok-
3en and Mr, A.B.ACfhani Khan Choudhry, Union Ministers 
for law and programme Inplementation respectively. 
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have been given due weightage. While this should line 
up a major section of the party behind the new execut-
ive, the appointment of Mr. Atish Chandra Sinha and 
Mr. Pradeep Bhattacharjee as two of five general secre-
taries will help in refurbashing its image. As minister 
of state when Mr, Siddhartha Ray was Chief Minister, 
both are known for their personal integrity and conpe-
tence. It remains to be seen how things work out. The 
supporters of the two Mukherjees may not cause much of 
a problem because of the accretion of strength follow-
ing cori^ lete integration of the Congress into the Cong-
ress - I which the new WB PCC - I executive marks. But 
dislodging the left Front is a tall order. 
-, -, -, JANATA, POLL PROSPECTS. 
255. JAiNlATA DILEMMA. Tribune. 107, 88; 1987, Mar, 31; 
4a-b. 
Editorially comments that the Janata party has the 
character and the potential to be a national alternative 
to the Congress (I) but it somehow seems reluctant and 
unready to take on the role of leading non-Congress 
force in the country. It has in its ranks many natio-
nally respected politicians - Mr. Ram Krishna Hegde, 
Mr. Madhu Limaye, Mr. Surendra Mohan and Mr. Madhu 
Dandavate and of course, Mr. Chandra Shekhar - who are 
308 
known to be respecters of norms and values in the con-
duct of public affairs. Apart from being a confident 
ruling party in Karnataka, the Janata has done well in 
local elections in Gujrat and the Assembly poll in Kerala. 
Instead of wallowing in sterile anti-r Congressism, the 
Janata can provide a decisive thxnist to national poli-
tics if only it shed what Mr. Hegde rightly calls 
"organisational indifference". The strength of this 
party is that it does not provke violent anti-pathy. 
Its weakness is its diffidence, absense of dynamic 
leadership and the continued presence of wreckers like 
Mr. Limaye and Mr. Biju Patnaik. It can be at the head 
of a national coalition of anti-Congress forces if it 
shakes off its inertia and tries to look as if it has 
a policy and programme of its own to offer to the elec-
torate. 
-# -/ -# OPPOSITION CONCLAVE. 
256. NON-CONGRESS Conclave. Democratic World. 16, 18; 1987, 
May, 3; 4-3. 
Editorially states that it will be futile to ex-
pect too much from the non-Congress Chief Ministers who 
met at a conclave in New Delhi last week. A lot of pre-
conclave speculations had been triggered off in view of 
the prevailing political situation, particularly in the 
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context of tiff between the president and prime Minis-
ter. Even some of the Chief Ministers made statements 
about an alternative to the Rajiv Gandhi Government and 
also about a "consensus" candidate as president. But 
when the six Chief Minister assembled, the sitaution 
became different. Another non-Congress Chief Minister 
meeting would be held in Bangalore in June '87. 
Dr. Farooq Abdullah, Chief Minister of Jansnu and Kashmir 
who was not invited in this conference, had criticised 
it and warned that nothing should be done to weaken 
the centre. Some Congress leaders, especially the 
functionaires of the AicC had characterised the con-
clave as a "damp squib". Jyoti Basu said that "a viable 
national alternative to the Congress is certainly our 
ultimate objective". He wanted to enlarge the conclave 
by including others. The resolution on centre*state 
relations is a hotch - potch of old documents. The 
non-Congress Chief Minister were clamouring for more 
powers for a long time. One of the proposals was that 
all the non-Congress Governments should come together 
in terms of a common socio-economic programme to safe-
guard the interests of the common people. 
257. NO WORKABLE Alliance. Times of India. 150, H I ; 1987, 
Apr, 22; 6a-b. 
The paper editorially states that less than a week 
after Mr. Jyoti Basu announced a summit of seven non-
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Congress Chief Ministers in New Delhi on ApriX 25, a 
few significant changes are already perceptible in the 
opposition parties• attitude towards the meeting and 
their expectations about its possible out come, At any 
rate Mr. Mahanta absence will reduce the participation 
at the Chief Minister's conference to six states/three 
of them ruled by CPM led coalitions, in view of the 
fact that Mr. M.G. Ramachandran of Tamil Nadu and Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah of jamrau and Kashmir have already been 
excluded presumably because of their close relationship 
with the Congress - the April 25 conference is likely 
to be but a pale image of the opposition conclaves of 
recent years. The CPM's central committee has been 
reported to have rejected Mr. Basu's thesis of a "work-
able alliance" of opposition parties and enphasised the 
importance of preserving national unity at this junctua^ ^^ e. 
All in all CPM appears to have moved even further from 
the Karnataka Chief Minister. Mr. Ramakrishna Hegde's 
concept of an opposition grand alliance that could pro-
vide an immediate alternative to the Congress and to Mr. 
Rajiv Gandhi. The April 25 conference will prove to be 
precursor to a major comraunlst-led effort to take on 
the Congress - rather it will probably confine itself 
to discussion of centre - state relations and forth-
coming presidential election. 
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258. THIRTEEN PARTY foriaisi Move for alternative to Congress 
(I) . Statesman. 127, 3590; 1986, Mar, lO; 6. 
The paper points out that the 13 party forum which 
was formed in Hyderabad soon after the "Mahanadu confe-
rence convened by Mr, N.T. Rama Rao in January 1986 is 
now trying to bring in more national opposition parties 
to become a rival to the Congress (I). The 13 parties 
which attended the Hyderabad conference are Telgu Desam, 
the Janata Party, the Congress (S^, the DMKjthe Samata 
Party led by Mr. Ram Naresh Yadav/the All people Hill 
Leaders' conference led by Mr. Lyngdoh, the people's 
party of Arunachal Pradesh led by Mr. Doma Riba, the 
Nega National Democratic Party led by Mr. C. Kevichusa, 
the National conference (Parooq), the Akali Dal, the 
Asora Gana Parishad, the Panthers' party and Rashtriya 
Congress of Gujarat. 
-, -, -, PERPORMANCE, CONGRESS (I). 
259. NANDY (Pritish). Yesterday, today, tomorrow, illustra-
ted Weekly of India. 107, 2; 1986, Jan, 12; 8-17. 
The author comments that in the end December 1984 
the nation voted the Congress - I to power at the 
centre with a massive mandate. The architect of that 
grand victory was Rajiv Gandhi : the bereaved son of 
Indira Gandhi, martyr. The opposition screamed itself 
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hoarse over the dynastic succession, but the electo-
rate was not impressed. The suave, young, prematurely 
retired airline pilot took over the promise he held out 
of a young, dynamic, honest government. Since then a 
year has gone by. A year of many achievements and yet 
many disappointments as well. Some sincere attempt have 
been made to clean up the Augean stables of the Cong-
ress - I, on one hand, on the other many of disreput-
ables have come back into power. Quite a few adventur-
ous steps have been taken to revitalise the slothful 
economy*Yet many compromises have also been made. 
New areas of endeavour have come into the lime-light. 
Crucial concerns have remain neglected. Meanwhile the 
euphoria seems to have ebbed somewhat. And the first 
signs of electoral disillusionment have manifested 
themselves in the by -elections and the outcome of the 
Punjab and Assam polls, where the Congress (i) has been 
humbled by a series of dramatic reversals. 
-# "t -# -# JANATA. 
260. DWIVEDY (S\irendranath) . National alternative focus, 
Nagpur Tiroes. 1986, Jun, 4. 
The author says that some Janata Party leaders 
have begun to talk about developing the Janata party 
as an alternative to the Congress. The recent elect-
ions to Parliament and State Assemblies have encouraged 
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them to think in this manner because they feel that 
among the opposition the Janata Party has been taken as 
a - national party because in as many as eight 
States Janata representatives have been elected to Lok 
Sabha and its performance in the State Assembly elect-
ions have been much better than any other party. Its 
victory in Assembly poll in Karnataka has somewhat 
wiped out the blemish and gave it some prestige. The 
picture that emerges does not really give it the posi-
tion of national party. There is no norm followed by 
all its leaders ? what is the moral behind the call to 
Qongress rebels to join the Janata party ? The real 
problem is not an alternative to the Congress but the 
development of a party in the opposition based on cer-
tain definite basic principles and objectives. Along 
with this it must also develop . disciplined leadership 
which can show enough dynamism and progressive outlook. 
-, -, PRIME MINISTER, GANDHI (Indira), ASSASSINATION 
AFTERMATH, RIOTS, HINDU-SIKH, DELHI. 
261. MISHRA (R K) Sack these traitors, patriot. 1984, Nov, 3. 
The author comments that the Delhi must hang its 
head in shame. The shock of the ghastly carnage in Tri-
lofcpuri is beyond words, official machinery in the cap-
ital ignored the Prime Minister's call to put down firmly 
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all acts of coramunal violence. Delhi administration 
abdic*ited its responsibility and handed over several 
areas in the Union capital to mobs of criminals, dacoits 
and murderers. Anti-social elements were allowed the 
freedom to rule without any fear of reprisals. The cli-
mate in capital was full of hatred and bitterness, and 
the Administration did nothing. Delhi police remained 
paralysed when it should have acted immediately in the 
wake of nximerous acts of arson, looting and murders. 
The Administration continued to act complacently in 
spite of repeated warnings. What is worse, it tried 
to suppoess facts, mislead the authorities and create 
and illusion that things were under control. A begin-
ning must be made in Delhi where all those who have 
acted treacherously and aided the crimes of communal 
gangstere were punished, and the Administration cleaa-
sed of these dangerous weeds. 
262. MISHRA (R.K) Where were the secular parties while 
Delhi burned ? Patriot. 1984, Nov, 6. 
The author conpiains that the last few days of 
grief and shame in Delhi have brought out into the open 
shocking paralysis which has gripped political parties 
professing by secularism. Not one of their leaders 
had courage to rush to the colonies rocked by violance 
and stand between the gangster and their helpless 
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victims. In some places party cadres remained specta-
tors as mobs indulged in loot, arson and murder. There 
are numeruous instances of men and women taking the 
risk of intervening in the midst of sitaution when their 
lives could be inperilled. They acted courageously in 
the face of frightening depredation; they acted sponta-
neously in accordance with the humanist instincts that 
reside in heart of every conscious and secular person. 
But what were the political parties doing, particularly 
those which never tire of advertising their secular and 
progressive •committments' when Delhi was burning ? Now 
that the violence appears to have been brought under 
control, the business of exploiting human misery has 
commenced. Accusations are being hurled and ammunition 
gathered for training guns against the 'enemy' in the 
electoral battle. This is the abysmal depth to which 
the perception of politics has sunk, 
263. NATIONS (Richard). Dynasty or division : Rajiv casps 
a violent legacy, but can he unite India ? Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 126, 46; 1984, Nov, 15; 14. 
The author states that the public cremation of 
india's national leader is a moment in this intensely 
emotional cotontry to sink political differences in a 
shared outwpouring of grief. Indira Gandhi assaasinatid 
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by two Sikh bodygaurds,within hours of the murder of 
Indira Gandhi,- her 40 years old son Rajiv Gandhi had 
been sworn in as her successor as prime Minister of the 
World's largest democracy. But while he had been quick 
to take power toe seemed a good deal slower to exercise 
it, and for the next three days New Delhi and other 
parts of the country saw the worst inter-communal vio-
lence since partition. With calm apparently restored, 
India and the rest of the world wait to see whether 
Rajiv Gandhi can consolidate the Nehru's dynasty. 
264. NAYAR (Kuldip). Sikhs in travial. Nagpur Times, 1984. 
Nov, 24; 
The author says that it is a fashion to put every 
violent eruption on the scales of economics and so it 
is no surprise to find that recent happenings in Delhi 
and elsewhere in India have been interpreted as a sort 
of class war, even if communal overtones are not denied*. 
During the recent riots Punjabi Hindus and a few others 
did go to the Sikhs' aid but more as people hailing 
from the same state or nieghbours than as members of 
the Hindu community. Therefore, the faith of the Sikhs 
in Hindus has been lost. So also the Hindus 'faith in 
the Sikhs. The Hindu belief is that Sikhs are running 
with the hare and hunting with the hounds. The Sikh 
317 
community is an integral part of the nation and any 
other role iitposed on it either by the Hindu chauvi-
nists or the Sikhs settled abroad is frought with dangers. 
Taking a step that negates the inpression of separateness 
will not be a come down for the community; it will stren-
ghten its ties with the Hindus and strengthen the coun-
try. 
265. RUMOUR MILL. Hindustan Times> 61, 304; 1984, Nov, 3; 
9a-b. 
The paper editorially points out the inposition 
of curfew and deployment of troops seems to have redu-
ced the intensity of violence in the riot - affedted 
regions in Delhi. But the situation contines to be 
critical. Firm action by the array and the police 
alone cannot eradicate the communal venom. It has to 
admitted that the situation would not have gone from 
bad to worse had leaders at different levels tried to 
check the trouble makers. It was the duty of the 
Congress-I, BJP and other political parties to fight 
the communal forces the moment they raised their head. 
Police apathy and political parties inaction gave a 
field day for trouble makers and rumour - mongers, 
Wild rumours suggesting that a particular community 
celebrated Mrs. Gandhi's assassination obviously made 
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the public angry. In Delhi, people were woken up at 
the dead of night to be told on the phone that city's 
water-supply was piosoned. All this was delibrate mis-
chief to incite coiranunal passions. Our radio and TV 
were again found wanting when rumours spread, is it 
not possible for our government owned mass media to 
refute them promptly..Today, the Sikhs are their target. 
Tomorrow other communities may suffer at their hands. 
Ultimately, it is the nation which will come to grief, 
_, », -, -, -, -, -,-, COMPENSATIONS, CLAIMS. 
266. SPEEDY COMPENSATIONS, Please. Indian Express, 25, 355; 
1984, Nov, 6; 6a-b. 
Editorially asserts that since the law and order 
situation in most riot-torn cities is under control, 
the next step must be to organise conpensation to the 
victims as speedily and efficiently as possible. Imme-
diate relief in the form of food and shelter is being 
provided by a number of organisations. But just as 
ijnportant is the question of restoring the livelihood 
of those whose trucks, taxis, shops and other assets 
have been destroyed. It will be the- task of the govern-
ment to condensate those who have suffered, and substan-
tial funds roust immediately be placed at the disposal 
of Relief commissioners. Victims have lost much more 
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than just trucks and shops. Many have lost much more 
that they can live and work as equals in safety in any 
part of India, and speed.and generosity in condensat-
ion will help restore that confidence. The restoration 
of normalcy will have real meaning only when the live-
lihood of those affected is restored, 
_, _, -, -, _, «, _, -, -, INVOLVEMENT, CONGRESS (I) . 
267, POLITICIANS AND riots, Hindustan Times. 61, 308; 1984, 
Nov, 7; 9a-b, 
Editorially comments that sis the detailed accounts 
of three days of tinrelenting violence in capital become 
available, apart from police inaction and connivance, 
the role the local politicians played has also earned 
much criticism and indictment. No local leader had the 
courage or willingness to take any perceptible initia-
tive to defuse communal hatred or control mob violence. 
The politicians were engrossed in their petty politick-
ing while the city was burihg . Admittedly, neither 
BJP nor two Communist parties displayed any different 
or better awareness of their responsibility, but the 
lions' share of blame must be apportioned to the Cong-
ress (I) as the ruling party. The Delhi riots have be-
come a fit case for judicial inquiry. Today the entire 
world has witnessed the consequences of that kind of 
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politics. It must be earnestly hoped that Prime Mihis-
ter Rajiv Gandhi will have the imagination to disengage 
himself and his party from these political riff-raff. 
268. UNNIKRISHNAN (KP). Riots engineered by some Congress 
(I) leaders. Statesman. 125, 30lO; 1984, Nov, 11; 7a-b. 
Author accuses "Local Congress (i) Leaders" of 
conniving with anti-social elements to unleash widesp-
read violence in the wake of Mrs. Gandhi's assassinat-
ion and demands that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi, order a judicial inquiry into the recent events, 
iffliat had happened in the capital was not the result of 
any spontaneous anger nor was it a Hindu - Sikh conflict^ 
It was the result of "preplanned and permeditated plan 
of action unleased by some local Congress (I) leaders 
with the connivance of anti-social elements as the 
police administration was rendered in-effective. 
_, -, _, -, _, -, -, _, -, JUDICIAL ENQUIRY, DEMAND, 
AKALI DAL. 
269. HAZARIKA (Sanjoy). India agrees to inquiry on Sikh 
Deaths. New York Times.. 134, 46377; 1985, Apr, 42; 
A3d-f. 
Author points out the Indian government announced 
that it had agreed to three major demands from Sikh 
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opposition groi^ qps, including a judicial investigation 
of wide spread killing of hundreds of Sixhs in the after-
math of the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi. The announce-
ment was welcomed in the Punjab by the Government's 
Chief political opponent there, Longowal, who urged 
New Delhi to concede other SiJch demands and move towards 
a negotiated settlement of the Punjab situation. There 
are two seperate sets of Sikh demands, in one lot the 
Akali want seven points, including the three conceded 
today as conditions for talks. The others are the dis-
missal of courtmartial against Sikh Army deserters who 
rebelled last year after receiving news of the Temple 
raid, the abolition of special courts to try purported 
terrorists, the withdrawal of the army and paramilitary 
troops from the Punjab and the release of detainees held 
without being charged. There has been no official word 
on these points. Another set of Sikh demands relate to 
the calls for greater political autonomy and a series 
of economic concessions. 
"t -* -/ -/ -i -t ~t -» "» -# MISHRA COMMISSION. 
270. JAiTLY (Jaya). Living dead. Illustrated Weekly of India. 
107, 9; 1986, Mar, 2; 28-33. 
The author says that over the past eighteen months 
a series of articles has come out exposing the despondent 
future facing the survivors of the genocide in Nov. 1984. 
9 0 
Despite mouthing meaningless promises of relief and 
rehabilitation thousands of men, women and children 
are homeless and hungry wilting indefinitely for a 
better deal. As the Rangarath Mishra commission begins 
its enquiry into the riots, the author reports on the 
living dead, the victims of the worst communal conflag-
ration since partition. 
271. MALIK (Baljit). Cry for Justice, Illustrated Weekly 
of India. 106, 7; 1986, Feb, 16; 44-7. 
Author investigates the working of Ranganath 
Mishra commission, which was constituted to redress 
the grievances of Sikhs, and e;q>lains how it repeatedly 
came up against bureaucratic and procedural obstacles. 
Startling facts which reflects that a percieved concept 
of national interest is in danger of iitpeding the course 
of justice. Whatever course the Mishra inquiry takes, 
and whatever its verdict, it is clear that vengeance, 
revenge, intolerance and social and political bruta-
lity are very much a part of the prevalent social ten-
sions of our society. Even within the framework of 
constitational parliamentary democracy, it is possible 
to exercise or witht-hold the exercise of political 
power to serve ncirrow, selfish interests. 
O uO 
—, —, —t "I "t "I "/ *"* ~/ ~* REPORT. 
272. MISHRA COMMISSION : New Wounds for old. SlJch Review 
35, 401; 1987, M§y/ 54-5. 
Comments that the predictably a suramairy of Ranga-
nath Mishra commission's findings has been leaked to 
sections of the press a few weeks before the formal 
presentation of the report in Parliament. Apparently 
Justice Mishra has conccbuded that there was no predict-
able killing of Sikhs during the riots that broke out 
in Delhi and other parts of North India in the wake of 
Mrs, Gandhi's murder in 1984. He is further more, belie-
ved to have fully exonerated certain congress (i) leaders, 
including two member of union council of Ministers, who 
were widely suspected of having instigated the violence. 
If the Mishra Commission's findings are true, they are 
even more embarrassing that had been feared. The Delhi 
police has apparently come in for harsh criticism in 
the Mishra report but that is neither here nor there. 
Victims of communal violence have always complained 
with some justification about the police's indifference 
on such accassion and the observation is not confined 
to Delhi. The failure to curb the violence - even if 
it erupted spontaneously - was political. It also seems 
that it might have been better not to publish the report^ 
for many Sikhs will find it incredible while the extre-
mists may use it further evidence of New Delhi's malafide 
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intentions towards coinraunity. In retrospect, tfa seems 
astonishing that Mr. Gandhi once tried to avoid holding 
an inquiry into the Delhi violence on the suspecious 
plea that it might reopen old wounds, 
_, -, -, _, _, -, _,-, ^, -, ORDINANCE AGAINST PUBLICA-
TION. 
273, HIDING FACT ? Frontier. 19, 32; 1987, Mar, 28; 15. 
Examines that the Ranganath Mishra commission's 
report on Delhi riots of Nov, 1984 is nothing but a 
travesty of justice and is an attempt to hide the facts. 
This is considered opinion of Association for Democratic 
Rights Punjab, The commission refused to consider the 
three reports brought out by independent people consi-
dered fairly objective.Only the Citizens Justice Com-
mittee and DGMC were to represent the riot victims. 
Seeing the partisan attitude of commission towards 
those who were accused/ CJC also withdrew- from the 
proceedings of the commission. PGMC continued to cooperate 
with it yet the commission made a mockery of DGMC when it 
accepted 13 minion Congress (i; workers as rioters, but 
rejected the list of 65 major functionaries, which inclu-
ded H.K.L. Bhagat and Co. which were named in DGMC meroo-
randam to the commission. The commission made a further 
mockery of justice when it accepted about 3000 represen-
tations against the riot victims. All the representations 
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were in the same text and signed by the same authority 
The commission relied less on representations filed by 
riot rictims and more on those which were filed against 
victims. Who are guilty? APDR demands that the Pnjab 
government also reject the report, as done by almost 
all the major opposition parties in the country. 
_, _, -, _, -, THAKKAR COMMISSION, REPORT, ORDINANCE 
AGATiMbT PUBLICATION. 
274. BHATTACHARYA (Shubhabrata). Cross-current. Sunday. 13, 
28; 1986, May, 25; 5. 
Author comments that the government has enpowered 
itself with an ordinance which enables it to hide from 
Parliament and legislatures the findings of commissions 
of enquiry. The ordinance was promulgated with a view 
of safeguarding the country's "security and integrity" 
Are commissions of inquiry set up to hide the truth ? 
Or, are they set up to uncover facts ? The nation has 
been patiently waiting to know about the findings of 
Thakkar commission, which is inquiring into the assas-
sination of Indira Gandhi. The Thakkar correnission is 
klso enquiring into the security lapses which led to 
Mrs. Gnahdi's murder. It is the national interest that 
the facts be known and the guilty punished. 
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-, -, -., -, -, _, -, -, -, POLICE IHACTION. 
275. POLICE CULPABILITY. Hindustan Times. 61, 306; 1984, 
Nov, 5; 9a-b. 
Editorially comments that the shame of Trllokpurl 
will blot the name of Delhi for ever. The sheer savagery 
is benumbing. How a supposedly peaceful Hindu Society 
could stage such a heinous carnival ef death is for 
sociologists to determine. For the time being there 
seems little to do except to pray for peace and to put 
faith in the Army. But onee Delhi returns to its senses 
and sanity, there will be no alternative to ordering a 
high-level probe into the worse-than-miserable perfor-
mance of Delhi police. The arrest of the station House 
Officer of Trilokpuri police station is only the first 
coiafession of police culpability. Admittedly the police 
force in the capital was under severe strain and many 
constaints. That Mrs, Gandhi's assassins were members 
of armed police instantly lowared the awe and respect 
people have for uniformed guardians of law and order. 
What is worse, a perception that police protection 
would not be available to them created in the besieged 
minority a feeling of do or die-* Attenpt by frightened 
and pancikly Sikhs to defend themselves in the face of 
uncontrollable mobs provided just the justification 
that the rioters were looking foi^ i. The failure of the 
Delhi police is totally inexcusable. 
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-, "t -, GANDHI (Rajiv), Cooperation with OPPOSITION 
276, REDDY (GK) Prime Minister for closer cooperation with 
opposition: Solutions to national problems. Hindu. 109, 
309; 1986, Dep, H , 8a-b, 
The author points out that the Prime Minister Mr. 
Gandhi has established a good personal relationship with 
the more iirportant opposition leaders despite his strong 
differences with them over many controversial issues, 
is credited with the view that it is both possible and 
desirable to develop the right conventions for avoiding 
adversary roles over issues affecting the country's 
larger interests. He is not thinking of |>ipartisn 
approach only to foreign policy problems or matters 
relating to national security, but also important do-
mestic issues like communalism, Harijan welfare^ family 
planning, reservations, land reforms, employment oppor-
tunities, medical care and rural developments. The rul 
ing party and the opposition could evolve mutually agree-
able procedures for consultation on issues, so that they 
could coperate closely in enacting and inplementing 
legislation on them, without prejudice to their politi-
cal and socio-edonosoic commitnients. 
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-, -, -, -, DESTABILISATION THRORY. 
277. NOT m fault. Economist. 303, 7499; 1987, May, 23; 27. 
The article highlights that Mj. Rajiv Gandhi spies 
foreign plots behind his domestic troubles, Indian Prime 
minister told 300,000 people at the rally of his Congress 
party on the Miay 16th, 1987 that foreign powers would 
like to destablise India and sabotage its democracy. 
Destabilisation is a code word as both Mr. Gandhi and 
his party have suffered all spring because of allegat-
ions of high level corruption in government and among 
the big business supporters. Q^ngress party officials 
alleged to have received large cash handouts for secur-
ring defence contracts in submarine deal with west Ger-
many and arms deal with Bofors's, a Swedish cort5)any, 
Mr. V.P. Singh the former finance minister and now 
sacked defence minister had ordered investigations 
into big business corruption. Mr. Gandhi visited the 
US and inpressed the Re!|gan administration with his en-
thusiam for economic liberalisation, high technology 
and cutting back India's enormous and inefficient pub-
lic sector. Anti-Americans are more worried that Mr. 
Gandhi may not be able to get his way against the 
party's big anti-change faction, which won a victory 
when he stopped backing Mr. V.P. Singh's investigat-
ions of business corruption. 
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-/ -» -0 -# ELECTION , 1984. 
278. HAZARIKA XSanjoy). Rajiv Gandhi's post secure for now. 
, New York Times. 134, 46219; 1984, Nov, 5; lOa-c. 
Author says that although Rajiv Gandhi occupies 
the centre stage of Indian politics today, waiting in 
the wings are influential politicians some of whom 
have made no secret that they covet his position. Rajiv 
Gandhi seems facing little iiwnediate challenge to his 
new position as Prime Minister until next general elec-
tions, probably in Jan. 85, before the five year term 
of parliament ends. Mr. Gandhi has not indicated whe-
ther he has made a decision on the election issue, but 
many commentators believe that his stock and that of 
his party, is at a peak because of public synpathy 
after MrS. Gandhi assassination on 31 Oct, 84. If he 
presses ahead with the election on time, his party 
believes he is likly to place his position in the 
and 
party/the country beyond challenge. 
-* '» "* -# FOREIGN POLICY, PRaspECTS. 
and foreign 
279. SETH (SP), India's despair and hope; domestic/issues. 
Asia pacific community, 28; 1985, Spring, 15-32. 
The author states that India's political baro-
meter fluctuated rapidly in 1984 between the despair 
and hope. The despair resulted from the assassination 
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of Mrs, Gandhi and hope steins from the smooth transi-
tion of political power to her son, which Rajiv Gandhi 
has now ligitimized by a resounding election victory. 
Rajiv Gandhi does inspire hope on account of his youth. 
He may not have the idealism of his grandfather or the 
manipulative skills of his mother, but he certainly 
gives the inpression of being a no nonsense kind of 
teohocrat who raigiit impart a sense of urgency in a 
country where it is too rare. While domestic problems 
will engage most of his attention. Prime Minister 
Gandhi cannot afford to ignore the country's foreign 
relations, it would appear that like his mother and 
grandfathers his predecessors as India's prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi will take an active interest in India's 
foreign policy, 
-/ -# -/ -/ PERFORMANCE. 
280. INDIA fiPTER Indira Gandhi. Monthly commentary on Indian 
Economic Conditions. 26, 5; 1984, Dec; 11. 
The article states that the assassination of Indira 
Gandhi, on October 31, l98i, is now seen as a great divide 
between a disturbed and somewhat controversial period of 
governance dominated by a personal concentration of power 
and, now a more open society in which a political consen-
sus is forming a;:ound the unique mandate given by the 
331 
Indian people to Rajiv Gandhi. Indian political and 
economic seene has been totally transformed, it is true 
that Rajiv Gandhi has filled this huge vaccum by the 
dignified manner of his bearing, and his wisdom in the 
choice of issues and words, and bis summary treatment 
of rebels in the Congress party. There is hardly a 
single area where the action of Government can be faul-
ted. This was also true of the most successfully mana-
ged eongress election canpaign. The prime Minister has 
also been full of confidencej, making change in his 
cabinet and his personal administration, showing that 
he has the will to make things look different. Now on 
this Republic day of 1985 the politic seems one, secure 
and united, whole in mind the part that was sick has 
been restored to health and vigour. 
281. KREISBERG (Paul H). India after Indira. Foreign Affairs 
63, 4; 85 spring; 873-891. 
The article statoBS that since the assassination 
of Mrs, Gandhi, India has passed into the hands of the 
post-independence generation. The change comes at a time 
when India faces numerous problems: Instability in Pun-
jab, civil conflict in neighbouring Sri Lanka, migration 
difficulties with Bangladesh, balanceing foreign policy 
towards the super powers, as well as internal political 
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corruption and tue coiqplexity of economic development. 
These challenges are not new to India, nor are many of 
Rajiv Gandhi's policies ostentatiously different from 
those of his mother. What is new is Rajiv's youthful, 
vig orous sytle, including his enthusiasm for modernisa-
tion, his commitment to economic growth, and an apparent 
willingness to broaden bilateral ties with the US, 
particularly in the areas of science, technology and 
trade. Despite a long list of challenges, India has pro-
ven itself remarkably stable as a country with a strong 
sense of national pride, a well established resistance 
to transient threats, and a commitment to the democratic 
institutions which have evolved over the last four 
decades. 
282. Mr. CSANDHI's almost bright start. New York Times. 134; 
46356; 1985, Mar, 22; A30a-b. 
Editorially says that the Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi has made inpressive start in first five months 
in office, and has real chance to inprove conditions 
in his country with one exception his refusal to deal 
with Sikh rebellion in Punjab, says his refusal to 
risk his popularity with Hindu majority by reaching 
out to Sikh moderates perpetuates unseccessful approach 
used by his mother. The Prime Minister contends an in-
quiry would "raise issues which are really dead." 
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But they were hardly dead to India's 14 million Sikhs, 
who charge that the police and array stood by as ethnic 
vendettas were settled. 
283. MOHAMMAD VAZEERUDDIN. Year of reconciliation. Tribune. 
1985, Dec, 29. 
Author states that on January 5, 1985 Prime Minis-
ter assured Sikhs their "Lives and property will be pro-
tected in every part in the country". All these sweet 
sounding words might well have been ignored by the 
people of the state if in the second half of the March 
Longowal had not been freed. At the same time Mr. Arjun 
Singh was appeinted Governor of Punjab. He held secret 
parly with the Akali Dal leaders who were released one 
after the an-other. In April an enquiry was ordered 
into anti-Sikh riots in Delhi in the wake of Mrs. Gandhi's 
assassination. Many Sikh youth were released and the ban 
on the All India Sikh Student Federation was lifted. By 
the end of May,Mr, Arjun Singh got the Akali leaders feo 
agree to package deal on July 17, 1985. Prime Minister 
invited the Akali Dal leader, Longowal and his aides to 
Delhi for talks, and on July 24th the histeric Punjab 
accord was signed. The Sant became a martyr to the 
cause of peace in the State but the holding of election 
and the formation of Government by Akalis show that the 
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martyrdom was not in vain. Another step towards national 
reconciliation was taken in the night of August 15 when 
the Assam accord was signed by the Centre with the Assa-
mese who had been agitating against 'foreign nationals' • 
A wound that had fastered for six years took less than 
12 hours to heal. While there can be two opinions about 
where accord left the minorities, the elctions held in 
the state this month would not have been possible with-
out it. 
., _, _, -, -, ASSESSMENT. 
284. IQBAL NARAIN, India in 1985: Triumph of democracy. 
Asian Survey. 26; 1986, Feb; 253-69. 
An evaluation of the first year of Prime Minister-
ship of Rajiv Gandhi who took over the reins of govern-
ment on 31 oct, 1984 after the tragic assassination of 
his mother. Despite the generational change that Rajiv 
symbolises in India's democratic politics, the vision 
that he cherishes ia a case of change in continuity. By 
way of illustration, the paper refers to elections to 
legislative assemblies in 11 states and one union Terri-
tory in March, 1985, and to the Punjab and Assam accords. 
Where Rajiv Seexas to swear by development with democracy 
a vision which he inherited from Nehru. He prefers 
nation over party - a new ethics that appears to be 
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entering democratic politics in India. There is also 
references to some indicators of the emergence of new 
policy in the realm of economy, science and technology, 
education and administration as well as foreign policy. 
285. RAM (M). Honeymoon is over. Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 131, 1; 1986, Mar, 13; 38-9. 
Author comments that the Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi's domestic triur^hs of the past year have turned 
into difficult problems. Widespread urban agitation 
against the Government pricing policies and the upsurge 
of communal violence have spawned disenchantment with 
his leadership, Gandhi himself acknowledged that the 
period of his political honeymoon is over. The spate 
of recent communal violence between Hindu and Muslims, 
thought not directly related to official policies, has 
come in handy for the opposition and put the govern-
ment on the defensive. Gandhi rode a wave of synpathy 
and then won the biggest victory in Dec. 84, general 
election the future of parliamentary democracy and 
the primacy of Congress party seemed to have been 
secured. He was hailed as man of reconcilation, deter-
mined to solve the problem left over by his mother, as 
he arrived at the settlement of Punjab in July 85 is 
new rated as his fcjiggest set back, Assam agreement is 
also proving difficult to implement. 
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-, -, _, _, -, -, MID-TERM. 
286. ABRAHAM (AS). Prime Minister at the half-way mark: 
Foreign and domestic perspectives. Times of India. 
150, 191; 1987, Jul, 11; 6c-e. 
Author states that as the Mr. Rajiv Gandhi begins 
the second half of his five year term, he is the inevit-
able subject of mid-term appraisals. Since he has been 
at the helm for the last two-and-a-half years, every-
thing that appears to be going wrong is attributed to 
him though he can hardly be accused of having caused 
it. Punjab, Assam, regional, communal and other centri-
fugalist pressures, not to mention foreign policy. True, 
Rajiv Gandhi can be said to have aggragated some of these 
problems. On Gorkhaland, he can even be said to have 
contributed to the causes of the agitation. He has tried 
especially to apply the balm of accommodation and to 
avoid confrontation. Assessments of him at the halfway 
mark are being made abroad as much as at home. His 
recent brief visit to Soviet Union to inaugurate the 
year long Indian utsav there has beeh interpreted in 
the West as an attenpt to divert attention from his 
difficulties at home. Even before circvimstances forced 
him to take up the premiership after his mother's assas-
sination, Mr, Rajiv Gandhi had been clearly aware of the 
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urgent necessity of revitalising the Congress party 
machine. When Mr, Gandhi addressed the party in Bombay 
during the centenary celebrations in December 1985, his 
fulminations against the "power-brokers" stung many 
Congress ears and struck fear in many Congress hearts. 
But by the middle of 1986, Mr, Rajiv Gandhi had all but 
given up his ambitions of making the Congress party in-
ternally democratic,wehther Mr. Gandhi will be able to 
rejuvenate the Congress will depend on, firstly his 
success in overcoming the present difficulties that 
beset him and secondly, he will have to change his 
style of functioning. On his success depends the fate 
of the nation at its most climatic moment since Inde-
pendence , 
_, -, -, -^  _, PROBLEMS, SOVIET HELP. 
287. JAIN (Girilal). Soviet Bogey: Helfpul to Rajiv Gandhi. 
Times of India. 150, 188; 1987, Jul, 8; 6c-e. 
Author states that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's brief visit 
to Moscow will have paid him unexpectedly rich dividend 
if some of his opponents managed to revive the Soviet 
bogey. Since April 1987 when the Congress Working 
Committee adopted the destablisation resolutioa 
Mr. Gandhi's strategy has been to revive the old left-
right controversy so that the issue of corruption at 
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high places does not continue to command all the lime-
light. Mrs. Gandhi in similar situation would have done 
the same. It is impossible to say whether President 
zail Singh would have contested the presidential elec-
tion if the two communist parties had supported him or 
he would have dismissed the Prime Minister if the two 
communist parties had not questioned his right to do 
so under the constitution. But there can be no question 
that the two moves by the CPs did ease the situation 
on 
for Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, whether the CPs acted^their own 
or were prodded by the Soviets, although the latter is 
doubtful because the relatioriP between Moscow and the 
two CPs are not those between a master and servant. 
Whether as a result of careful delebration or other-
wise in his first two years in office, Mr. Gandhi has 
behaved as if politics had got frozen in the country 
and has tried to reverse the economic and foreign poli-
cies of Mr. Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi. Mr. Gandhi is neither 
a leftsit nor is he pro-Soviet by conviction but had to 
become one because of convulsions. His destabilisation 
theory which has been attacked by all opposition parties, 
including the two CPs, has not had many buyers in the 
country, although the Soviet leadership has supported 
it. The fall of Mr. Gandhi and the collapse of Congress 
cannot benefit either the Soviet or the two CPs. 
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288. PADGAONKAR (Dileep). Soviet backing for Rajiv: Signi-
ficance of visit to Moscow. Time of India. 150/ 187; 
1987, Jul, 7; 6a-b. 
Author says that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was eager to 
pre-eirpt criticism that he had sought Soviet interven-
tion to help him tide over his domestic difficulties. 
If Mr. Gandhi sounded less than persausive in his end-
eavour the reasons were that the public opinion at 
home and abroad has not forgotten the support exten-
ded by Moscow to his mother in 1975. Given the high 
stakes the Soviet Union place on the internal stabi-
lity of India and its external security, it will take 
such action as is necessary to serve its interest. An 
exchange of views on domestic and foreign affairs bet-
ween the leaders of two friendly countries does not 
call for any kind of apologitic explanation. The situa-
tion within the country and in its neighbourhood has 
undergone a sea-change eversince Mr, Gorbachov visited 
Delhi last November. One of the main purposes of Mr. 
Dobrynin's visit to India in May 1987 was to assess 
these changes. Mr. Gandhi had six hours of face-to-
face talks with Mr. Gorbachov and Moscow extended excep-
tional courtsies to him. The Russians may not have 
reached the firm concluelion that the Prime Minister 
and his ruling party are in a position to meet the 
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crisis facing them but they realise that a collapse 
of central authority in Delhi would seriously under-
mine, the indo-Svoiet friendship. The single most 
significant achievement of Mr. Gandhi's visit has been 
that Moscow appears to share New Delhi's perceptions 
on its relations with its neighbours, 
_, _, _, _, STYLE OT? FUNCTIONING. 
289. CHAKRAVARTY (PR). Clean politics. Nagpur Times - 1985, 
Mar, 72. 
The author highlighting that the Prime Mihister 
Mr. Gandhi has statted assuring the people at large of 
his feverent will to work for celan politics in India, 
is caught up in intriguing and squeamish tirades of 
political rhetorics lacking in prudence and propriety. 
Today, our enemy is not outside us but within us. Hunger, 
poverty and disease, our ignorance, prejudice and folly, 
and above all the spirit of violence and disorder let 
loose by corwnunal passions, are the real enemies. Against 
these enemies, we have to marshall all our forces. The 
new struggle will need even a greater spirit of sacri-
fice and self discipline than we showed in our struggle 
for freedom. 
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290. HAMLYN (Michael). Rajiv Gandhi accused to trying to 
create one party rule in India. Times. 62076; 1985, 
Feb, 5; 5a-b. 
Author highlights that Mr. Bajiv Gandhi, the Prime 
Minister of India, is accused of trying to create one-
party rule in the largest democracy in the World. After 
his victory in the Dec. 1984 general election, which 
give his party more than 400 seats in 542 seats in par-
liament/ Mr. Gandhi is aiming to repeat the magic by 
having Congress Ministeries returned in 12 local assem-
blies. Almost three-quarters of the country's electorate 
are entitled to vote in the polls which take place today 
and Tuesday. Mr. Gandhi was enphasizing the benefits 
that accrue to the people if they have the same party 
in power at the centre and in the state. But the opposi-
tion has been saying that the concept of the same party 
ruling at the centre and in the states will lead to 
authoritarian government. Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, 
the president of BJP, declared in Jaipur this week 
that the weakening of the opposition was "dangerous to 
the survival of democracy in the country". In Andhra 
Congress was put out by the meteoric rise of N.T. Rama 
Rao, whose Telgu Desam Government topped last year in 
general election and now forms the largest opposition 
party in Lok Sabha in Delhi. In Karnataka, Congress 
was replaced by a shaky coalition of opposition parties 
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led by the Janata party. Voting takes place today in 
all 320 assembly districts of the biggest state in the 
country, Madhya Pradesh, Voting also takes place in 
three most populaous states, UP,, Bihar and Maharash-
tra. 
291. JAIN (Girilal). Political upheaval in India ; Rajiv's 
blunder after blunder. Times of India. 150, 83; 1987, 
Mar, 25; 6c-e. 
Author comments on the style of leadership of 
Ra$±v Gandhi and analyses that the current controver-
sies will affect adversely the legitimacy of Rajiv 
Gandhi's rule. Mr, Rajiv Gandhi cannot possible emerge 
unscathed out of the storm that is raging around him. 
One general proposition may be made at this very stage 
Indians make two apparently contradttory demands on 
their ruler, prime Minister was not showing the respect 
due to the office of President by virtue of constitut-
ional provisions conventions, the situation was ripe for 
an explosion of popular sympathy and support for the 
Giani. All the talk of Mr. Gandhi wanting and trying 
to distance himself from his mother's style of function-
ing not with-standing, he was equally determined not to 
share leadership with his colleagues. This required that 
he must treat his ministers and senior partyraen as his 
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minions and they mist accept that treatment,Mr. V.P. 
Singh did not fit into such a scheme. 
292. JAIN (Girilal) . Promise and fulfilment: problems Rajiv 
Gandhi may face. Times of India. 149, 37; 1986, Feb, 6; 
8c-e. 
The author says that the iitpression has spread 
that as Prime Minister is delibrately distancing him-
self from his mother's approach to the problems of the 
country's governance. This inpression is justified on 
a number of counts. His decision to drop Mr. pranab 
Mukherjee, without dotibt the minister closest to Mrs. 
Gandhi from the cabinet, to remove the former Prime 
Minister Mrs. GandhiSpersonal staff and his emphasis 
on clean government. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is much better 
placed to function the way he wants to and to fulfil 
this promises* than his mother ever was. 
293. NAYAR (Kuldip), Limitations of Rajiv Gandhi, tribune. 
107, 83; 1987, Mar, 26; 4c-f. 
Author points out that what is becoming increasing-
ly apparent in Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's functioning 
is the absence of political input. His lack of experi-
ence is understandable because he has been pushed into 
the maelstorm of state affairs after the assassination 
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of Mrs. Gandhi. But advice on political matter is not 
difficult to get. Among the people surrounding Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi, however there is nobody who has even a semblance 
of political maturity. A few months ago Mr. R. Ventaka-
raman,the Vice-President, was among Mr. Gandhi's advisers. 
He was probably being favoured to humiliate the presi-
dent; but he is no longer in picture. Mr, K.C Pant was 
selected to find out the solution to the Punjab problem, 
but was dropped suddenly. Similarly Mr, Natwar Singh 
and Mr, P, Chidambaram, both minister of States shutt-
led between Delhi and Colombo to negotiate with the Sri 
Lankan authorities on the Tamil problem.Among the non-
official advisers, the two jEormost are Mr. Satish Sharma 
and Mr. Rajish Pilot, both from the flying days of Mr, 
Rajiv Gandhi, most of the seniour colleagues and Congress 
(I) MPS and public men conplain that it is difficult to 
meet the Prime Minister, because "he is surrounded by 
only two or three persons all the time". What is still 
worse that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi developed a feeling that he 
has the answers to all the problems. He had even shed 
the air of hximility which he once had and which made 
the people overlook his limitations. 
part four 
indexes 
AUTHOR INDEX 
345 
ABDI (S N M) -
ABRAHAM (AS) -
AjAY (Kumar) -
ALI (S) and RAB (s) 
190, 238 
169, 200, 286 
225 
182 
'B' 
BAKHSHI (Rajni) 
BARUAH (Sanjib) 
BEHL (Vinod) and Ol^ JKAR SINGH 
BHATal^GAR (Ashwini) 
BHATTi^CiirtRYA ( S h u b h a b r a t a ) -
BIRD ( D a v i d ) 
BOt-lBWALL (KR) 
BUCK (MW) 
BUTLER ( D a v i d ) 
29 
22 
2 0 5 
63 
2 7 4 
40 
2 1 9 
26 
134 
CHAKARABORTY (Su:^i t ) 
CHAKRAVARTHY ( N i k h i l ) 
CH/VKRAVARTI (PR) 
CHAWLA (Probhu) 
CHOPRA (VD) 
27 
7 6 , 2 3 1 
2 8 9 
235 
86 
DANG ( S a t y a p a l ) 
DEWAN BERINDRA NATH 
DIET-RICH ( A n g e l a ) 
1 3 7 , 221 
1 2 7 
2 1 5 
346 
DUA (HK) - 239 
DWIVEDY (Surendranath) - 260 
ip I 
PERA (Ivan) - 43, 59 
FORD (Richard) - 69, 138 
'G' 
GANGULI ( T a r u n I - 175 
GUJRAL (IK) - 227 , 249 
GUPTA ( s h e k h a r ) - 38 
<3.UPTE ( P r a n a y ) - 50 
HAMLYN ( M i c h a e l ) - 1 1 / 4 8 , 105 , 128 , 
132 , 144 , 147 , 1 6 3 , 
1 6 8 , 2 3 2 , 2 3 3 , 
2 9 0 . 
186 
46 
269 , 2 7 8 . 
234, 
PiARDGRAVE ( R o b e r t L) 
HARMINDER KAUR 
HAZARIKA ( S a n j o y ) . 
•I' 
IKDERJIT - 241 
lUiSAF ( ) Psued - 143 
IQBAL NARAIN - 284 
IRODOV (S) ^ 31 
•J' 
JAIN (Girilal) - 6, 92, 94, 106 
114, 287, 291, 292 
JAIN (Meenakshi) - 248 
JAISINGH (H) « 60 
JAITLY i J a y a ) - 270 
347 
•K' 
KARLEKAR (Hiranmay) 
KHANNA (KC) 
KOTHARI (Rajni) 
KOTTARY (Sailesh) . 
KREISBERG (Paul H) . 
174 
187 
71, 228 
99 
281 
»T.» 
LAKSHMAN (Nikhil) 81, 253, 226. 
(M' 
MALHOTRA (inder) 
MALIK (Baljit) 
MALIK (Yogendra) 
MANOR (JOMES) 
MENDELSOHN (Oliver) 
MENON (Amarnath)and NINAN (TN) 
MENON (Venu) 
MISHRA (RK) 
MITRA (Nirmal) 
MOHAMHAD VAZEERUDDIN 
95, loo. 111 
271 
223 
229 
218 
7 
13, 15, 162, 237. 
261, 262 
158 
283 
'N' 
NABOODI RIPAD (EMS) 
NAGI (Saroj) 
NANDI (pritish) 
NATIONS (Richard) 
NAYAR (Kuldip) 
NINAN (TN) and MENON (Amarnath) 
NOQRANI (AG) , 
129 
33, 51 
93, 250, 259 
263 
109, 135, 208, 211, 
217, 264, 293, 19 
7 
34, 42, 89. 
ONKAR SINGH HND BEHL (VitlOd) 205 
348 
.p. 
PADGAONKAR (Dileep) - 288 
PANDIT (CS) - 122 
PATIL (RLM) - 203 
PARDESI (Ghanshyam) - 23 
PRABHAKARA (G) - 16 
PRABHAKARA (MS) •» 28, 124. 
•R' 
RAJAPPA (S) •«• 116 
RAJGHATTA (Chidanand) - 204 
RAW (M) - 123, 285 
RAM (Mohan) - l8l 
BAM (S) and ALI (S) - 182 
REDDY (GK) . 276 
RUSTAMaJI (KF) . 61 
•S' 
aADHU (Arun) 
SAEED (Emeria) - 177 
SAHAY (Anibikanartd) * 67 
SALAMAT ALI - 44, 91, l83, 
189, 222. 
SANGHVI (Vir) - 180 
SAREEN (Ra^endra) - 244 
SATHYMURTI (TV) - 35^ 49 
SEl^ (Mohit) - 39 
SETHI (Lalit) - 230 
SETHI (P) 
SETHI (SP) - 2 70 
SINHA (SK) - 20 
SRI RrtMAN (J) - 24 
SUROOR (HASAN) t, 184. 
irp I 
349 
TAPAS (Mukherjee) 
THApAR (Romesh) 
TARAMUNGALAM (Joseph) 
TARYAN (P) 4 
4 
185 
3 
242 
•U' 
UNIKRISHNAN (KP) 268 
•V 
VISWAM (S) 150 
WALLACE (Paul) 220 
350 
TITLE INDEX 
Accent on Welfare 118 
Accord and after 224 
Accord and disquiet 37 
After the euphoria 20 
After the March mini election 167 
Agitation to power 119 
Agony of Ahmedabad 72 
Akali party and Sikh militancy move for greater 
autonomy or seecessionism in Punjab 223 
Andhra Pradesh 7 
Another 'Khalistan*. 4 
Apprearances are important 173 
Assam 124 
Assam accord 21 
Assam after Punjab 145 
Assembly polls 127 
Assembly poll outcomes 169 
Auction politics 8 
B 
Back from the cold 238 
Banging the table 52 
Battle for Belgaum 204 
Battle for Haryana 158 
Battle of Lais 156 
Battle of the giants 184 
Behind tensions in Kerala Coalition Ministry 16 
Beyond fire fighting 73 
Blitzkrieg 43 
Bofor 102 
Bofor deal 99 
By-election of April 1985 126 
By-election trends 146 
351 
Capital gains 206 
Can tactics raaXe perfect ? 157 
Centre - State relations 18 
Centre and the challenge 228 
Change in Congress (I) 251 
Choice for Bengal 252 
Choice wise and proper 195 
City under siege 77 
Clash of heads 91 
Clean politics 289 
Collision course 89 
Conimunalism in U.P: 67, 78 
Coninunal violence 68 
Coirplaint of rigging 151 
Conflicting claims 209 
Congress (l) 235 
Congress (i) after Haryana 239 
Congress (i) and Punjab 45 
Congress (I) code 247 
Congress (i) fields new face for Churu seat 192 
Congress (i) revolt nipped 244 
Conspiracy issue l8l 
Controversy at its peak 87 
352 
Cracking up 253 
Crisis in Gujrat 9 
Cross-Currents 274 
Cry for Justice 271 
Cul-De-Sac 50 
Curfew widended in Gujrat to halt acid bomb 
riots 69 
Curious reshuffle 83 
Dangerous plea to president 94 
Dangerous portents 74 
Days of national parties over 122 
Dealing with dissent 236 
Defence minister resigns in Delhi political 
storm 105 
Delicate balance 162 
De politicisation of India 174 
Dharm Yudh 215 
Direct Congress - Akali fight for most seats 140 
Down South 132 
Dynasty or division 263 
Election under the gun 136 
Emerging in India 30 
Ending the dead lock over the Chandigarh 210 
End of nightmare 23 
End this Controversy 103 
Eradi discovery 212 
Eradi Tribunal 213 
Excellent choice 196 
353 
Fairfax Affair 
Fairfax and submarine deal 
Familiar twaddle 
Farmer's stir 
Farooq's new team 
Fear is the key 
Follov/ i t through 
For whom the bell tolls 
Fragile consensus 
Free man at last 
Fresh violence in Janunu 
Pron platform to party 
113,114 
106 
88 
1 
160 
51 
202 
13 
194 
46 
75 
231 
Game plan 81 
Gandhi faces another electoral test 133 
Gandhi leads to Candle light tribute 233 
Gandhi pleged new developments to woo Punjab 
voters 138 
Gandhi's Gujrat 71 
Gandhi's poll defeat in Mizorara is victory 
for his peace policies 147 
Gandhi refutes charges of bribery in Swedish 
arras deal. 104 
Gandhi rocks his party hierarchy with strong 
attack oncorrupt ways 232 
Gandhi sees poll support fizzle out 163 
Ghastly outrage 56 
Ghising Hafiil't changed. 6 
Gianiji's decision 193 
Going seperate ways 222 
Growing Chasm 237 
Guj rat 70 
354 
H 
Hard option 
'Harijan elite'V 
Haryana's stand 
Haryana Verdict 
Helpless Election Coiranission 
Hiding fact ? 
Hitlerite barbarites in Meerut 
Hone/moon is over 
53 
218 
36 
240 
153 
273 
76 
285 
Iramigration ethinic conflict and political 
turmoil in Assam 
Inpeccable move 
In Cold blood 
India after Indira Gandhi 
India agrees to inquiry on Sikh deaths 
India in 1985 
Indian nationalism and national question 
India state elections will measure decline 
in Gandhi's popularity. 
India on the eve of elections 
India revives attempt to mollify sikhs 
India's despair and hope 
India's peasant uprisings 
India's Punjab problem 
India's regional role 
India's upper castes rebel over special 
favours granted untouchables 
Is Insurgency the only way ? 
It may have worked 
22 
110 
59 
280/281 
269 
284 
49 
168 
186 
211 
279 
3 
35 
200 
11 
26 
32 
355 
Janata dilemma 255 
K 
Karnataka 216 
Kerala 15 
Kerala and Bengal 172 
Kerala Congress and League seek time 14 
Kerala leans left again 164 
Language riots lead to curfew in Assam 217 
Left is always right 175 
Legacy of blood 61 
Limitations of Rajiv Gandhi 293 
Little Comfort for Gandhi 170 
Living dead 270 
M 
Maharashtra - Keraataka border row 203 
Mandate and after 188 
Man who knew too much 250 
Meaning of the verdict 242 
Militant backlash 44 
Mishra Coionission 2 72 
Mizo accord in sight 2 7 
Mizoram 28 
Moderate sikh in shadow of militants 40 
Mr, Gandhi fails the test 84 
Mr. Gandhi's almost bright start 282 
Mudding the waters 214 
Multi pronged strategy of destabilisation 39 
Muslims and Harijans 248 
356 
Murmuring in the heartlands 
My dear Rajiv 
227 
93 
N 
National alternative focus 
National perspective needed 
Need for cohesion in Congress (I) view of 
party election 
New pressures on the system 
New Team in Bengal 
Non-Congress Conclave 
Kot ray fault 
No workable alliance 
260 
60 
230 
86 
254 
256 
277 
257 
0 
Odd state out 
One rah for Rajiv 
One year after 
Opening the flood gates 
Our man in Virginia 
Overhauling the monolith 
154 
131 
42 
63 
112 
130 
Prime Minister at the half-way mark 
Prime Minister closer cooperation with 
opposition 
pace quickens 
party shake up 
People are angry 
Police culpability 
Political commentary 
286 
276 
151 
82 
152 
275 
100,111 
357 
p o l i t i c a l upheaval in Ind ia 291 
P o l i t i c i a n s and r i o t s 267 
Po l l in the Feb suggested 150 
Po l l i n th ree s t a t e s on March 23 149 
p r e s i d e n t - e l e c t 198 
P r e s i d e n t i a l r u l e i n Punjab 54 
P r e s i d e n t ' s ob l iga t ion 92 
Prime Minis tership may belong t o him but the 
nat ion belong t o a l l of us 97 
Promise and fulf i lment 292 
Provoking a r eac t ion 58 
Punjab 38,134,137 
Punjab accord 34 
Punjab c r i s i s 221 
Punjab e l e c t i o n and a f te r 139 
Punjab keenly awaits t r ans f e r of Chandigarh 207 
Punjab se t t l ement 31 
Punjab t o the p o l l s 141 
'R V 197 
Rajiv 171 
Rajiv accused to trying to create one party 
rule 290 
Rajiv, Haryana p o l l and new c r i s i s 241 
Rajiv Gandhi and p o s t - e l e c t i o n India 229 
Rajiv Gandhi pos t secure for now 278 
Rajiv pa r ty and the Hindus 185 
Ra j iv ' s f i r s t act t r iunph 189 
Ra j iv ' s swivel 85 
Raj iv-Zai l r i f t 90 
Relaels spurn offer t o j o i n ce lebra t ion 234 
358 
Reluctant challenger 246 
Renewed self confidence 166 
Respite in Gujrat 10 
Reviewing the Congress position 249 
Riding a syrrpathy wave 183 
Riots engineered by some Congress(I) leaders 268 
Rise of Shiv Sena 177 
Round the states 143 
Rumour mill 265 
Sack these traitors 261 
Scarred psyche 29 
Selling of Raroa Krishna Hegde 180 
Shadow boxing 96 
Shadow of seventies 95 
Shahabuddin syndrome 66 
Show of strength 65 
Sikh identity/ Akali Dal and federal policy 219 
Sikh pact leads to clashes in Delhi 48 
Sikhs agree to fight Punjab poll 135 
Sikhs as "minority in a Sikh majority 220 
state of India 
Sikh, set free denounces Gandhi 47 
Sikhs in travai^ l 264 
Sikhs reject Delhi land transfer plan and 
bring accord near to collapse 208 
Singh speaks out 107 
Siren song of lobbyists 125 
Small is better ^ 179 
Some question on Bahujan Samaj 225 
So much to do 191 
359 
Soviet backing for Rajiv 288 
Soviet bogey 287 
Speedy cornpensations please 266 
Sri Lanka 201 
Stakes in Haryana 159 
Still on the hook 17 
Student power 121 
Sudden impact 226 
Suicide fuels Gandhi attacks 109 
T 
Taking on the left Front 190 
Talks on Punjab 55 
Tamil Nadu line up 117 
Tamil Nadu on way to coalition raj 116 
Terrorists strike again 157 
"Thakkar" Commission probe 115 
Thirteen party forum 258 
This canker of communalism 62 
Tj^ reat from Communalism 64 
To save the accord 25 
To this might dawn 33 
Towards caste war 2 
Tremendous victory 176 
Trident and the wword 80 
U 
Unchanged loyalities 148 
Under stress 165 
Uneasy portent in Punjab 41 
United minorities pose a poll threat 144 
United democracy and secularism 129 
Upset in Assam 123 
360 
V«P Singh*8 eoq^uXsion 245 
V«nqalahing of V p Singh 108 
Violence in Oarjettling 5 
Violenctt in Oujrat ^2 
Voters deal blov to Oendhi 128 
Voting for peace 142. 
Waive of eyac>athy 182 
Halce up 79 
Warning for Congress 243 
Warning signals for AZADMK 198 
ifefve heard this before 98 
WelccNue, Mr. VenJcataraaan 199 
Welcone probe 101 
Where were the secular parties while Delhi 
burned ? 262 
fOiich accord has won in Assam 7 24 
Why the delay 7 155 
Winter of discontent 205 
With this new hope 120 
Working the two accords 19 
Year of reconciliation 283 
Yesterday, today, tomorrow 259 
Young man in hxirry 187. 
